Opinion
C. A. 1:23-369-JFA-SVH
07-17-2023
Scotty M. Brown, #257869, Petitioner, v. Charles Williams, Warden Perry Correctional Institution, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Scotty M. Brown (“Petitioner”) is an inmate at Perry Correctional Institution in South Carolina who filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's return and motion for summary judgment. [ECF Nos. 16, 17]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's motion. [ECF No. 18]. Petitioner filed a response on June 23, 2023. [ECF No. 20].
Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The Spartanburg County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner in May 2014 on two counts of distribution of heroin second offense (2014-GS-42-1804 and 2014-GS-42-1805) and in September 2014 for trafficking in heroin and possession of cocaine third offense (2014-GS-42-3942, 2014-GS-42-4458). [ECF No. 16-1 at 286-95]. Assistant Solicitor Matthew Kendall prosecuted the case, and attorneys John Strickland and Fletcher Smith (“plea counsel”) represented Petitioner. Id. at 1.
After negotiation, Petitioner pled guilty on April 1, 2015, to the two counts of heroin distribution second offense before the Honorable J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge. Id. at 1-24. Judge Cole sentenced Petitioner to ten years' imprisonment on each count to run concurrently, and Respondent represents that Petitioner did not appeal other than filing a motion to reconsider that was denied. [ECF No. 16-1 at 24, see also ECF No. 16 at 2].
The record, as submitted by Respondent, does not appear to contain Petitioner's motion for reconsideration as to his first guilty plea.
On August 25, 2015, Petitioner also pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of heroin distribution third offense, and Judge Cole sentenced him to seventeen years to run concurrent with the above sentences. [ECF No. 16-1 at 25-38]. During the plea hearing, the following exchange occurred:
The Court: All right. Now have you been promised anything that caused you to change your mind about having a trial and wanting to now enter a plea of guilty?
(Pause to confer with counsel.)
Mr. Smith: No, sir. He hasn't been promised anything. There's been a recommendation on the table of 17 years concurrent.
The Court: All right. Well, they promised to recommend a 17-year sentence?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. Do you understand that-is what the-is that the recommendation you're making, Solicitor?
Mr. Kendell: Yes, sir, yes, sir, Your Honor.
The Court: All right. So he's fulfilled his promise. He's recommending that I sentence you to 17 years in jail. Do you understand I don't have to go along with that recommendation?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: And if I don't go along with it I could sentence you up to 30 years. And of course they've sought a life sentence. But I could sentence you to 30 years if I accept your plea of guilty. Do you understand that?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Other than their agreement to make that recommendation have you been promised anything?
The Defendant: No, sir . . . .
The Court: Are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.Id. at 31-33.
Approximately two years later, as Petitioner continued to serve his sentence, the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) informed Petitioner that due to having pled guilty at the second plea hearing, he was required to serve 85% of his sentence without the possibility of parole under South Carolina statutory law. [See ECF No. 16-1 at 211 (“SCDC General Counsel's recent interpretation of S.C. Code § 44-53-0370 and § 44-53-375, in conjunction with Bolin v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, is that inmates convicted of 3rd offense drug offenses are to be treated as 85% offenders unless all of the offender's prior drug offense are for simple possession under the same subsection (either § 44-53-0370 and §44-53-375). If an offender has prior drug convictions for Manufacturing, Distribution, Possession with Intent to Distribute, or Conspiracy, he or she must be treated as an 85% offender on the 3rd or subsequent offense.”)].
Finally, Petitioner pled guilty to possession of cocaine third offense on November 16, 2015, before the Honorable Robert L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge, and Judge Couch sentenced Petitioner to ten years to also run concurrently to the above sentences. [ECF No. 16-1 at 40-60, see also Id. at 107, ECF No. 16 at 2].
Petitioner was also indicted in September 2014 for possession of a pistol with obliterated or removed serial numbers (2014-GS-42-3943). [ECF No. 16-1 at 194-95]. The record indicates Petitioner also pled guilty to this offense on November 16, 2015, and Judge Cole sentenced him to five years to run concurrently to all other sentences. [See ECF No. 16-1 at 216 n.1].
The transcript for Petitioner's third guilty plea, as submitted by Respondent, appears to be incomplete. [See ECF No. 16-1 at 40-60].
