Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-1123.
February 6, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment and motion for extension of time to amend pleadings, defendant Turner Industries, Ltd.'s motion for summary judgment, and defendant Standard Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment is DENIED, and plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to amend pleadings is GRANTED. The Court will consider defendant Turner Industries Ltd.'s motion for summary judgment and defendant Standard Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment following the time by which plaintiffs may amend or supplement the pleadings.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 1, 1999, plaintiff Evelyn Brown enrolled in an employee welfare benefits plan sponsored by her employer Turner Industries, Ltd. ("Turner") and insured by Standard Insurance Company ("Standard") which offered her long term disability insurance. Brown paid four months of premiums into the plan before terminating her employment on June 30, 1999 because of complications associated with multiple sclerosis and the advice of her physician.
Before leaving Turner, Brown inquired about the status of her long term disability insurance benefits. She claims that a Turner employee reviewed her records and explained that she was entitled to receive sixty percent (60%) of her salary until age sixty-five. When Brown attempted to collect her disability insurance benefits, however, Standard denied her claim because she had not participated in the plan for twelve months.
On March 8, 2000, Brown filed a complaint in the 24th Judicial District for Jefferson Parish, Louisiana against Turner and Standard for detrimental reliance and negligent representation and seeking damages related to the loss of benefits, emotional distress, loss of income, and loss of enjoyment of life. Her husband, Levance Brown, also joined the complaint with a claim for loss of consortium and enjoyment of life.
Defendants subsequently removed the litigation to the Eastern District of Louisiana because they contend that plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Plaintiffs moved to remand the proceedings back to state court, but this Court found that ERISA preempts plaintiffs' state law claims.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Brown's Motion for Relief From Judgment
Plaintiffs are entitled to relief from the judgment denying their motion to remand only if they satisfy the criteria outlined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Under Rule 60(b), the court will grant relief from a final judgment or order only upon a showing of one of the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The burden of establishing at least one of these reasons is on the moving party, and the determination of whether that burden has been met rests within the discretion of the court. See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1990). In this case, plaintiffs offer no evidence of mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or any other necessary basis to warrant relief from the Court's order.
While plaintiffs state that they did not receive timely notices from the Court during the incipient stages of the case, they do not explain how this administrative delay prejudiced them. On the contrary, plaintiffs actively participated in the litigation of their case and raise no new evidence in their motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiffs instead argue that ERISA does not preempt their state law claims because they do not seek benefits from the disability plan. Rather, plaintiffs admit that Brown was not eligible for benefits under the plan because she never properly enrolled in the plan. Brown contends that the ERISA plan is only relevant to her claims for the purpose of determining damages.
Although plaintiffs pose a creative argument to avoid preemption, they ignore the centrality of ERISA to their claims. Plaintiffs bring their suit to recover damages amounting to the benefits Brown would have received from the plan. Brown also demonstrated an interest in the plan by inquiring about its terms of coverage and by contributing four months of premiums to the plan. She complains that defendants failed to provide her a written copy of the plan or to advise her properly of her eligibility under the plan. Therefore, the disability plan governed by ERISA motivates plaintiffs' cause of action and is the gravamen of their theory of damages.
In Lee v. E.I. DuPont, the Fifth Circuit similarly found that ERISA preempted plaintiffs' state law claims of misrepresentation for damages concerning the denial of employee benefits. See 894 F.2d 755, 56 (5th Cir. 1990). The plaintiffs in Lee claimed that their employer misled them into retiring prior to the implementation of an early retirement incentive plan. See id. at 755. Because the alleged misrepresentation prevented them from participating in the early retirement plan, the Lee plaintiffs argued that they did not seek benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) and therefore ERISA did not preempt their misrepresentation claims. See id. at 756. The Court rejected this distinction and found that the time at which the ERISA program was adopted was irrelevant to the character of the plaintiffs' suit "as an action that relates to their former employer's pension plan and interferes with the exclusively federal regulatory scheme." Id. at 758. Like the plaintiffs in Lee, the plaintiffs in this case raise claims intimately associated with an ERISA plan. The fact that Brown did not become a participant in the disability plan does not overcome the application of ERISA to her suit.
B. Brown's Motion for Extension of Time to Amend Pleadings
Plaintiffs seek an extension of time to amend pleadings because of an error m communication with the clerk of court. Plaintiffs explain that they have been unfairly prejudiced from asserting additional or alterative claims because they were not timely aware of Court orders. Defendants oppose an extension because they believe plaintiffs participated in the litigation and suffered no prejudice.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that leave to amend and supplement pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. Because of miscommunication with the clerk of court and in light of the application of ERISA to plaintiffs' claims, the Court finds that justice requires an extension of time for plaintiffs' to amend their pleadings.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment is DENIED. Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to amend pleadings is GRANTED; and, plaintiffs have five (5) days in which to amend or supplement their pleadings. Following this period for amending pleadings, the Court will consider defendant Turner Industries Ltd.'s motion for summary judgment and defendant Standard Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment.