Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet, 826 F.3d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 2016) ; Miller v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 484 (7th Cir. 1997). Whether a function is essential is a question of fact, not law. Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2016). We are obligated to consider the employer's judgment and to consider a job description as evidence of the job's essential functions.

"The essential-function inquiry is a factual question, not a question of law." Brown v. Smith , 827 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff "bears the initial burden of establishing that she was a qualified individual who could perform the essential functions of her position."

"[A] plaintiff alleging employment discrimination generally is required to mitigate damages by making diligent efforts to obtain reasonably comparable employment." Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2016). See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982) ("An unemployed or underemployed claimant, like all other Title VII claimants, is subject to the statutory duty to minimize damages set out in § 706(g).").

Whether responding to violent emergencies is an essential function of the lieutenant position "is a factual question, not a question of law." Brown v. Smith , 827 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). As the district court correctly observed, to answer that question, "we consider the employer's judgment, including written job descriptions, as evidence."

Whether the defendants raised a genuine issue of material fact about the pre-termination proceedings is not the sort of question of law that might permit appellate review of the denial of summary judgment. See Brown v. Smith , 827 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2016) (" ‘question of law’ typically concerns ‘the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision, regulation, or common law doctrine rather than ... whether the party opposing summary judgment had raised a genuine issue of material fact’ ", quoting Ahrenholz v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois , 219 F.3d 674, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2000) (addressing "question of law" as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) )). Accordingly, there is no basis here for appellate review of the denial of Carmody's own motion for summary judgment.

We give the district court “substantial discretion with respect to the precise wording of instructions so long as the final result, read as a whole, completely and correctly states the law.” Saathoff v. Davis , 826 F.3d 925, 932 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brown v. Smith , 827 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We review a district court's decisions on jury instructions for abuse of discretion.”). Reversal due to an improper jury instruction is warranted only if the “instruction misstates the law in a way that misguides the jury to the extent that the complaining party suffered prejudice.” Brown , 827 F.3d at 614.

A lost-wages award "compensates an unlawfully discharged employee for the loss of earnings that [she] sustains as a result of the discharge." Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2006)). Harnishfeger argues that she is entitled to an award of special damages based on her lost wages before securing new employment, totaling $1, 152.91 (Filing No. 98 at 27).

Even if Plaintiff could not renew his CDL in 2016, he disputes that maintaining a CDL was an essential function of the General Laborer job. "The content of a job description is merely one of several factors courts consider when determining whether a function is essential." Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). One relevant factor is the "work experience of past incumbents on the job."

"[A] plaintiff alleging employment discrimination generally is required to mitigate damages by making diligent efforts to obtain reasonably comparable employment." Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). "The employer generally bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate, which entails showing not only a lack of 'reasonable diligence' but also 'a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff might have found comparable work by exercising reasonable diligence.'"

Self-employment often is a reasonable alternative to a conventional job search even where new the venture is unrelated to a former employer's operations and is not profitable.See Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2016) (self-employment reasonable despite lack of success); Jackson v. Host Int'l, Inc., 426 F. App'x 215, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2011) (self-employment reasonable where after unsuccessfully searching for employment, plaintiff opened a business that did not profit); Coronet Foods v. NLRB, 158 F.3d 782, 801 (4th Cir. 1998) (self-employment and work in other industries reasonable forms of mitigation); Poff v. Prime Care Med., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133682, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2015) (self-employment selling items online and opening a roofing business reasonable despite past work as a nurse); Newcomb v. Corinth Sch. Dist., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41700, at *26 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2015) (a change from custodial work to starting an air-conditioner repair business reasonable); Serricchio v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 606 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (D. Conn. 2009) (opening a tanning salon reasonable despite past work in banking industry and where salon was not immediately lucrative). By contrast, it is usu