Opinion
No. 14-05-01022-CR
Opinion filed February 1, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 180th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1013109.
Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, HUDSON, and GUZMAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Robert Lynn Brown, plead guilty to the aggravated robbery of Jamie Melchor and was sentenced to confinement for fifteen years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. In two points of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and his motion to suppress oral statements. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of December 8, 2004, Deputy Victor Zigmont of the Harris County Sheriff's Department responded to a call from J.C. Rutherford, a resident of northeast Harris County. Rutherford stated that two men named "Bobby" and "Ryan" had come to his home and accused him of breaking into their nearby residence. Rutherford told Zigmont that "Bobby" and "Ryan" had stolen property, including stolen vehicles and license plates from stolen vehicles, at their residence. Zigmont took Rutherford to a residence on Spicewood Lane, where "Bobby" and "Ryan" were alleged to live. Rutherford found license plates on the property and showed them to Zigmont. Zigmont determined that one of the license plates belonged to a stolen Chevrolet Suburban. Zigmont also observed one of the windows on the front of the residence was broken. However, the opening in the broken window was not large enough for a person to pass through. Also on December 8, Deputies Gregg Board and Jesse Aranda went to the same residence on Spicewood Lane to execute multiple warrants for the arrest of Christopher Moak. When the officers arrived, they observed the back door was open and a window was unsecured. Board and Aranda entered the rear of the residence and determined that no burglary was in progress at that time. While the officers were at the location, they received information from Rutherford that an occupant of the Spicewood residence might be driving a stolen Chevrolet Suburban. Board and Aranda believed that Moak was the owner and occupant of the Spicewood residence. On December 9, 2004, Deputy Board returned to the Spicewood residence to execute arrest warrants for Moak. Board observed the glass in the front window of the residence was completely broken out, which was significantly different from the condition he had seen the prior day. A Chevrolet Suburban with no license plates was backed into the driveway of the residence. Board checked the vehicle identification number ("VIN") on the Suburban and learned that the vehicle had been reported stolen. Board suspected a burglary was in progress at the residence and called for the assistance of other officers. Board entered the Suburban and found appellant's wallet and cellular telephone, neither of which contained any information indicating appellant lived at the Spicewood residence. A purse belonging to Susan Lopez was also recovered from the Suburban. The purse contained a checkbook belonging to Megan Goodman, the girlfriend of the complainant, Jamie Melchor. Additional officers arrived at the scene and secured the perimeter of the residence. The officers heard movement inside the residence and repeatedly instructed the occupants to come outside. The officers observed Susan Lopez, who began to exit the residence, but instead walked back down a hallway and into a bedroom. Deputy Board contacted his supervisor, Sergeant Steubing, and stated that he believed a burglary was in progress at the residence. Board informed Steubing that a stolen vehicle was backed into the driveway, the picture window on the front of the residence had been broken out, and the people inside the residence refused to come out. Steubing instructed Board to enter the residence through the broken window. The officers entered the residence and found appellant and Lopez in a bedroom. A loaded pistol-grip shotgun was lying on the bed near appellant. It was subsequently determined that the shotgun had been stolen, and the same type of weapon had been used to commit an aggravated robbery involving Jamie Melchor. It was also later determined that the residence on Spicewood Lane was owned by appellant's mother and leased to appellant by his mother. Appellant was taken into custody and advised of his Miranda rights. Deputy Board transported appellant to the police station. While being transported, appellant sua sponte stated that he bought the Suburban for $500; he thought the VIN plate on the vehicle had been changed; and the vehicle would not show up as having been stolen. Appellant further stated that he "was going to take the rap for all this" because his wife was a good person. After arriving at the police station, appellant was interviewed by Houston Police Officer David Pena, Jr., who was investigating the aggravated robbery of complainant, Jamie Melchor. Appellant made additional statements to Officer Pena. On February 22, 2005, a Harris County grand jury indicted appellant for the aggravated robbery of Jamie Melchor. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to suppress oral statements. On September 16, 2005, the trial court held a suppression hearing and considered both of appellant's motions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence and denied appellant's motion to suppress oral statements with regard to statements made by appellant to Deputy Board. On September 21, 2005, appellant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to fifteen years' confinement. This appeal followed.STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a trial court's suppression ruling, we give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that the record supports. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We afford the same degree of deference to a trial court's ruling on mixed questions of law and fact when the resolution of the ultimate question turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Id. We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact when the resolution of the issue does not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. During a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We must sustain the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Villareal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Suppress Evidence In his first point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the police entered his house without a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The State argues the police officers who entered the residence had probable cause to believe a burglary was in progress, and exigent circumstances justifying entry into the residence also existed based upon the reasonable belief that a burglary was in progress. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless entry of a residence by police without probable cause and exigent circumstances. Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). It is undisputed that the police did not have a warrant to search the premises. Therefore, we must determine whether, under the facts of this case, the police had probable cause and exigent circumstances to enter appellant's residence without a warrant.A. Did the police have probable cause to enter the Spicewood residence?
Probable cause is the accumulation of facts which, when viewed in their totality, would lead a reasonable police officer to conclude, with fair probability, that a crime has been committed or is being committed. Id. at 599. Probable cause to search exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence of a crime will be found. Id. at 597. When the police decided to enter appellant's residence without a warrant, the following facts were known to them: (1) The glass was completely broken out of a window on the front of the residence, more so than it had been on the previous day. (2) A Chevrolet Suburban was backed into the driveway of the residence, and the vehicle had no front or back license plates. (3) A check of the Suburban's VIN indicated that the vehicle was stolen. (4) A wallet containing appellant's birth certificate and social security card was found in the Suburban. Nothing in the wallet indicated appellant lived at the residence. (5) A purse belonging to Susan Lopez was found in the Suburban. The purse contained a checkbook that belonged to Megan Goodman. (6) Before the officers entered the residence, they heard movement inside the residence and repeatedly instructed the occupants to come outside. (7) Susan Lopez began to walk out of the residence, but then walked back down a hallway. Under factually similar circumstances, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that police had probable cause to believe a burglary had been committed. See In re J.D., 68 S.W.3d 775, 779B80 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). In In re J.D., police responded to a report that two juveniles had been seen carrying a rifle in the vicinity of an elementary school. Id. at 779. A witness at the scene told police that the juveniles had entered a nearby residence. Id. Two officers approached the residence and heard noises coming from within. Id. The officers observed that the front door had been tampered with — the screen on the door had been torn, a window was broken, and the door was ajar. Id. Suspecting a burglary was in progress, the police pounded on the front door and instructed the occupants to come outside. Id. When no one responded, the police entered the residence. Id. at 780. The court of appeals held that police had sufficient probable cause to search the residence based on facts indicating a burglary had been committed. Id. at 779B80. Similarly, in the instant case, police observed a window on the front of the residence was completely broken out, more so than it had been on a previous day. The police heard noises coming from within the residence and repeatedly instructed the occupants to come outside. While looking through the broken front window, Deputy Board saw Susan Lopez inside the residence. Despite repeated instructions by police, occupants of the residence refused to come outside. The police were also aware that a stolen Chevrolet Suburban was backed into the driveway. We conclude that the facts known by the officers at the scene were sufficient to lead a reasonable police officer to conclude, with fair probability, that a burglary had been committed or was being committed. See In re J.D., 68 S.W.3d at 779B80. Therefore, the police had probable cause to search the Spicewood residence.B. Were there exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry of the Spicewood residence by police?
Exigent circumstances are circumstances which justify the immediate need to enter a residence without first obtaining a search warrant. Parker, 206 S.W.3d at 597. A variety of situations may place a police officer in circumstances in which a warrantless entry is viewed as reasonable. McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 107 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Situations creating exigent circumstances include danger to the officer or victims, an increased likelihood of apprehending a suspect, or the possible destruction of evidence. Id. The same facts which give rise to probable cause may also be relevant to an analysis of exigent circumstances. Parker, 206 S.W.3d at 600B01. In Barocio v. State, 158 S.W.3d 498, 499B500 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the possibility a burglary is in progress or has been recently committed may provide officers with exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry of a residence. In Barocio, two sheriff's deputies noticed an illegally parked car, with the door open and the keys in the ignition, in front of a house. Id. at 498. When they approached the residence to investigate, they observed pry marks on the front door lock. Id. The deputies knocked on the front door. Id. While waiting for someone to answer the door, they heard loud noises coming from within the residence and smelled burnt marijuana. Id. The defendant answered the door and was unable to provide identification. Id. at 499. At the suppression hearing, one of the deputies testified he followed the defendant into the residence to investigate the odor of marijuana and the possibility that a burglary was in progress. Id. Under these circumstances, the court held exigent circumstances existed based on the officers' reasonable belief they were investigating a burglary and that other suspects might be inside the residence. Id. The court reasoned:Because suspects or victims may still be in the residence, and because there is an immediate and urgent need to protect the resident and his property, the warrantless police entry may be justified as exigent depending on the specific circumstances of the case. For example, police may properly enter to look for other perpetrators or victims.Id. at 500 (quoting Barocio v. State, 117 S.W.3d 19, 33 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2003), rev'd, 158 S.W.3d 498 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (Guzman, J., dissenting)). In the instant case, as in Barocio, evidence introduced at the suppression hearing shows that the police reasonably believed they were investigating a burglary and suspects might be inside the residence. The broken window on the front of the residence, like the pry marks on the door lock in Barocio, is an indication of forced entry. The stolen Suburban backed into the driveway is further evidence of foul play. A search of the purse and wallet found inside the Suburban yielded no indication that the driver of the