Opinion
No. 3:02CV12-D-A.
September 29, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on the November 24, 2004, motion by Robert Sudduth and Mike McGowan ("Municipal Defendants") for summary judgment. The plaintiff responded December 16, 2004. The remaining defendants joined the motion June 23, 2005. The matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the instant case shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). "The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden." Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066(1988)). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Substantive law determines what is material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id., at 248. If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998). In the absence of proof, the court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
The Plaintiff's Claims
Brown claims that the defendants arrested him without probable cause, warrant, or due process — and conspired together to do so. He seeks $2,000,000.00 from each defendant in compensatory damages, $5,000,000.00 collectively in punitive damages, as well as court costs and attorneys fees.
Undisputed Material Facts
While the defendants may well dispute Eric Brown's version of the facts, for the purposes of this memorandum opinion only, the court shall take as true the Brown's allegations as to the events from the time Investigator Sudduth took charge at the scene of the arrest until he arrived at the police station, as the defendants did not present any facts regarding this time period in their motion for summary judgment.
Law enforcement officers in Pontotoc County were familiar with Moore, as she had been involved in many domestic disputes with Eric LaQuinne Brown ("Brown") and Tennille Brown ("Tennille"), whom Brown had married only a few days before the murder. Brown had lived alternately with Moore and Tennille, and each woman had borne Brown a child. Indeed, Moore was pregnant with a second of Brown's children at the time of her murder. A number of domestic disputes among the three required police intervention, and several criminal complaints had arisen out of the love triangle, as well.
Sudduth began investigating the homicide immediately. He spoke first to the day shift manager at McDonald's, Moore's place of employment. The manager told Sudduth about various arguments and domestic disputes between Moore and Brown, who had called Moore at work two or three times the day she was murdered. Further, Moore planned to meet Brown after work that day. Sudduth also spoke with Moore's good friend, who told police that Moore had arranged for the friend to keep Moore's child the weekend of the murder so that Moore could go out of town with Brown. Sudduth also went to Brown's apartment and spoke to his neighbor, who informed police that she did not believe Brown or his wife Tennille were home the night of the murder. Tennille, however, had borrowed the neighbor's phone several days before the murder to call Moore. During this call, Tennille threatened Moore, cursed at her, and warned her to stay away from Brown. Then Tennille told the neighbor she wished Moore would die.
At 1:47 p.m. on January 23, 1999, Russell Perry ("Perry"), an officer with the Pontotoc Police Department, passed a beige GMC Jimmy truck on West Oxford Street in Pontotoc. Perry noticed in his rearview mirror that truck did not have a license plate, so he turned around, moved behind the truck, and turned on his blue lights. The truck stopped, and a black man exited, asking, "What is the problem?" A woman and three children were in the truck with the man. Perry ordered the man back into the truck, but the man again asked, "What is the problem?" After Perry ordered him back into the truck a second time, the man complied. Perry approached the driver's side door and asked for the man's driver's license. He also told the man the reason for the stop, that the truck did not have a license plate. The man stated that the plate had been stolen the night before and that he had a tag receipt to prove that he had obtained a plate. Perry issued the man a citation for failing to display his license plate. At this point, Perry realized that he had pulled over Eric L. Brown, the man Investigator Sudduth was seeking in his murder investigation. Perry called Sudduth and others to the scene; five or six police cruisers arrived in short order, and Sudduth took over.
Officer Long approached with his hand on his sidearm and asked Brown to accompany law enforcement personnel to the police station. Brown asked if he was under arrest, and Long said no. Another officer then approached, hand on sidearm, and asked Brown if he would go to the police station. Again, Brown asked if he was under arrest. Again, the officer said no. Brown decided to accompany the police to the station when Sheriff Daniels approached, with his hand on his sidearm, and told Brown to follow Daniels to the police station for questioning. Brown complied.
Once at the station, an officer read Brown and Tennille their Miranda rights and asked where they had been the night before. Brown's version of the events of the night of the murder conflicted with Tennille's version. Both stated, however, that they had visited Gerald Edwards in Tupelo, Mississippi the previous night.
