Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-01242
10-10-2018
ANTHONY TARIQ BROWN, Plaintiff, v. SAROJ PATEL, Defendant.
(MARIANI, J.)
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is a complaint seeking damages (Doc. 1) and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5), both filed by pro se prisoner-plaintiff Anthony Tariq Brown (hereinafter referred to as "Brown"). At the time of the filing of his complaint, Brown was incarcerated at Lackawanna County Prison, located in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). For the reasons stated herein, the Court respectfully recommends that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5) be GRANTED, but that the complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED with leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 20, 2018, Brown filed the instant complaint, which names Saroj Patel (hereinafter "Patel") as the sole defendant. (Doc. 1). The same day, Brown also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2; Doc. 5). In his complaint, Brown avers that Patel owns the Red Carpet Inn located in Scranton, Pennsylvania (the "Red Carpet Inn"). (Doc. 1, at 1). Although sparse, the factual allegations in the complaint appear to stem from a criminal accusation made against Brown, presumably with respect to an incident that occurred at the Red Carpet Inn ("the crime"). (Doc. 1, at 2).
On October 27, 2017, Brown claims that an employee of the Red Carpet Inn, identified as Peter M. Wallace ("Wallace"), falsely accused him of the crime. (Doc. 1, at 2). Although Brown does not articulate what the accusation entailed, he alleges that Wallace engaged in racial profiling by wrongfully incriminating him, instead of another African-American male "who strangely entered the hotel weeks before," in the crime. (Doc. 1, at 2). Given the matter of mistaken identity, Brown further avers that Wallace, who worked "for and under the direction of Mr. Patel," assisted in his false imprisonment at the hands of the Scranton Police Department. (Doc. 1, at 2). While the body of the complaint does not expressly assert a cause of action against Patel, the civil cover sheet indicates that Brown brings his claims under the Federal False Claims Act and state law. (Doc. 1-1). As for relief, Brown requests that Patel assist him in "clear[ing] [his] name by being honest and truthful about the chain of events." (Doc. 1, at 2). Brown also seeks an unspecified amount of compensatory damages for the losses he incurred as a result of the alleged misconduct and the degradation of his character, as well as any future damages. (Doc. 1, at 2).
The matter is now before the Court pursuant to its statutory obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2) to screen the amended complaint and dismiss it if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. SECTION 1915 SCREENING STANDARDS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 F. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis and actions concerning prison conditions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). See generally Banks v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and standards). Here, as Brown seeks to bring his suit in forma pauperis, the screening provision under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) applies. In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Banks, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). A court "need not credit a complaint's 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). In order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted, and should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). "[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, which defines what a complaint should contain and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Thus, a pro se plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action. Indeed, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires a "showing that 'the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Phi lli ps, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may also consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
A. BROWN'S COMPLAINT IS SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 8
As a preliminary matter, the Court recommends that Brown's complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). To withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must satisfy the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 355 (3d Cir. 2005). Specifically, Rule 8(a) provides that "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8(d)(1) further instructs that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Thus, dismissal under Rule 8 is proper where a complaint "le[aves] the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action]," Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App'x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011), or where the complaint is so "rambling and unclear" as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441 F. App'x 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. App'x 431, 432 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal where "complaint fails to clearly identify which parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue").
Even when liberally construed, as is necessary for pro se complaints, Brown's complaint does not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Specifically, Brown fails to clearly articulate the proper basis for this Court's jurisdiction, either in the body of the complaint or in the civil coversheet. (Doc. 1; Doc. 1-1). Further, while the civil coversheet cites to the "False Claims Act" and "assault, libel, & slander" as the nature of the suit, it is unclear whether Brown intends these claims to be distinct from one another, given that the complaint is entirely devoid of any factual allegations that would allow the Court to reasonably infer a False Claims Act claim. Moreover, the conclusory allegations in the complaint do not show that Brown has a viable state law claim for relief against Patel for defamation. (Doc. 1-1). Indeed, the body of the complaint does not contain a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action, or any factual allegations of wrongdoing specifically attributable to Patel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Notably, Brown indicates that this Court has jurisdiction to hear his claims because the U.S. Government is a Plaintiff to the action. (Doc. 1-1). However, Brown evidently invoked this basis of jurisdiction in error. See Boczar v. Thomas, No. 3:17-CV-556, 2017 WL 5593965, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-556, 2017 WL 5616740 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017) (Finding that plaintiff could not rely on his averment that the U.S. Government was the plaintiff to establish federal jurisdiction, as he did "not bring a claim on behalf of the United States Government."); see also Eckenrode v. Grove, No. 1:CV-13-1228, 2013 WL 3788951, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 9, 2013), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part on other grounds, No. 1:13-CV-1228, 2013 WL 3789608 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2013) (Finding that the Court lacked jurisdiction when the "Plaintiff incorrectly indicated that this Court had federal jurisdiction over his case since the U.S. Government was the Plaintiff.").
