Opinion
24A-CR-1349
12-10-2024
Michael James Brown, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Michael R. Auger Franklin, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Andrew A. Kobe Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Johnson Circuit Court The Honorable Andrew S. Roesener, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 41C01-2302-F3-15
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Michael R. Auger
Franklin, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Andrew A. Kobe
Section Chief, Criminal Appeals
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MATHIAS, JUDGE.
[¶1] Michael James Brown appeals his fourteen-year sentence after he pleaded guilty to Level 3 felony robbery. Brown raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On February 7, 2023, eighty-year-old Jerry Wood had a good night at the blackjack tables at the Horseshoe Casino in Shelbyville. Brown noticed Wood's good night and observed Wood "with a roll of cash in his pocket." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 10. As Wood left the Casino, Brown followed him back to Wood's house. There, Brown struck Wood on the back of the head, knocking him down and causing him to bleed from his left ear and incur a knot on the back of his head. Brown then took the roll of cash as well as Wood's billfold, which resulted in Brown taking about $5,000 in cash from Wood.
[¶3] Officers who later responded to Wood's residence readily located Brown through various surveillance videos and arrested him shortly thereafter. After reading Brown his Miranda rights, officers asked him about the robbery of Wood. Brown admitted that he had followed Wood to Wood's house from the casino and had stolen the money from Wood but denied having struck Wood.
[¶4] The State charged Brown with Level 3 felony robbery. The State also filed a notice of intent to charge Brown with being a habitual offender. However, the State did not amend the charging information because Brown pleaded guilty, without the benefit of a plea agreement, to the Level 3 felony charge.
[¶5] At his ensuing sentencing hearing, Brown testified that he is a veteran of the Gulf War; that he suffers from PTSD; that he is in difficult financial circumstances; that he has a gambling addiction; that he has several dependents; that he was facing eviction; and that he has serious health issues. The trial court, however, found the following to be relevant:
[T]he biggie here . . . is your criminal history. It's concerning because . . ., when you have committed criminal acts[,] it seems like you hurt people.... [Y]ou prey on people who are weaker than you . . . and you hurt them in order to get money from them.... [I]t seems like a mirror of what you did in this case. It's almost identical. And to do that once in a person's life is a terrible thing. I don't think you really have a full appreciation of how being on the receiving end of something like what you have done to people can change the course of their life.... [A]nd to do this again . . . speaks to something beyond just a gambling addiction.... And the truth is you haven't learned your lesson. You can't do this. Ever. You've done it a whole bunch of times.... [Y]our conduct on pretrial release is [also] an issue.... I expressed some concern about this, but having legitimate concerns about your medical condition and not wanting to deprive you of an opportunity to get medical treatment, I very reluctantly agreed to release you. And . . . you didn't follow those rules. We had to issue a warrant to re-arrest you and that doesn't give me much confidence that you're going to follow the rules and conditions of community corrections or probation if given the opportunity .... The age of the victim is a statutory aggravator.... [T]he harm, nature and loss to Mr. Wood are significant and in excess of the elements necessary to prove the offense.... [T]here are some mitigators.... I do believe that
[Brown] has a medical condition that warrants some consideration by the court.... [H]e has taken some responsibility.... I think there is some remorse there....[Y]our age.... [Y]ou're looking down the barrel of spending the rest of your life in prison ....Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 13-14. The court found that "the aggravators strongly outpace the mitigators" and that an "aggravated sentence is absolutely appropriate." Id. at 15. The court then sentenced Brown to fourteen years executed in the Department of Correction.
[¶6] This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶7] On appeal, Brown argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is "inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Making this determination "turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
[¶8] Sentence modification under Rule 7(B), however, is reserved for "a rare and exceptional case." Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we generally defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court, and that deference will prevail unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence on appeal that portrays the nature of the offense and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offense or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[¶9] Brown pleaded guilty to a Level 3 felony, which carries a sentencing range of three to sixteen years and an advisory term of nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (2022). And, here, the trial court ordered Brown to serve fourteen years executed after finding that the aggravating factors strongly outweighed the mitigating factors.
[¶10] We cannot say that Brown's sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offense, we agree with the trial court's assessment that Brown preyed on an elderly man. We also agree with the trial court's assessment that victims of offenses such as this one often have long-lasting emotional and mental impacts, and Wood testified to similar impacts he has endured. Regarding Brown's character, he has a long criminal history of similar offenses, including five prior felony robbery and theft convictions. He also violated the conditions of his pretrial release during these proceedings.
[¶11] We acknowledge that Brown pleaded guilty and rather promptly cooperated with law enforcement. However, the impact of those facts is lessened by the significant evidence the State had against him. The impact of his guilty plea is further lessened by the fact that the State had filed a notice of intent to charge Brown as a habitual offender; Brown's plea precluded the State from actually amending the information to include that charge. As for Brown's additional assertions on appeal regarding his age, health, status as a veteran, and expressions of remorse, Brown has not met his burden to demonstrate that the trial court's consideration of those factors merits our revision.
[¶12] For all of these reasons, we affirm Brown's fourteen-year sentence.
[¶13] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.