visions the non-contest laws violate sound principles of public policy as recognized by the courts of this State. (7) Assuming the clause to be constitutional and valid under ordinary conditions, no court should enforce this clause when there is reasonable grounds and probable cause for the contest. Tate v. Camp (Tenn.), 245 S.W. 839: Rouse v. Branch, 74 S.E. 133, 91 S.C. 111; Appeal of Chew's, 45 Pa. 228; Jackson v. Westerfield (N.Y.), 61 How. Prac. 399; In re Friend's Estate, 58 A. 853, 209 Pa. 442; South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 101 A. 961, 92 Conn. 168; In re Baker's Estate, 168 P. 882; Sherwood v. McLaurin (S.C.), 88 S.E. 363; Lewis' Estate, 19 Pa. Dist. 695; Wright v. Cummins (Kan.), 196 1089 P. 247; In re Lynn, 31 Pittsburgh Leg. J.N.S. (Pa.) 258; In re Owens, 32 Pittsburgh Leg. J.N.S. (Pa.) 257; Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398; Lee v. Calton, 5 T.B. Mon. 246; Hoit v. Hoit, 42 N.J. Eq. 338, 7 A. 856; Powell v. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90; Morris v. Burroughs, 1 Ark. 399; Brown v. O'Barn, 199 N.Y.S. 824; In re Title Guarantee Trust Co., 165 N.Y.S. 71; In re Wall, 136 N.Y.S. 452; In re Vom Saal's Will, 145 N.Y.S. 307, 68 L.R.A. 451; Whitehurst v. Gotwalt (N.C.), 127 S.E. 582; 2 Schooler on Wills (6 Ed.) 1489 to 1496; In re Keenan, 205 N.W. 1001; In re Bergland, 180 Cal. 629 (in principle). (8) To deny this right of contest when probable cause and reasonable grounds existed would be calculated to work and promote fraud on the testator, legatees, the public and the court.

The court held that the in terrorem clause was invalid. In Brown v. O'Barn ( 120 Misc. 550, 553) Judge VAN SICLEN expressed a clear dictum on the filing of objections to a will on the facts of that case. It reflects nothing useful to either side of the instant case.