Opinion
# 2014-015-497 Claim No. 122362 Motion No. M-84747
06-03-2014
DAVID A. BROWN v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
David A. Brown, Pro Se Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Joan Matalavage, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Defendant's motion to strike interrogatories was granted.
Case information
| UID: | 2014-015-497 |
| Claimant(s): | DAVID A. BROWN |
| Claimant short name: | BROWN |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 122362 |
| Motion number(s): | M-84747 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | FRANCIS T. COLLINS |
| Claimant's attorney: | David A. Brown, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Joan Matalavage, Esquire Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | June 3, 2014 |
| City: | Saratoga Springs |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Defendant moves for a protective Order pursuant to CPLR 3103 and 3123 striking claimant's Demand For Admissions.
Claimant, a prison inmate, seeks damages for wrongful confinement allegedly arising from an improperly conducted disciplinary hearing. In a Demand For Admissions, claimant requested that the defendant provide reasons why the Hearing Officer presiding over the hearing did not follow the applicable regulations governing the conduct of such hearings (defendant's Exhibit C, demands numbered 1, 1 [a], [b], [c]); why certain determinations were made during the course of the hearing and subsequent thereto (id. at demands numbered 2, 3, 4); why a lesser penalty was imposed upon another inmate charged with the same offense (id. at demand numbered 5); why the claimant's confinement to the SHU for 272 days was proper (id. at demand numbered 6); why Southport Correctional Facility is designated a special housing unit (id. at demand numbered 8); why certain evidence was the only evidence relied upon by the Hearing Officer (id. at demand numbered 9); why the Hearing Officer did not review his grievance (id. at demand numbered 10); why the defendant failed to verify the validity of each witnesses' refusal to testify (id. at demand numbered 11); and why the penalty of 12 months confinement to the special housing unit was imposed under the circumstances of his case (id. at demand numbered 13). Aside from the requested explanations for defendant's actions, claimant requested defendant provide him any authority permitting the Hearing Officer's deviation from "know[n] procedures" (id. at demand numbered 7); the identity of the individuals who completed the witness refusal forms and interviewed the witnesses who refused to testify on his behalf (id. at demand number 12) and, lastly, defendant's explanation for its assertion of immunity (id. at demand numbered 14) .
As relevant here, CPLR 3123 permits a party to serve upon another party " a written request for admission by the latter of . . . the truth of any matters of fact set forth in the request, as to which the party requesting the admission reasonably believes there can be no substantial dispute at the trial and which are within the knowledge of such other party or can be ascertained by him upon reasonable inquiry" (CPLR 3123 [a]). It is well settled that insofar as the "purpose of a notice to admit is to eliminate from dispute those matters about which there can be no controversy", the use of this device is inappropriate where it does not involve " 'clear-cut matters' " that are beyond dispute, or involves ultimate conclusions which can only be reached after a full trial (Eddyville Corp. v Relyea, 35 AD3d 1063, 1066 [3d Dept 2006] [citation omitted]; see also Jet One Group, Inc. v Halycon Jet Holdings, Inc., 111 AD3d 890, 892 [2d Dept 2013]). A notice to admit may not be used as a "substitute for existing discovery devices" (Jonas v Liberty Lines Tr., 142 AD2d 554 [2d Dept 1988]).
Claimant's use of a notice to admit as a vehicle to ascertain why certain conduct was undertaken by the defendant is patently improper. Such matters are incapable of a simple admission or denial and seek the sort of information for which a notice to admit is improper. Instead, claimant may be well advised to explore the other discovery devices permitted under CPLR article 31, including the use of interrogatories under CPLR 3130 and/or a demand for documents under CPLR 3120.
Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted and claimant's Demand For Admissions is stricken.
June 3, 2014
Saratoga Springs, New York
FRANCIS T. COLLINS
Judge of the Court of Claims
The Court considered the following papers:
Notice of motion dated March 7, 2014;
Affidavit of Joan Matalavage sworn to March 7, 2014 with exhibits;
Affidavit and letter in opposition to motion of David Brown sworn to March 19, 2014.