Still on January 23, 1999, Sudduth accompanied two police officers to question Gerald Edwards; he, however, stated that he had not seen Brown in three weeks. He told Sudduth to speak to Christopher Carter about the matter. Carter told the police that on January 2, 1999, Brown had asked Carter to kill Moore because she was "always up in his business" and was pregnant again — and she kept getting him into trouble and "signing papers on him." Brown asked Carter how much he would charge to "knock her off." Carter told Brown that he "must have been watching too much T.V. and [he] must be crazy." Carter then changed the subject. Brown, however, said that he was going to find someone to do it.
The Municipal Judge of the City of Pontotoc signed warrants for the arrest of Brown and Tennille January 26, 1999. As the investigation progressed and it became clear to Tennille that her alibi was broken; she started giving investigators more statements implicating herself and Brown. Her February 4, 1999, statement gave officers enough information to search Brown's house, where they found his singed hair in the sink. This evidence placed Brown at the scene of Moore's burning car and body. Once Brown realized that his wife was giving the police numerous statements, he gave his own statement, in which he admitted killing Moore and traveling to Memphis to burn her car and body.
Brown pled guilty November 29, 1999, to the murder of Shorelonda Moore and manslaughter of her unborn child. Brown was represented by counsel, the Honorable James Ford, at the hearing. He was sentenced in the Circuit Court of Pontotoc County that day to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections for the homicide; his sentence for the manslaughter conviction was twenty years. The sentences run concurrently.
Discussion
The instant case should be dismissed for three reasons, outlined here and discussed more fully below. First, Brown, who was represented by counsel, entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty both to the murder and the manslaughter for which he was arrested. In doing so he waived all non-jurisdictional defects to his conviction. Second, Brown's claims are barred under the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), as a favorable ruling in this case would necessarily call into question his conviction. Third, as Brown has suffered no physical injury at the hands of the defendants, he is not entitled to money damages for mental or emotional injury in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For these reasons, the instant complaint must be dismissed.
Knowing and Voluntary Plea Is a Waiver of All Non-jurisdictional Defects to a Criminal Conviction
A guilty plea given knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently on the advice of counsel waives all non-jurisdictional defects in a criminal case. Hayes v. Smith, 447 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1971); North Carolina v. Alford, 1970, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162; Jenkins v. Beto, 442 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1971); Stephen v. Smith, 438 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1971); Askew v. Alabama, 398 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1968). Brown, on the advice of counsel, pled guilty to the charges of homicide and manslaughter. The testimony at Brown's November 29, 1999, plea hearing establishes that Brown gave his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly. As such, he has waived his claim that he was arrested without probable cause, and this claim shall be dismissed.Brown's Claims Shall Be Dismissed Under the Doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994)
Two lines of Fifth Circuit cases have interpreted Heck — those following Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995) and those following Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 1995). As discussed below, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment under the analysis of Wells; the Mackey analysis does not apply to the instant case.
The Fifth Circuit in Wells invalidated — under a Heck analysis — a prisoner's claim for damages under § 1983 in which he alleged that his conviction was not supported by probable cause. The Fifth Circuit held that a finding in a § 1983 case of no probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest, "would demonstrate the invalidity of the [plaintiff's] conviction. . . ." Id.; see also Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999) (prisoner's conviction on one of the charges for which he was arrested established that probable cause existed for that arrest — thus barring under Heck prisoner's § 1983 suit based upon want of probable cause for arrest). Brown's claims must be dismissed under the Wells analysis, as he was convicted of the murder and manslaughter for which he was arrested. The valid conviction — not overturned or invalidated — stands as proof of probable cause for the arrest. A finding that the defendants arrested Brown without probable cause would undermine the validity of his conviction; as such, Brown's § 1983 claims must be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).