The False Claims Act, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729, is "a federal statute that permits whistle-blowers to come forward as plaintiff-relators, reporting instances in which someone has allegedly profited by making false claims against an agency of the United States government." See Walsh v. Greater Scranton YMCA, No. 3:16-CV-834, 2016 WL 2946274, at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-0834, 2016 WL 2937521 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2016), appeal dismissed (Nov. 7, 2016); See; Jones v. Fitzgerald, No. CIV.A. 14-412, 2014 WL 2938619, at *8 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2014) ("The False Claims Act creates a cause of action for the United States to recover economic losses incurred from fraudulent claims for payment.") (quoting U.S. ex rel. Babalola v. Sharma, 746 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2014)).
Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary, a "plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Further, even when liberally construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Brown, the complaint's sparse allegations make it difficult for the Court to assess the basis of its jurisdiction over the instant action. While the Court is mindful that that pro se complaints must be afforded considerable latitude and construed so "as to do substantial justice," Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d, 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), pro se plaintiffs are not relieved of the requirement to plead an adequate jurisdictional basis for their claims. Thus, such pleading deficiencies fall well short of the standards enumerated in Rule 8 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Subject matter jurisdiction may be predicated on federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal-question jurisdiction requires that a complaint "aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331, whereas diversity jurisdiction provides district courts with "original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States," 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Doubts with respect to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte by the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
Here, the Court cannot clearly invoke its jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), as Brown alleges both Parties are citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 1-1). Thus, complete diversity is plainly lacking. See Grand Union Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003) ("Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) requires complete diversity of the parties; that is, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants.") (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990)); see also Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010). Further, as discussed supra, it is unclear from the meager allegations in the complaint whether Brown intends to invoke this Court's Federal Question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as he fails to state a claim under the Federal False Claims Act, or, when liberally construed in deference to Brown's pro se status, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his protected federal rights. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) ("To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law."). To the extent Brown wishes to clarify the basis of this Court's jurisdiction, he must do so in an amended complaint.
Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that Brown's claim be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Court recognizes that pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, see Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004). As the complaint in its current form does not clearly set forth any claims or grounds for this Court's federal jurisdiction, dismissal is warranted. However, out of an abundance of caution, and to preserve Brown's rights as a pro se litigant, the Court will allow him to file a single, unified, legible complaint setting forth factual allegations and legal claims in a manner that can be reviewed by the Court and, if necessary, answered by Patel. The amended complaint must be a pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original complaint. Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (emphasis added). The amended complaint must also establish the existence of actions taken by Patel which have resulted in specific constitutional or federal violations, to the extent Brown intends to invoke this Court's Federal Question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Further, the amended complaint must be "simple, concise, and direct" as required by Rule 8(d)(1) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. It should also be limited to those claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as averred, albeit vaguely, in the original complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with the aforementioned requirements may result in the dismissal of this action in its entirety.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that the complaint (Doc. 1) should be DISMISSED, as it fails to comply with the pleading requirements of Fed R. Civ. P. 8. Specifically, the Court recommends that:
1. Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
2. Plaintiff be given thirty (30) days to amend his complaint, from the date of this Report and Recommendation, that clearly reasserts his claims in accordance with Rule 8(a) and 8(d)(1) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and the directives of the instant Report and Recommendation;
3. Plaintiff's Motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2; Doc. 5) be GRANTED; and
4. The matter be remanded to the undersigned for further proceedings.
Dated: October 10, 2018
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated October 10, 2018. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Dated: October 10, 2018
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge