Opinion
No. 11-02-00139-CR
June 26, 2003. Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(b).
Appeal from Dallas County.
Opinion
The jury convicted Katina Latisha Brown of capital murder, and the trial court assessed her punishment at confinement for life. We affirm. In her first point of error, appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to show that she intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the victim. In her fourth point of error, appellant claims that the evidence was factually insufficient to show that she caused the death of the victim. In order to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000). In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence supporting guilt is so weak as to render the conviction clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the evidence supporting guilt, although adequate when taken alone, is so greatly outweighed by the overwhelming weight of contrary evidence as to render the conviction clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996). Appellant was indicted for the capital murder of the two-year-old victim. The victim was nicknamed "Little Jay," and that is how we will refer to him in this opinion; his father is known as "Big Jay." Little Jay died of multiple blunt injuries on September 16, 2000. Little Jay was the son of Juzri Nagi Flax, Sr. (Big Jay) and Vatosha Powdrell. Appellant was dating Big Jay at the time of the offense. On September 15, 2000, Little Jay was staying at appellant's apartment while Big Jay went out with friends. Appellant testified that appellant, appellant's son (Daequan), and Little Jay were eating when Big Jay left. Appellant testified that, after Daequan and Little Jay ate and cleaned up, they played. She later washed them and put pajamas on them. Appellant testified that she let the boys watch "Scream" on cable and that they fell asleep while watching the movie. The State offered the listing of the broadcasts on the night of September 15, 2000, to show that cable television was not showing "Scream" that night. Appellant testified that she had given Robitussin, a cough medicine, to both Daequan and Little Jay to keep them from getting sick. Appellant testified that she put both boys to bed in Daequan's bed between 11:30 p.m. and 11:45 p.m. While she was in the kitchen rinsing out her hair, appellant heard a whining-type cry. She went to check on the boys and noticed that Little Jay had fallen out of the bed; she put him back to bed. Appellant testified that, at that time, she noticed a small scratch on Little Jay but that he appeared not to be injured in any way. Appellant testified that, after Big Jay returned home around 2:30 a.m., she asked him to check on the boys. She left for work around 4:00 a.m. and "clocked in" a little before 4:30 a.m. She did not check on the boys before leaving. Appellant testified that she stayed at work until 8:30 a.m. and that, after making a couple of stops, she came home. Appellant testified that she could not sleep and that she got up and made breakfast for the boys. Big Jay got up, said that he had a hangover, got something to drink, and went back to bed. When Daequan woke up, appellant sent him in to awaken Little Jay. Appellant stated that Daequan came back and told her that there was food in the bed and that Little Jay would not wake up. When she went into the room, appellant saw vomit on the bed. As she checked Little Jay for fever, his whole body turned over when she turned him. Appellant then realized that Little Jay was dead. Detective Patricia Ann Sanmartino was one of the patrol officers called to the scene on September 16, 2000. Detective Sanmartino spoke with Big Jay, Little Jay's mom, and appellant. Detective Sanmartino testified that Big Jay and appellant related the events of September 15 up to the time the paramedics showed up on September 16. Detective Sanmartino testified that appellant had given her a very specific time line for the events of that night. She said that such detail was very unusual in "her line of work." Detective Sanmartino further testified that appellant told her she gave Nyquil to Daequan and Little Jay. When the officers executed a search warrant at appellant's apartment on October 4, Detective Sanmartino and her partner found Nyquil but did not find Robitussin. Detective Sanmartino testified that the sheets and pillowcases had been removed from the bed but were later recovered from appellant's mother. Big Jay testified to a time line of events similar to that to which appellant testified. When he came home between 2:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., he turned on the bathroom light directly across from the room in which the boys were sleeping. He testified that he did not touch Little Jay and that nothing looked unusual to him. Big Jay further testified that it had been a long time since appellant had worked overtime in the early morning hours. He was under the impression that she was going to work in the morning at the normal time because he was going to watch the boys. The medical examiner, Dr. Jennie Duval, testified as to her findings in the autopsy. Externally, Little Jay had a raised bruise and a 1-1/2-inch long scratch on his forehead, some abrasions on his cheek, and bruises on his back and hip. Dr. Duval testified that these were all recent injuries. Internally, Little Jay suffered bleeding and swelling of the brain and bleeding in his chest cavity. His liver and pancreas were completely split lengthwise. Little Jay's transverse colon was lacerated, and there had been bleeding in his kidneys. Dr. Duval testified that all of these injuries were caused by forceful kicks or punches to the stomach. She stated that these multiple blunt injuries caused Little Jay to internally bleed to death. Dr. Duval testified that Little Jay's stomach contents