The Fifth Circuit adopted a two-step approach to applying Heck in Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 1995). Under Mackey, the first step is to determine if the plaintiff was tried and convicted. Id. Next, the court must examine the record to determine whether evidence the prosecution presented evidence in the plaintiff's criminal trial resulting directly or indirectly from plaintiff's arrest. Id. If such evidence was presented in the underlying criminal trial, "then [the plaintiff's] section 1983 damage claims challenging the validity of his arrests would appear to undermine the validity of his conviction and hence be barred by Heck." Id. At the time the Fifth Circuit decided Mackey, Mackey was being held in pre-trial detention. The Fifth Circuit held, "If Mackey is tried and convicted and in his contested criminal case no evidence is presented resulting directly or indirectly from any of his arrests, it is difficult to see how any illegality in any of his arrests could be inconsistent with his conviction." Id. (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit thus limited the holding in Mackey to contested criminal cases. This limitation is sound, as a criminal defendant in an uncontested case ( i.e., one resulting in a guilty plea) waives all non-jurisdictional defects in his prosecution and conviction — as discussed in the section above. Therefore, the holding in Mackey does not apply in this case. As Brown never faced a trial, he did not contest the criminal charges — he confessed them. Thus, under the only Heck analysis applicable to this case, Brown's claims must fail.
The Plaintiff Suffered No Physical Injury And Thus Cannot Recover Money Damages
Finally, nowhere in the instant complaint does the Eric LaQuinne Brown allege that the defendants' actions caused him physical injury. Absent an allegation of physical injury, Brown's claims seeking monetary damages for mental and emotional injury must fail. Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2005), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e). The Fifth Circuit's ruling on this issue is clear:
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e) states: "No federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined to a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury."
We agree with the majority of the other federal circuits that have addressed this issue in holding that it is the nature of the relief sought, and not the underlying substantive violation, that controls: Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent physical injury.Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374 (internal citations omitted). As Eric LaQuinne Brown seeks only money damages, and as he has not alleged physical injury, his claims for compensatory damages must fail.
In sum, all of the plaintiff's claims are without merit and shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, counting as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915(g). A final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion shall issue today.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PONTOTOC COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
STATE OF MISSISSIPPIvs. CAUSE NO. CR99-100.
ERIC LAQUINNE BROWN.
TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS HAD AND DONE IN THE GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCING IN THE ABOVE STYLED AND NUMBERED CAUSE, BEFORE THE HONORABLE THOMAS J. GARDNER, III, SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGE, IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PONTOTOC COUNTY ON THE 29TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1999.
APPEARANCES:
Present and Representing the State:
HONORABLE CLAY JOYNER Assistant District Attorney Tupelo, MS
Present and Representing the Defendant:
HONORABLE JAMES FORD Attorney at Law Tupelo, MS
Also Present:
MR. BILL BRAND Mississippi Department of Corrections
Court Reporter: Mary Margaret Ferguson, CSR 1042
THE COURT: This is cause CR99-100, State of Mississippi versus Eric, E-R-I-C, Laquinne, L-A-Q-U-I-N-N-E, Brown. Is that correct, Mr. Brown?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Brown, you have indicated through your attorney that you desire to enter pleas of guilty to one charge of murder, that being Count I, and one count of manslaughter, that being Count II in Cause CR99-100 pending in the Circuit Court of Pontotoc County, Mississippi.
Before accepting your pleas of guilty the law requires that I question you concerning your understanding of these proceedings, the nature of the charges against you and the consequences of you pleading guilty to these charges.
Before I ask any questions I'm going to ask you to raise your right hand and take the following oath: "Do you solemnly swear the testimony given by you will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?"
THE DEFENDANT: I do.
THE COURT: You may refuse to answer any question that I ask of you. You may talk with your attorney before you answer any question.
EXAMINATION BY THE COURT:
Q. Are you Eric Laquinne Brown, the defendant named in this indictment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you and your attorney received a copy of this indictment and read it or had it read to you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor or drug of any kind?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you been treated in the past for alcohol or drug abuse, psychiatric illness or mental disease?