Petitioner filed an application for PCR relief on March 16, 2017, id. At 61-92, asserting the following claims and allegations of error:
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
a. “My defense attorneys did not advise me of all of my rights or take any actions that were necessary to protect or preserve them, knowing that I was illiterate of the law.”
b. “My defense attorneys never properly ascertained whether or not I actually understood or comprehended all of the issues that were involved in my case.”
c. “Trial Counsel's ineffective in failing to fully apprise Applicant of the sentencing consequences of his guilty plea.”
d. “Applicant would have insisted on going to trial, if it were not for counsel's acts and omissions.”
e. “Applicant was denied a fair proceeding when counsel failed to place the State's agreements on the record.”
f. “Counsel failed to object to allege lesser included offense.”
2. Involuntary Guilty Plea
a. “Applicant was induced to plead guilty on all charges by the advice of both attorneys.”
b. “My defense attorneys coerced me into making a plea bargain on my charges when they had not done the necessary legal research or investigations into the merits of my cases prior to inducing me.”
c. “Trial attorney's erroneous advice concerning parole eligibility rendered his guilty plea invalid.”
3. “After Discovered Evidence”
a. “Parole projection date was rescinded on 2-1-17.”
b. “Applicant specifically inquired about his parole eligibility.”
c. “Both attorneys advised Applicant to plead to all charges which would be back dated to indictment 2014101804-05 and remain parole eligible pursuant to an agreement.”
d. “If this case was not back dated and ran concurrent along with his parole eligibility, he would have insisted on going to trial.”
e. “Trial counsel stated to applicant that he will remain parole eligible despite his convictions being added on. No procedural changes will occur.”Id. at 61-92, see also Id. at 217-18.
The State filed a return denying the allegations, id. at 93-102, and an evidentiary hearing was held on June 22, 2018, before the Honorable Grace Gilchrist Knie, Circuit Court Judge. Id. at 103-207. Assistant Attorney General Jordan A. Cox represented the State, and attorney Richard W. Vieth represented Petitioner. Id. at 103. The court heard testimony from Petitioner, his mother Annette Brown Dorsey, Debbyette Bush (“Bush”), and both of his plea counsel. Id. at 106. Petitioner presented evidence that plea counsel stated Petitioner would remain parole-eligible and that his charge and sentence from his second plea hearing would run concurrently with the charges and sentences of his first hearing. Plea counsel testified Petitioner was facing life without parole (“LWOP”) at his second plea hearing, they recommended Petitioner take the 17-year plea offer, and they never made promises to Petitioner as to parole eligibility.
Petitioner's PCR attorney filed a motion to supplement the PCR record to counter plea counsels' assertion that Petitioner was facing LWOP before his pleas, but Judge Knie issued an order denying Petitioner's motion on August 21, 2018, and dismissing his application with prejudice. Id. At 212- 225. Judge Knie found, in part, as follows:
Applicant alleges his defense attorneys did not advise him of the consequences of pleading guilty to his charges and the possible changes to his parole eligibility. Applicant further alleges that he was prejudiced by his attorneys' representation, as he would not have plead guilty had he known he would not be eligible for
parole. The record clearly refutes this allegation. During all three guilty plea proceedings, the trial judge explained Applicant his constitutional rights and that entering a guilty plea would give up those rights. Applicant, under oath, proclaimed at all three proceedings that he understood his rights and that he still wished to enter a guilty plea. During the evidentiary hearing, Applicant's attorneys testified credibly that it was Applicant's decision to enter a guilty plea. Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proof . . . .
Applicant alleges his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Applicant also alleges his guilty plea was not made with a complete understanding of the nature of the charges and the inadequacies of the plea potential. This Court finds the record supports Applicant's plea was made knowingly, voluntarily and upon the sound advice of Counsel. The underlying facts to the crime are overwhelming to establish Applicant's guilt of the offenses to which he pled. His attorneys appear credible when testifying during the evidentiary hearing. The transcript of the plea hearing is thorough as to Applicant's understanding of his right to a trial and his willingness to forgo trial . . . .Id. at 222-23.
A month later, Petitioner filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to alter or amend the judgment, to which the State promptly responded. Id. at 226, 230- 34. Judge Knie held a hearing on March 20, 2019, and denied the request to amend. Id. at 236-83.
Petitioner timely appealed the denial of relief to the South Carolina Supreme Court through a petition for writ of certiorari, raising one issue:
Although counsel did not advise petitioner of the date on which he would become parole eligible; nonetheless, counsel erred in advising petitioner that his parole eligibility dates on all sentences received would match identically and fall due on the
same date because this was incorrect advice regarding parole eligibility.[ECF No. 16-1 at 227, 284, ECF No. 16-2].
