" (See, also, Eachus v. LosAngeles etc. Ry., 103 Cal. 614 [37 P. 750, 42 Am.St.Rep. 149]; Lane v. San Diego Electric Ry. Co., 208 Cal. 29 [ 280 P. 109]; Williams v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592, 594 [ 89 P. 330]; Hargro v. Hodgdon, 89 Cal. 623 [26 P. 1106]; Geurkink v. City of Petaluma, 112 Cal. 306 [44 P. 570]; Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713 [ 123 P.2d 505].) The identity of the tests in the nuisance cases and actions for damages under article I, section 14, is forcefully brought out in Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171 [ 88 P. 713], in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin the construction of a railroad in a street. In sustaining a demurrer to the complaint the court declared: "Generally speaking, a public nuisance does not furnish ground for action by a private person, but such public nuisance may inflict upon an individual such peculiar injury as to entitle him to maintain a separate action for its abatement, or to recover damages therefor. . . . The injury to the individual must, however, be different in kind and not merely in degree from that suffered by the general public.

(10) These rules, however, do not give aid or comfort to Helix for to state a cause of action for nuisance, sufficient facts must be alleged so the court may conclude a nuisance exists within the statutory provisions. ( People v. Lim, 18 Cal.2d 872, 881 [ 118 P.2d 472]; People v. Seccombe, 103 Cal.App. 306, 310 [ 284 P. 725]; Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171, 174, 175 [ 88 P. 713].) Additionally, a private party does not have a cause of action on account of a public nuisance unless he alleges facts showing special injury to himself in person or property, and of a character different in kind from that suffered by the general public.

Thus the mere narrowing of a street is not ipsofacto an infringement of his right of access ( Brown v. Boardof Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274, 281 [57 P. 82]; and see Bigley v. Nunan, 53 Cal. 403), but where there is evidence showing that the reduction in width has left a street insufficient in width to afford ingress and egress in a reasonable manner, an interference with his right is clearly established ( Rose v. State of California, supra). Similarly, a change in the grade of a street or the construction of an improvement thereon does not per se constitute an interference with the right of access ( Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171, 174, 175 [ 88 P. 713]; Montgomery v. Santa Ana etc. Co., 104 Cal. 186, 190 [37 P. 786, 43 Am.St.Rep. 89, 25 L.R.A. 654]; City of San Mateo v. Railroad Commission, 9 Cal.2d 1, 9, 10 [ 68 P.2d 713]), but if the obstruction substantially interferes with ingress and egress to the property, considering its nature and the particular uses to which it is adaptable, the easement of access is impaired. ( Rose v. State of California, supra; Eachus v. City of Los Angeles, 130 Cal. 492 [ 62 P. 829, 80 Am.St.Rep. 147]; Williams v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592 [ 89 P. 330]; Lane v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co., 208 Cal. 29 [ 280 P. 109]; McCandless v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal. 67 [ 4 P.2d 139].)

(Civ. Code, sec. 3493) [1] To entitle a party to sue to enjoin a public nuisance he must allege and prove facts showing that it causes special injury to himself in person or property, and of a character different in kind from that suffered by the general public. ( Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 174, [ 88 P. 713]; City Store v. San Jose etc. Co., 150 Cal. 279, [ 88 P. 977]; Spring Valley W. W. v. Fifield, 136 Cal. 15, [ 68 P. 108]; Code Civ. Proc., sec. 731.) Since the plaintiff is not injured at all, either specially or otherwise, he cannot under the general law maintain any action with respect to the continuance of the water service.

[Citations.]" ( Brown v. Rea (1907) 150 Cal. 171, 174 [ 88 P. 713].) Defendant argues plaintiffs have failed to allege special injury.

"Where the nuisance alleged is not also a private nuisance as to a private individual he does not have a cause of action on account of a public nuisance unless he alleges facts showing special injury to himself in person or property of a character different in kind from that suffered by the general public. ( Ward v. Oakley Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 840, 850 [ 271 P.2d 536]; Donahue v. Stockton Gas etc. Co., 6 Cal.App. 276, 279-280 [ 92 P. 196]; Wallace v. MacDonough Theater Co., 34 Cal.App. 498, 499 [ 168 P. 144]; Voorheis v. Tidewater Southern Ry. Co., 41 Cal.App. 315, 320 [ 182 P. 797]; Hitch v. Scholle, 180 Cal. 467, 468-469 [ 181 P. 657]; Frost v. City of Los Angeles, 181 Cal. 22, 24 [ 183 P. 342, 6 A.L.R. 468]; Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171, 174 [ 88 P. 713]; Thompson v. Kraft Cheese Co., 210 Cal. 171, 178 [ 291 P. 204].) Under this rule the requirement is that the plaintiff's damage be different in kind, rather than in degree, from that shared by the general public.

(7) Where the nuisance alleged is not also a private nuisance as to a private individual he does not have a cause of action on account of a public nuisance unless he alleges facts showing special injury to himself in person or property of a character different in kind from that suffered by the general public. ( Ward v. Oakley Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 840, 850 [ 271 P.2d 536]; Donahue v. Stockton Gas etc. Co., 6 Cal.App. 276, 279-280 [ 92 P. 196]; Wallace v. MacDonough Theater Co., 34 Cal.App. 498, 499 [ 168 P. 144]; Voorheis v. Tidewater Southern Ry. Co., 41 Cal.App. 315, 320 [ 182 P. 797]; Hitch v. Scholle, 180 Cal. 467, 468-469 [ 181 P. 657]; Frost v. City of Los Angeles, 181 Cal. 22, 24 [ 183 P. 342, 6 A.L.R. 468]; Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171, 174 [ 88 P. 713]; Thompson v. Kraft Cheese Co., 210 Cal. 171, 178 [ 291 P. 204].) Under this rule the requirement is that the plaintiff's damage be different in kind, rather than in degree, from that shared by the general public.

That rule, applied to the instant case, would show an injunction should not be issued upon a complaint when all the allegations are general, showing that the complaint is founded simply upon information and belief, and contains absolutely no specific instances or facts supporting the conclusions of the pleader. In the case of Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171 [ 88 P. 713], the court held that a complaint seeking damages or an injunction which failed to show any specific acts, was insufficient to justify the granting of an injunction, or of a restraining order. The two cases which we have cited, and the reference to Corpus Juris, established that the complaint in this action, for the reasons which we have set forth herein, is insufficient to justify the issuance of an injunction, or to state a cause of action therefor, and that the demurrer of the defendants was properly sustained.

It may be, under certain facts, that an improvement might be enjoined where it interfered with the right of an easement of access to land until damages were paid which would follow such use, but a complaint, whether seeking damages after the construction, or an injunction before, must show some actual or threatened injury to a private property right of a plaintiff. The conclusion by the pleader that such a result will in all probability follow is a mere averment of opinion or conclusion too general and indefinite to afford a basis for relief by injunction ( Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171-175 [ 88 P. 713]; Willis v. Lauridson, 161 Cal. 106 [ 118 P. 530]). The order and judgment are affirmed.

[2] If the nuisance invades a distinct private right, a cause of action for injunction is not destroyed by the fact that similar rights of an indefinite number of other persons are also infringed in the same manner. ( Williams v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592 [ 89 P. 330]; Brown v. Rae, 150 Cal. 171 [ 88 P. 713]; Fisher v. Zumwalt, 128 Cal. 496 [ 61 P. 82].) [3] It seems to be assumed that because the premises on which the laundry is situated were zoned to permit the maintenance of such establishments, all persons building residences in that vicinity must submit to such discomforts and injuries as are ordinarily incident to the operation of similar industries in the manner in which they are customarily conducted.