A. No, sir.
Q. How old are you, Mr. Brown?
A. Twenty-seven.
Q. And what education do you have?
A. Twelfth grade level.
Q. And what kind of work do you do?
A. Factory.
Q. Do you have a prior felony record of any kind?
A. CCW.
Q. What was that?
A. Carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor.
Q. A misdemeanor?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any other charges pending anywhere?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you understand that your answers to my questions are given under oath and that a record is being made of these proceedings?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that I will not accept your pleas of guilty if you tell me you did not do what is charged in each of these — in each of the charges in this indictment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that by these questions the Court is attempting to determine if the pleas of guilty which you have offered to make will be made by you knowingly, freely, understandingly and voluntarily?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are these pleas of guilty free and voluntary on your part?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Has anyone threatened you in any way or promised you anything in order to get you to plead guilty to these charges?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you understand that by entering these pleas of guilty you are giving up or waiving a great number of legal rights that you have as a defendant in criminal proceedings?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand the meaning of the word waive, W-A-I-V-E?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to these charges you are waiving your right to be tried before a jury on these charges, to participate in the selection of a jury for the trial of your case and to have that jury hear the evidence and decide your guilt or innocence as to each such charge?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Brown, I understand that this case is set for trial on Wednesday, day after tomorrow. Do you understand that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And on that date we will have a venire panel here and we will draw a jury for the trial of your case if you wish to do that. Do you understand that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to these charges you are waiving the requirement that the State of Mississippi prove each of these charges and each and every element of each of these charges beyond a reasonable doubt?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to these charges you are waiving your right to remain silent?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that you would have the right to testify at a trial on these charges, but that no one could force you to testify during that trial or make any statement whatsoever?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that if you did go to trial on these charges and you exercised your right to remain silent, that is, you did not testify during the trial, no inference or suggestion of your guilt could be drawn from the fact that you did not testify and that I would instruct the jury to that effect if you asked me to do so?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to these charges you are waiving your right at a trial to confront and to cross-examine any witnesses who appeared and gave evidence against you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand you are likewise waiving your right to challenge the makeup and composition of the grand jury that returned this indictment against you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that if you did go to trial before a jury on these charges you would have the right to have the process of this court issue requiring the attendance of any witnesses that you wished to call to give evidence in your behalf during that trial?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that if you did go to trial before a jury on these charges, all twelve of those jurors selected for the trial of your case would have to agree as to each charge before they could return a verdict of guilty against you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that if you did go to trial before a jury and that jury found you guilty or convicted you of either or both of these charges, you would have the right to appeal any such conviction to the Supreme Court of this state?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that if you enter pleas of guilty here today to these charges and I accept those pleas, you will have no right to appeal whatsoever?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand the charges against you?
A. Yes, sir.
MR. JOYNER: Your Honor, may we approach?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
(CONFERENCE HELD AT THE BENCH OUTSIDE THE HEARING OF THE REPORTER.)
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, state your motion.
MR. JOYNER: Your Honor, at this time the State would move ore tenus to amend the indictment in Count II on the fourth line where it states an unborn, unnamed, quick male child.
That is a typo, Your Honor. The State would move to delete the word "male" from the indictment. It's not a substantive change, Your Honor. It's unimportant whether the child was male or female. As I stated, it's a clerical error. The State apologizes, but the State would move to delete that one word from the indictment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, sir.
BY THE COURT: (Continuing)
Q. Mr. Brown, I'm going to read these charges separately.
In Count I the indictment charges that you on the 22nd day of January, 1999, in Pontotoc County in the State of Mississippi in Count I that you did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate design, kill and murder Shorelonda Moore, a human being.
Do you understand that charge?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you in fact do that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that on your entering a plea of guilty to that I am required by law to impose a life sentence? Do you understand that?
A. Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Joyner, I'm going to ask you to offer — you don't need to do it — let me get through with the reading of the indictment then I'm going to ask you to tell me what the State would show on trial of this case.
BY THE COURT: (Continuing)
Q. In Count II the indictment charges that on that same day, the 22nd day of January, 1999, in Pontotoc County in the State of Mississippi that you did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and slay a certain human being, to-wit, an unborn, unnamed, quick child of one Shorelonda Moore by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and of your deliberate design, kill and murder Shorelonda Moore, a human being, contrary to and in violation of Section 97-3-19 (1) (a) of the Mississippi Code of 1972 as amended; said charge of manslaughter being contrary to and in violation of the Section 97-3-37 of the Mississippi Code of 1972 as amended.
First of all, do you understand that charge?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you in fact do that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you understand that on your entering a plea of guilty to this charge the maximum penalty which I could impose would be a term of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. There is no mandatory fine but I can impose a fine of ten thousand dollars. There is no mandatory sentence that I am required by law to impose. Do you understand that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you in fact — you said you did do that, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Counsel, I'm going to ask you, Mr. Joyner, to state for the record what the State would show at a trial of this case.
MR. JOYNER: Your Honor, at a trial of this cause the State would show the following:
That on January 2nd, 1999, this defendant, Mr. Eric Brown, shot pool with a young man named Christopher L. Carter. While they were shooting pool they had a conversation and during this conversation Mr. Brown told Mr. Carter that he was having trouble with his girlfriend, Shorelonda Moore.
He said that she was always up in his business. She was pregnant again. He said she kept getting him in trouble and signing papers on him.
While they were riding Mr. Brown said that he was thinking about getting somebody to knock her off. He then asked Mr. Carter what would Mr. Carter charge to knock her off for him.
Mr. Carter replied that Mr. Brown had been watching too much television; he needed to stop talking crazy like that. And later on that evening Mr. Brown said he was going to find someone to do it.
Your Honor, the State would further show that two or three weeks prior to this murder that Eric Brown spoke with a co-worker named Mr. Mike Ostrander, O-S-T-R-A-N-D-E-R, about obtaining some syringes. When Mr. Ostrander asked why this was done, the defendant stated that he needed to do something to somebody.
The State would further show at trial, Your Honor, that numerous altercations took place between Mr. Brown actually Moore to the point between Mr. Brown's wife Tennille Brown and the victim in this case, Shorelonda Moore.
The State would show that Shorelonda Moore had one child by this defendant already and was pregnant with a second child by this defendant.
On the day of the crime, Your Honor, the State would show that Shorelonda Moore had paged Mr. Brown several times on January 22nd, 1999, that they had spoken by telephone at her work place at McDonald's, there are numerous witnesses to that, and that he wanted her to meet him behind Westown Restaurant after she got off work at McDonald's. She agreed to meet — they agreed to meet.
Ms. Moore had told coworkers that she planned to spend the weekend in Memphis, Tennessee, with Mr. Brown. He had been seeing both Shorelonda Moore and Tennille Johnson. As stated previously, Your Honor, there's a great deal of trouble between the two, between Ms. Brown and Ms. Moore.
Now, on that day, according to the defendant's own confession, Eric Brown left his residence that afternoon, January 22nd, 1999, to meet Shorelonda Moore. He drove behind the Westown Restaurant to meet her. She wasn't there. He drove by McDonald's, saw that she was still at work. He waited for her to get off work in in the Hardee's parking lot.
When she got off work he went to the Westown Restaurant and parked between the restaurant and the recycling business under the big oak tree where they would usually meet. Mr. Brown stated that Ms. Moore opened the car door for him to get into her car. They had an argument regarding the fact that she had married Tennille Brown, and according to Mr. Brown she began telling him that she was going to break he and Tennille up. She began to tell him what he had to do. She wanted him to go to Memphis with her and get a hotel room that weekend. And Mr. Brown simply states that they were arguing and that he began to shake her. And the next thing he knew she stopped moving and seemed to be passed out but he couldn't revive her.
He left her in the car and went home. He knew he had to do something with her. He wanted her away from him. He decided to take her to Memphis.
He went home. He told his wife that he had killed Shorelonda Moore, that they were going to Memphis. Tennille got the children ready while Mr. Brown put a five gallon plastic gas can in the back of his car.
They left the house, went to the restaurant where Mr. Brown gave Tennille some money to put gas in his car. And she followed him to Memphis as he was driving Shorelonda Moore's car with her dead body in it all the way to Memphis.
Also, Your Honor, the proof would be that Ms. Tennille Brown took her three children and Mr. Brown's vehicle, his GMC Jimmy, following him to Memphis. The proof would be, Your Honor, that at some point between Pontotoc and Memphis that Mr. Brown threw out of the car a planner that belonged to Ms. Moore, threw it out the window. He had stated to the officers that he never opened the planner.
The State would point out that Ms. Moore had gotten paid that day and had about two hundred dollars cash but none of that cash was ever discovered on the person of the defendant.
Your Honor, the proof would further show that Tennille Brown followed Mr. Eric Brown to an alley in Memphis, Tennessee, and that in that alley Mr. Brown used that gas can and attempted to set fire to the body of the victim and the automobile that he had driven her to Memphis in.
It was drizzly raining that day. He couldn't get a match lit on the outside of the car. He leaned into the car to strike the match. There was a little bit of a flash fire due to the gas fumes. He shut the door to the car as he stumbled backward. The proof would show that he was singed, both his clothing and his person.
Mr. Brown by his own confession states that he stopped and obtained some vasoline to put on his skin to help stop the burning on the way home.
On the way home Mr. Brown pulled off his burned clothing and it was thrown out of the car on Highway 78 as well, Your Honor, and that clothing was recovered by officers with the Pontotoc Police Department, highway patrol.
Mr. Brown's hair, Your Honor, the proof would show that it was singed and that he smelled of gasoline and that upon arriving home he used a pair of clipers to cut his hair in the bathroom sink. Much of that hair was later recovered as well, Your Honor.
At around 4:20 a.m. on January 23rd a Lue Jean Bishop discovered Ms. Moore's vehicle in the alley and flagged down Memphis police officers. The officers discovered Ms. Moore's body in the car and called for detectives.
The state would point out, Your Honor, that Ms. Moore's black trousers were pulled down below her hips. Her panties were low on her hips. Her shirt and her bra were pulled up, and her bra appeared to be around her throat. She appeared to the officers to be obviously pregnant. The vehicle appeared to have been burned. A dark brown residue was on her body.
And in light of the clothing that she had on, the manner in which it was arranged, Your Honor, the State would also point out that the forensic evidence would show that Ms. Moore had — they couldn't pinpoint the time, but that Ms. Moore had recently had sex with someone. That has not been submitted to the crime lab, Your Honor. The State did not believe it was a rape, but the assumption is that it was the defendant.
But, Your Honor, the proof would be that Mr. Brown had worn upon leaving the house that night a New York Yankees baseball hat. And at the crime scene was found a New York Yankees hat which he lost there that evening, which he later admitted he had lost there that evening.
The cause of death was determined by the medical examiner's office in Memphis to be strangulation. The ligature marks on her neck were matched to the material pattern on her bra, Your Honor.
The Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department was notified of her death. An investigation was conducted both in Pontotoc and in Memphis.
The Browns were stopped and they were questioned. At their initial questioning they had a story that they had come up with together in which they lied to the officers and stated they had been at Gerald Edwards' house in Tupelo, Mississippi.
The officers immediately went to interview Mr. Edwards, and lo and behold it was indeed a lie. And the alibi was shattered when Mr. Edwards gave a statement stating they had indeed not been there. And he actually pointed them in the direction of Mr. Christopher Carter who gave the officers a statement as to what he had been told by the defendant.
After the alibi was done away with, Ms. Tennille Brown gave several Moore statements I believe totaling six to seven, all of them incriminating the defendant and herself. And of course when the officers searched the house, they found cut, singed hair in the bathroom lavatory. Tennille Brown later admitted going to Memphis and later incriminated the defendant.
The Browns were formally charged on January 26, 1999, by the Pontotoc Police Department. And on February 23rd, 1999 Mr. Eric Brown gave a voluntary statement to officer Robert Sudduth with the Pontotoc Police Department, Mickey Baker with the Mississippi Highway Patrol Criminal Investigations Bureau, and Mr. Mac McAuley, who is the county attorney here in Pontotoc, Your Honor.
The State would further point out that the autopsy that was done in regard to this case showed that the fetus that we're dealing with was aged approximately twenty-eight weeks with a plus or minus ratio of close to a week, about five days, Your Honor. And under Mississippi law the State would point out that for a fetus to be quick as defined in Mississippi it simply has to be moving within the womb. And such movement, Your Honor, normally starts at about ten weeks of fetal age. And as we stated, this fetus was at least twenty-seven weeks of age. And the State would put on proof through witnesses that the fetus was indeed moving in the womb, Your Honor, and was a quick fetus.
In short, Your Honor, the proof in this case would be that Mr. Eric Laquinne Brow on January 22nd, 1999, did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate design kill and murder Ms. Shorelonda Moore; and that on that same date that because he had done what is charged in Count I, that he had murdered Shorelonda Moore, that the death resulted of an unborn, unnamed, quick child of Shorelonda Moore; and that he is guilty as charged in the indictment by the men and women of the Pontotoc grand jury of both the murder of Shorelonda Moore and manslaughter in connection with the death of their unborn, quick fetus.
THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Joyner.
MR. JOYNER: If I could point out one more thing. Mr. Ford did file a motion for a psychiatric exam on this defendant and he was indeed found competent both to stand trial, and it was found at that examination that he knew the nature and quality of his actions at the time this murder occurred.
THE COURT: Counsel, is there a copy of that in the court file, that report?
MR. JOYNER: I don't believe so, Your Honor. I left a copy with the court administrator.
THE COURT: I have seen it.
MR. JOYNER: I have a copy here with me, Your Honor. I will file it in the court file as soon as we leave these proceedings.
THE COURT: File it in the court file.
BY THE COURT: (Continuing)
Q. Mr. Brown, you have heard the proffer made by the State. Is that substantially correct?
A. Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Ford, as attorney for this defendant, have you discussed these charges with him carefully, advised him of his constitutional rights and the consequences of him pleading guilty to these charges?
MR. FORD: Yes, sir, I have. For the record I'd like to state that since I was appointed back in January, latter part of January that I have had numerous visits with the defendant at the county jail, and I have discussed the issues in this case both pro and con. And I believe that he understands the matters that we're here today for.
BY THE COURT: (Continuing)
Q. Mr. Brown, are you satisfied with the legal services and the advice given you by your attorney, Mr. Ford?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you think that he has properly advised you before pleading guilty to these charges and represented your best interests in handling these cases?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have any questions about what is taking place here?
A. No, sir.
Q. Is there anything about this that you do not understand?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you have any questions you want to ask of me?
A. No, sir.
Q. As to the charge of murder as charged in Count I in Cause CR99-100 which charges that on the 22nd day of January, 1999, that you did kill and murder Shorelonda Moore, a human being, do you plead guilty or not guilty?
A. Guilty.
Q. As to the charge of manslaughter contained in Count II in this indictment which charges that on the 22nd day of January, 1999, you did kill and slay an unborn, unnamed, quick child of Shorelonda Moore while engaged in the felonious and deliberate design to killing and murdering of Shorelonda Moore, do you plead guilty or not guilty?
A. Guilty.
THE COURT: The Court finds that this defendant has knowingly, understandingly, freely and voluntarily entered these pleas of guilty; that there is factual basis for each such plea.
Those pleas are accepted. The Court adjudges you guilty on each such plea.
Mr. Brown, I am prepared to proceed with sentencing in this case now. I asked you or made the request that you meet with the presentence investigator. I have had an opportunity to talk with him about the results of your meeting.
But before I impose sentence, do you have anything that you would like to say?
THE DEFENDANT: First I would like to apologize to the family. I'd like to apologize to the family and hopefully one day they'll find a way to forgive me in their heart one day. I apologize to this Court for my actions.
THE COURT: Counsel?
MR. FORD: I ask the Court to be as lenient as possible.
THE COURT: Mr. Joyner, are there members of the victim's family who wish to be heard?
MR. JOYNER: Your Honor, I believe we have Ms. Rose Ray in the courtroom who is the mother of the victim in this case.
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Gray; is that correct?
MR. JOYNER: Ms. Ray.
THE COURT: Ms. Ray I'll permit you to come take the stand or you may state whatever you wish from there will be fine.
ROSE RAY, after having been duly sworn, testified as follows, to-wit:
THE COURT: All right. You may make any statement you wish.
BY MS. RAY: I would just like to say I would like to see him get the maximum what he's supposed to get for doing what he done to my daughter and my family.
And he have left — Shorelonda had a son. I've got him. He's two years old.
We haven't slept a whole night since he killed her.
And for the baby I want him to get the maximum for that if the law allows. And I hope he's happy.
He told her once that he would get to her in order to get to me. So he done that. So I guess he's happy.
I heard him saying something about he apologized to the family. I couldn't hardly hear what he was saying. I just heard a little bit of it.
And if you will, will you let him repeat that to me?
THE COURT: That's what he said that he apologized to the family.
MS. RAY: That's all I have to say.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MS. RAY: Thank you.
THE COURT: Anyone else? Anyone else who wants to make any statement?
MR. JOYNER: I don't believe so, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ford, if