Opinion
No. 05-08-00403-CR
Opinion Filed April 2, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F07-38767-WV.
Before Justices MORRIS, WRIGHT, and MOSELEY.
OPINION
William Charles Brown, Jr. waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. The trial court assessed punishment at forty years' imprisonment. In three issues, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and the trial court never found him guilty of any offense. We affirm. In his first issue, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary because he was misled by an erroneous admonishment regarding probation. Appellant asserts the trial court admonished that a jury could not consider him for probation because he had a prior felony conviction, although appellant did not have a prior felony conviction. The State responds that the trial court properly admonished appellant regarding his ineligibility for probation. During the plea hearing, the trial judge admonished appellant both orally and in writing regarding the punishment range for the offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2007); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Appellant testified he understood the charges, the punishment range, and that the judge could assess punishment anywhere within the punishment range. Appellant testified he freely and voluntarily waived a jury trial and wanted to plead guilty because he hoped to receive probation. Appellant's signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence was admitted without objection. The trial judge said the court could consider giving appellant deferred adjudication probation, but a jury could not due to the nature of the offense. After a ten-minute recess, the trial judge told appellant that if he had no prior felony conviction, he would be eligible to seek probation from a jury, whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty. The judge said he would allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and confer with counsel to decide if he wanted a trial before a jury or the court. When the hearing resumed, appellant said he understood a jury could recommend probation if he was found guilty by the jury, but that he wanted to proceed with a guilty plea before the court. The judge passed the case for a presentence investigation report and sentencing. During the sentencing hearing, appellant again testified he understood the trial court could give him deferred adjudication probation or sentence him to a prison term within the punishment range. Appellant testified he robbed a fast-food restaurant at gunpoint because he needed money to buy marijuana, and he did not intend to hurt anyone when he fired two gunshots through the manager's office door, hitting an employee. Appellant also testified about his lengthy juvenile criminal history and that he was on deferred probation from Tarrant County at the time he committed the aggravated robbery. Nothing in the record shows appellant was misled by the trial court's admonishments regarding probation. The fact that appellant received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his plea involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). We conclude appellant has not shown his guilty plea was involuntary. We resolve appellant's first issue against him. In his second issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient because his signed judicial confession was not made part of the evidence held by the court reporter. In his third issue, appellant contends the trial court never found him guilty of any offense. Appellant cites no authority for his contentions. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, and the trial court made an implied finding of guilt. The failure to adequately brief an issue, either by failing to specifically argue and analyze one's position or provide authorities and record citations, waives any error on appeal. See Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 881 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h); Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Because appellant failed to adequately brief his second and third issues as mandated by the appellate rules, we conclude he waived these complaints. We resolve appellant's second and third issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
The trial court's certification recites appellant waived his right to appeal the guilty plea in this case, but reserved the right to appeal the punishment portion of the open plea. Because appellant's waiver was entered before appellant knew what the punishment would be, the waiver is ineffective. See Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794, 797 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).