vehicle resided at the Spicewood residence. The State introduced evidence of an urgent need to protect the police and potential victims within the residence. Deputy Board testified he heard noises coming from within the residence and saw Susan Lopez through the window. However, the occupants of the residence refused to respond to repeated commands to come outside. Board also testified he was concerned that occupants of the house might be armed, and that police had revealed their presence and location by issuing verbal commands. Board testified: "If it was a burglary and they're in there, there is no telling if they're armed or what they are going to do in the house now. We've got the house perimetered [sic] at that time. We don't want to give them the chance. They know where we're at." Under these circumstances, a reasonable police officer could have believed a burglary was in progress and there was an immediate need to enter the residence to apprehend suspects and protect the police and the occupants of the residence. Appellant claims Barocio is factually distinguishable from his case because, unlike Barocio, the police were on scene for approximately one hour before entering his residence. Appellant's argument fails to acknowledge that the investigation conducted by the police, prior to entering the residence, led to their knowledge of facts constituting exigent circumstances. Board testified that he checked the VIN on the Suburban and called dispatch to determine if the vehicle was stolen. He also searched the wallet and purse found in the Suburban and saw no indication that the occupants of the Suburban lived in the residence. Board called for the assistance of other officers, and attempted to make contact with the occupants of the residence. Finally, Board saw Susan Lopez through the window and decided to enter the residence. Here, as in Barocio, the police entered appellant's residence when they became aware of exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry. Taking into account all the information known to the police at the time they entered appellant's residence, we hold that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry of the residence. Because we find both probable cause and exigent circumstances, appellant's first issue is overruled.
II. Motion to Suppress Oral Statements
In his second point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress oral statements made by appellant to Detective Pena because the statements were the product of custodial interrogation and were not recorded as required by article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3. (Vernon 2005). In response, the State argues that the trial court issued an oral ruling on the record suppressing appellant's oral statements to Officer Pena — the exact relief sought by appellant on appeal. Therefore, the State contends, appellant's second point of error should be overruled as moot. We agree with the State. Appellant's motion to suppress oral statements argues broadly that "the oral statements of the defendant" should be suppressed. Evidence at the suppression hearing shows that appellant made oral statements to Deputy Board, while being transported to the police station, and to Detective Pena, after arriving at the police station. Appellant's motion to suppress oral statements does not distinguish between the statements made by appellant to Deputy Board and the statements made by appellant to Detective Pena. However, appellant's argument on appeal is expressly limited to the trial court's ruling regarding the suppression of statements made by appellant to Detective Pena. On September 16, 2005, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing and considered both of appellant's motions; specifically, appellant's motion to suppress evidence and appellant's motion to suppress oral statements. Deputy Board gave the following testimony at the suppression hearing regarding the spontaneous statements made by appellant to Deputy Board while en route to the police station:State's counsel: Did you Mirandize him after he was placed into custody?
Deputy Board: He was Mirandized immediately.
State's counsel: At that time did you ask him questions about the Suburban that was at the Spicewood address?
Deputy Board: I didn't ask him specific questions about it, but when we were en route to the station, he made comments about it.
State's counsel: What did he say to you?
Deputy Board: He told me that he had purchased the Suburban for $500 and he thought the VIN plate had been changed on it and that it would not show stolen.
State's counsel: You said he did not answer questions but made comments?
Deputy Board: I wasn't asking him questions because the HPD detective was coming to the station and I was not doing a follow-up in this case.
State's counsel: So tell me the circumstances wherein he made the statements to you. Where were you at [sic]? Where was he?
Deputy Board: We were driving to the police station in the police car when he made the statement. It all started off when he made the statement: I'm going to take the rap for all this because my wife is a good person.At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court made the following oral rulings on the record:
The Court: Mr. Brown, I will deny your motion to suppress.
Defense counsel: Is that also as to the —
The Court: The oral statements, anything that is not as a result of interrogation, as well.
Defense counsel: So we are clear, are you saying that those are also the questions of Detective Pena?
The Court: No, no.
Defense counsel: Because there is [sic] different statements.
The Court: No, no. I'm talking about what he said the defendant volunteered to him in the car on the way that were not as a result of the questions. I'm not talking about anything else.Based on the transcript of the suppression hearing, we find that the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress oral statements only with regard to statements made by appellant to Deputy Board while being transported to the police station. Therefore, the trial court implicitly granted appellant's motion to suppress his unrecorded oral statements to Officer Pena. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A). That ruling made appellant's point of error regarding the Pena interrogation moot. Accordingly appellant's second point of error is overruled.