were clearly recognizable. She further testified that, if the stomach contents are recognizable, then it is probable that the victim had eaten within two hours of death. Dr. Duval also stated that vomiting could be a result of the type of injuries Little Jay suffered. Dr. Duval testified that the toxicology report showed that Little Jay's blood and his pillowcase both contained the narcotics found in Nyquil but not in Robitussin. She further testified that the evidence of Nyquil in Little Jay's blood would indicate that he had taken the medicine within one-half hour to an hour before he died. The medical expert called by appellant, Dr. Lloyd White, testified that the digestive studies relied upon by Dr. Duval had been conducted only on adults and that they were not accurate for children. However, he testified that there was nothing to indicate that a child's digestion would be different. He also stated that it was a "rule of thumb" that recognizable food in the stomach contents would indicate that the food had been consumed within two hours of death. Both experts agreed that rigor mortis alone was not a good indicator of the time of death. The evidence showed that appellant was alone with Little Jay and Daequan from approximately 9:45 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. on September 15, 2000. The evidence further showed that Big Jay was alone with the boys from around 4:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. The medical evidence suggests that Little Jay died around midnight, while he was with appellant. The jury was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony and as such could choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness's testimony. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. ART. 36.13 (Vernon 1981); Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986), cert. den'd, 488 U.S. 872 (1988). The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused Little Jay's death. We overrule appellant's first and fourth points of error. In her second and third points of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to impeach appellant and her mother through improper cross-examination. Appellant further argues that the trial court also erred when it allowed the State to question its rebuttal witness about specific acts of misconduct. Appellant, her mother Ernestine Brown, and her sister Cheketa Banks testified. Through these witnesses, an impression was created that appellant was a good mother and that appellant had good caregiver skills. Brown testified as follows:
Q: Tell us a little bit about the relationship between [appellant] and Daequan.
A: It's a real close relationship. She would take them — She would take Daequan to the movies, Chuck E. Cheese's.
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I'm going to object as to irrelevant.
THE COURT: [Defense Counsel].
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It simply shows her interaction with children and her mothering skills, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I'll take it
[PROSECUTOR]: It's irrelevant, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I'll take it, [Prosecutor]. Overruled.
Q: You can answer.
A: Okay. She would take them to Chuck E. Cheese's and take them to the movies, take them skating. When the day care would have their outing, she would take them on the outing. She would take off work and go. But when she would take off work and go, then she would go in that night and work and I would watch him, so she would make up her time that she missed from not being at work.
Q: Now, in watching her with Daequan, have you ever seen any tendency on her part to over discipline or be too physical with him?
A: No.
Q: Is she the — In terms of her personality, she is the type of person that, yes or no, if she gets under stress, she might flip out and —
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I'm going to object.
A: No.
[PROSECUTOR]: That's irrelevant and improper character evidence from this witness.
THE COURT: [Defense Counsel], you want to respond to that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, Judge, it's certainly not improper character evidence. The mother is simply describing the relationship of her daughter in a parenting situation with a young child. And that goes right to the very heart of what we are trying here.
THE COURT: All right. I'll overrule. I'll take it, [Prosecutor].After a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court found that the above testimony opened the door to rebuttal evidence; and, on cross-examination, the State asked Brown questions concerning an incident involving another child, Tremain Davis. The State asked Brown if she knew that appellant was involved with Joseph Davis in 1990 and that Davis had a 9-month-old son, Tremain. Brown answered that she did. The State further asked Brown if she knew that Child Protective Services (CPS) had investigated appellant concerning an injury to Tremain while he was in the care of appellant. Brown testified that she did not. The State also asked Brown if she knew that Tremain was in the hospital in traction because of a broken femur bone. Brown said that she did. Appellant's sister, Banks, testified that appellant was good to Little Jay and that appellant treated him like her own son. Appellant testified on her own behalf regarding the night Little Jay died. She stated that she had formed an emotional bond with Little Jay. On cross-examination, the State questioned appellant about her disciplining her child, Daequan. Specifically the State asked:
Q: Do you recall telling your co-workers about a time when Daequan couldn't remember, couldn't tell you what he had eaten at your sister's house and that you popped him so hard upside the head that he flew across the car; do you remember telling your co-workers that?