The State filed a return, after which the Supreme Court of South Carolina transferred the PCR appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) in April 2020. [ECF Nos. 16-3, 16-4, see also Rule 243(1), SCACR]. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the petition and issued a remittitur on October 25, 2022 [ECF Nos. 16-5, 16-6], which was filed with the Spartanburg Clerk of Court on November 4, 2022. [ECF No. 16-6]. Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus was received in the prison mail room on January 25, 2023. [ECF No. 1-13].
Under South Carolina law, “[t]he final disposition of a case occurs when the remittitur is returned by the clerk of the appellate court and filed in the lower court.” Christy v. Christy, 452 S.E.2d 1, 4 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994); see also Beatty v. Rawski, 97 F.Supp.3d 768, 774 (D.S.C. 2015) (“. . . there can be no question that South Carolina law states that the final disposition of an appeal does not occur until after the remittitur is filed in the circuit court.”).
Because Petitioner is incarcerated, he benefits from the “prison mailbox rule.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). The petition includes a date stamp reflecting it was received by the prison mailroom on January 25, 2023. [ECF No. 1-13]. Therefore, the court construes the petition as having been filed on January 25, 2023.
II. Discussion
A. Federal Habeas Issues
Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:
Ground One:Was the PCR court's decision an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented and submitted?
Supporting Facts:Petitioner stated that he was being tried on the trafficking in heroin charge until his trial attorney and solicitor stopped the trial and offered a plea on the lesser charge of dist. of heroin. Had he known that the 17-yr sentence plea offer would not result in the same parole date as the parole date attached to his prior two concurrent ten-year sentences per counsel's advice, then he would have continued with his trial on the trafficking charge and not pled guilty to dist. of heroin in exchange for the seventeen year sentence . . . . Petitioner specifically inquired about his parole eligibility before pleading guilty to trafficking. Both attorneys advised petitioner to plea to all charges which would be back dated to indictment and remain parole eligible . . . .
Ground Two:Was the PCR court's decision an unreasonable determination of the facts in light [of] evidence submitted in the 59[e] Reconsideration Motion and Hearing?
Supporting Facts:As a threshold matter, the procedure followed by the PCR Court “denied” petitioner Brown an opportunity to have his post conviction relief claims adjudicated by a judicial officer. S.C. § 17-27-80 (1976) require the PCR court to make specific finding of fact and state expressly its conclusion of law relating to each issue presented. The PCR did not do that, but rather delegated that responsibility to the S.C. Attorney General's Office . . . . The State's PCR Order in this Case was drafted by Respondent, and adopted verbatim by the State-Court Judge . . . . The petitioner moved the PCR court to allow him to Supplement the PCR record to rebut a argument passed by the respondent, Fletcher Smith because Smith misrepresented the true and accurate facts of the plea-arrangements and plea-deal . . . .
Ground Three:Did the South Carolina Court of Appeals final order on Writ of Cert. violate clearly established federal law by issuing a “Post-Card Order”?
Supporting Facts:The South Carolina Court of Appeals failed to explain their denial of petitioner's claim . . . .[ECF No. 1-3 at 3-9 (citations omitted, errors in original)].
B. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. At the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
C. Habeas Corpus Standard of Review
1. Generally
Because Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 410. Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Respondents concede that Petitioner timely pursued and exhausted his claims in Grounds One through Three. [ECF No. 16 at 1]. .
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Petitioner must show (1) that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The court must apply a “strong presumption” that trial counsel's representation fell within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and the errors must be “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). This is a high standard that requires a habeas petitioner to show that counsel's errors deprived him “of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. That the outcome would “reasonably likely” have been different but for counsel's error is not dispositive of the prejudice inquiry. Rather, the court must determine whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that “‘[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task[,]' . . . [e]stablishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 88 (quoting Padi la v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must satisfy the highly deferential standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Strickland “in tandem,” making the standard “doubly” more difficult. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. In such circumstances, the “question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable,” but whether “there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standards.” Id. The unreasonableness of the state court determination must be “beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103. “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Id. at 102. Section 2254(d) codifies the view that habeas corpus is a “‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102-103 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)).
D. Analysis
Under the AEDPA, a § 2254 petition must be filed within one year of the date on which the state court judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a properly-filed state post-conviction action, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), but not the filing of a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172-73 (2001) (finding that federal habeas petitions are not included within 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)'s provision that tolls the one year while collateral actions are pending).
