As discussed above, because sexual harassment was not identified or detailed in Boudreaux's EEOC charge of discrimination, and thus she has failed to exhaust administrative remedies for any alleged sexual harassment, such conduct cannot be the basis for a constructive discharge claim. See, e.g., Brown v. Prentiss Reg'l Hosp., 2013 WL 610520, at *6-7 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2013) (citing Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 2002)) (court could not consider Title VII claim premised upon constructive discharge where plaintiff failed to allege facts that would support theory of constructive discharge in EEOC charge). Constructive discharge cannot be the back door for a sexual harassment claim barred at the front door.

Suspension without pay may be an adverse employment action. Hypolite v. City of Houston, Tex., 493 F. App'x 597, 606 (5th Cir. 2012) (temporary suspension without pay was an adverse employment action, but the court did not distinguish between discrimination and retaliation claims); Brown v. Prentiss Reg'l Hosp., No. 2:11-CV-180-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 610520, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2013) (suspension without pay qualifies as an adverse employment action in the Title VII discrimination context). The VA has not presented evidence clarifying whether the suspension was with or without pay.