A: No, I ain't never hit my baby in his head, nor would I hit any other baby in the head.Even though this statement was made during cross-examination, the State had not solicited this testimony. Appellant volunteered the information. See Dunn v. State, 804 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1991, pet'n ref'd). The State informed the court of its intention to question appellant about a prior offense. The court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury, found that the prior testimony offered by appellant created a false impression with the jury, and allowed the State to rebut that false impression with the introduction of evidence concerning the injury to Tremain. The State questioned appellant about being investigated by CPS after Tremain's injury. Appellant stated that she did not know that CPS specifically was investigating her until this trial started. Appellant testified that she believed that Tremain's injury was the result of a car wreck that had happened around seven days prior to the time that the hospital admitted Tremain for the broken leg. After appellant testified and had rested, the State called Dr. Carolyn J. Levitt, an expert pediatrician in the field of child abuse. Dr. Levitt testified that she was a consultant in a case which involved alleged abuse to Tremain. She reviewed X-rays and participated in the staffing at the hospital in which Tremain was admitted. Dr. Levitt testified that, when Tremain was first taken to the hospital on June 11, 1990, a few days after the car accident, the X-rays showed no fracture or injury to his leg. On June 15, 1990, Tremain was brought to the emergency room with swelling in his leg and a fever. This time, Tremain's X-ray showed a definite fracture of his femur. Dr. Levitt testified that the fracture could not have been missed in the first X-ray. She further testified that the fracture occurred within a few hours of Tremain's June 15 evaluation at the emergency room. Dr. Levitt gave her opinion that the injury Tremain sustained to his leg could not have been the result of a car accident which occurred several days prior. A trial court's decision to admit or to exclude evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001). An appellate court will not reverse a trial court's ruling unless that ruling falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Burden v. State, supra at 615. The trial courts should favor admission in close cases in keeping with the presumption of admissibility. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991). The limitation on introduction of evidence relating to extraneous offenses is designed to prevent the accused from being tried for a collateral crime. Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985). However, TEX.R.EVID. 404(a)(1) allows "[e]vidence of a pertinent character trait offered by an accused. . . or by the prosecution to rebut the same." Evidence of a prior bad act is relevant to rebut a defensive theory. Montgomery v. State, supra. A witness who testifies to the defendant's good character may be cross-examined regarding relevant specific misconduct by the defendant. Reynolds v. State, 848 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet'n ref'd). Once a witness opens the door by testifying to the defendant's good character traits and presents an image of a person who would not commit such type of offense, the State may impeach such testimony with specific instances of conduct. Roberts v. State, 29 S.W.3d 596 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2000, pet'n ref'd). However, the right to cross-examine a character witness on specific instances of a defendant's conduct is subject to two limitations: first, there must be some factual basis for the incidents inquired about; and second, those incidents must be relevant to character traits at issue in the trial. Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 350-51 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002). Taken together and in context, the testimony offered by appellant and her witnesses created the impression that appellant would never harm Little Jay or any other child. Appellant specifically denied committing the charged offense. Additionally, she stated that she would never "hit any other baby in the head." While some of Little Jay's injuries were to his head, we do not think that, when taken in the context of the whole case, appellant's testimony would limit rebuttal testimony solely to head injuries. Her mother and sister testified that appellant was a good mother and was not abusive toward Little Jay. This direct evidence tends to leave the impression that she never had been and never would be abusive toward children. These broad statements and assertions exposed appellant to rebuttal proof of similar acts against other children. When a false picture is presented by a defendant, the prosecution may impeach the defense witnesses' testimony by introduction of extraneous offenses. The court found that the State had a good faith basis for introducing the extraneous offense. The questions asked by the State referred to an incident very similar to the offense in this case. Tremain was the son of appellant's boyfriend at the time and was in appellant's care. The testimony reflected upon appellant's child-care skills and rebutted the impression Brown and appellant left with the jury that appellant had good mothering skills. Further, the testimony of Dr. Levitt impeached not only appellant's testimony regarding actions toward other children but also appellant's testimony that the injury to Tremain was from the car accident. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the impeachment testimony. Appellant's second and third points of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.