Here, Petitioner challenges three sets of guilty pleas in which the judges all imposed the sentences to run concurrently. First, Petitioner pled guilty on April 1, 2015, and filed a motion to reconsider on April 3, 2015. [See ECF No. 16 at 9]. Respondent argues Petitioner then had 30 days to file a direct appeal, and because Petitioner did not, the statute of limitations began to run on May 2, 2015. See id.; but see, e.g., Hampton v. Warden of Leath Corr. Inst., C/A No. 9:22-00967-JFA-MHC, 2023 WL 3324972, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2023) (“In South Carolina, a defendant must file a notice of appeal within ten days of her conviction. Rule 203(b)(2), SCACR. Thus, if a defendant does not file a direct appeal, her conviction becomes final ten days after the adjudication of guilt and the one-year statute of limitations begins to run.”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 922-00967-JFA-MHC, 2023 WL 3071416 (D.S.C. Apr. 24, 2023).
Petitioner then filed his PCR application on March 16, 2017, almost two years later and already beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The PCR appeal remittitur was filed with the clerk on November 4, 2022, and Petitioner delivered the instant petition to the prison mailroom 82 days later, on January 25, 2023. The calculations are similar, where Petitioner also pled guilty on August 25, 2015, and November 16, 2015, filed no appeals, did not file his PCR application until March 16, 2017, and did not file the instant petition until January 25, 2023. [See ECF No. 16 at 1 (Respondent arguing that “Petitioner is grossly out of time and is barred from presenting his claims to this Court by AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. He pled guilty on three separate occasions, and filed his petition for habeas corpus 766 days, 635 days, and 553 days later respectively, adding in all appropriate statute of limitations tolling periods, well past the 365 he was allotted.) (emphasis in original))].
Petitioner does not dispute these dates, but argues that his petition is based on “newly discovered evidence,” including that on February 1, 2017 “Petitioner found out that his parole projection date was rescinded . . . .” such that his petition should be considered timely. [ECF No. 20 at 17, 20]. However, this court has consistently rejected this argument. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (utilizing the date on which the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence); Spurgeon v. Warden, McCormick Corr. Inst., C/A No. 0:16-2766-RBH-PJG, 2017 WL 1232439, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2017) (“Courts have recognized in other, similar contexts that the failure to appreciate the collateral consequences of a guilty plea conviction until after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations does not delay the commencement of a limitations period.”) (collecting cases)), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 0:16-02766-RBH, 2017 WL 1214405 (D.S.C. Apr. 3, 2017); see also McKnight v. Cohen, C/A No. 2:07-0027-DCN-RSC, 2007 WL 2891784, at *9 (D.S.C. Sept. 28, 2007) (rejecting petitioner's argument that he was “entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations because his attorney misadvised him concerning his parole eligibility”).
For similar reasons, equitable tolling principles do not apply to otherwise permit a review of Petitioner's time-barred claims. The Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations for habeas petitions “is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Ho land v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). The limitations period should be equitably tolled “only if [the petitioner] shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562. Here, Petitioner has not alleged-nor does the record reflect-an extraordinary circumstance to warrant equitable tolling.
Finally, even if it were timely, Petitioner's Ground One is without merit. Petitioner has failed to overcome “doubly” more difficult standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Strickland to show that the PCR court's application of Strickland was unreasonable particularly where, here, he has failed to show prejudice ensuing from counsels' allegedly deficient performance and where the PCR court's applicable holding was based on credibility determinations of Petitioner's plea counsel. See, e.g., Cagle v. Branker, 520 F.3d 320, 324 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[F]or a federal habeas court to overturn a state court's credibility judgments, the state court's error must be stark and clear.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1))); see also Marsha l v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (“28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them”).
Petitioner's Grounds Two and Three are additionally without merit where he challenges the PCR court's practice of asking one of the parties to draft the relevant PCR order and the South Carolina Court of Appeal's practice in issuing a “post-card order.”
Petitioner argues that he “would not have pleaded guilty to the above charges if he had known that the specific agreement would not be enforced and voided by SCDC classification system” [ECF No. 20 at 35], but he also testified at his plea hearings that he was aware that the judges involved were not bound by the parties' negotiations or the solicitor's recommendations, and that he still chose to plead guilty. [See, e.g., ECF No. 16-1 at 31-32].
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the recommends the court grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 17] and dismiss the petition with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).