¶ 7 California has enacted two statutory schemes for medical marijuana possession. See Browne v. County of Tehama , 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 62, 66–67 (2013). In 1996, California voters adopted the Compassionate Use Act.

Although Jon was not formally appointed cotrustee until November 2010, he does not challenge the trial court's finding that he owed duties directly to the Trust and Residual Trust, thereby forfeiting any such arguments. (See, e.g., Brownev. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 726, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 (Browne).) Such a challenge would likely not be successful in any case because Jon had broad powers of attorney for Nicola (who was a trustee) and the Trust paid him $5,000 a month in "co-trustee fees" from April 2010 to May 2011.

In the third and most recent cannabis case cited by Musgrove, Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704 (Browne), the Court of Appeal addressed essentially the same issues as did the court in County of Los Angeles. In Browne, a group of medical marijuana users challenged a county ordinance that "place[d] numerical limits on the amount of medical marijuana that a qualified patient may cultivate while the CUA does not" and imposed a "complete ban on cultivating marijuana if (1) the qualified patient ha[d] only an oral, not a written, recommendation or approval from a physician; (2) the parcel [was] within 1,000 feet of a school or certain other properties or is too small to accommodate the setback requirements; and (3) the qualified patient [was] not the landowner and ha[d] not or [could not] obtain a notarized consent from the owner of the property."

Court of Appeal decisions also recognized “the limited reach of the CUA and the MMP” and held these statutes did not preempt local land use regulations involving medical marijuana. (Inland Empire, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 749, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 300 P.3d 494; see Kruse, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 [upholding moratorium on medical marijuana dispensaries]; Hill, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 861, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 [upholding licensing and permitting for medical marijuana dispensaries].) Recently, in Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 (Browne ), we upheld an ordinance regulating the cultivation of medical marijuana. In doing so, we held that “[n]either the Compassionate Use Act nor the Medical Marijuana Program grants petitioners, or anyone for that matter, an unfettered right to cultivate marijuana for medical purposes.

’ ( Big Creek Lumber Co., supra, at pp. 1149–1150[45 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 136 P.3d 821].)." ( Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 718–719, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 ( Browne ).) In two cases decided the same day in 2002, our Supreme Court applied these principles to the state regulation of guns and their possession and usage versus similar regulation by counties.

(Kelly, supra, at pp. 1043–1049, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 222 P.3d 186.) In all other respects, however, section 11362.77 continued to “have legal significance” (Kelly, supra, at p. 1048, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 222 P.3d 186), such as a “safe harbor” against prosecution ( id. at p. 1015, fn. 5, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 222 P.3d 186; see also, Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 713, fn. 3, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 62). The principles applied in Kelly relating to impermissible amendments of initiative measures have no bearing on this case because no substantive provision of the CUA was amended or altered by the recent amendments to the MMPA clarifying the role of local governments.

Accordingly, we do not further address this text from the Anthem Pulse site. (See Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956; Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 725-726 (Browne) [holding that an appellant forfeited a contention by failing to "present[ it] in the argument section of either the opening or reply brief"].) For all these reasons, we conclude that the compliance certifications and corrective action forms did not incorporate by reference the arbitration policy found on Anthem Pulse.

We are not required to guess which complaints made in the factual background section of their opening brief are intended to support this claim of error. (See Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 725-726 (Browne) [holding that an appellant forfeited a contention by failing to "present [it] in the argument section of either the opening or reply brief"].) In sum, we conclude that the abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court's rejection of appellants' assertion that the election was conducted in an unfair and biased manner, and that appellants have failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting this challenge and denying their preelection request to void the forthcoming results of that new election.

In her reply brief, appellant appears to suggest that IPN did not authorize this action against her. She has forfeited any such claim, however, by failing to raise it in her opening brief (see Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 726 (Browne) [failure to raise argument in opening brief constitutes forfeiture]), and by failing to raise it below (see Dumas, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 356, fn. 5). Q. Admission of Hayat's Video Deposition

When an appellant fails to meet this burden, we may deem the point to be without merit. (See, e.g., Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 716 [unsupported claim of error deemed waived].) Given that the pleadings frame the issues for review of a motion for summary judgment (see Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1252), Keefer's causes of action for restitution, conversion and violation of the UCL cannot form the basis for a challenge to the trial court's order granting Bounce's motion for summary judgment.