Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-01534-RMG-MGB
07-08-2022
TIARRA BROWN, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Tiarra Brown (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42 U.S.C. Section 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (the “Administration”) regarding her claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED and that this case be REMANDED for further consideration in accordance with this Report and Recommendation.
RELEVANT FACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on January 17, 2018. (R. at 135, 153-54.) Plaintiff was born on April 2, 1999 and was 19 years old on the date her application was filed. (R. at 135, 15354.) Plaintiff's initial application alleged a disability onset date of September 20, 2003. (R. at 135.) Her application for reconsideration alleged a disability onset date of August 1, 2013. (R. at 153.) Plaintiff ultimately amended her alleged onset date to January 17, 2018, the date her application was filed. (R. at 117.) Plaintiff claims disability due to intellectual disabilities. (R. at 135, 154.) She has no past relevant work. (R. at 24.) Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. at 149, 170.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on July 11, 2019. (R. at 175.) The ALJ issued a favorable decision on September 23, 2019. (R. at 175-78.)
On March 18, 2020, the Appeals Council remanded Plaintiff's case, finding that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's finding that the severity of Plaintiff's mental impairment(s) met the criteria of Listing 12.05 since her alleged onset date. (R. at 179-86.) The Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to offer Plaintiff the opportunity for a new hearing, to address the evidence Plaintiff submitted in response to the notice of review, and to take any further action necessary to complete the administrative record and issue a new decision.
On October 22, 2020, the ALJ held a second hearing. (R. at 92-124.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at this hearing, as did her mother and an impartial vocational expert. (R. at 92-124.) On November 20, 2020, the ALJ issued a new decision in which he found that Plaintiff was disabled from January 17, 2018 through April 13, 2020. (R. at 12-25.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's disability ended on April 14, 2020 and that she had not become disabled again since that date. (R. at 24.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on March 24, 2021, (R. at 1-5), making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In making the determination that the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits beginning on April 14, 2020, the Commissioner has adopted the following findings of the ALJ:
(1) The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January [17], 2018, the date the claimant became disabled (20 CFR 416.920(b) and 416.971 et seq.).
(2) From January [17], 2018 through April 13, 2020, the period during which the claimant was under a disability, the claimant had the following severe impairments: borderline intellectual functioning; attention deficit/hyperactive disorder (ADHD); major depressive disorder (20 CFR 416.920(c)).
(3) From January [17], 2018 through April 13, 2020, the period during which the claimant was disabled, the severity of the claimant's impairments met the criteria of section 12.11 of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d) and 416.925).
(4) The claimant was under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, from January [17], 2018 through April 13, 2020 (20 CFR 416.920(d)).
(5) The claimant has not developed any new impairment or impairments since April 14, 2020, the date the claimant's disability ended. Thus, the claimant's current severe impairments are the same as that present from January [17], 2018 through April 13, 2020.
(6) Beginning April 14, 2020, the claimant has not had an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.994(b)(5)(i)).
(7) Medical improvement occurred as of April 14, 2020, the date the claimant's disability ended (20 CFR 416.994(b)(1)(i)).
(8) The medical improvement that has occurred is related to the ability to work because the claimant no longer has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of a listing (20 CFR 416.994(b)(2)(iv)(A)).
(9) After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, beginning April 14, 2020, the claimant has had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: The claimant is limited to a low stress work environment, defined to include the following: able to perform simple, routine tasks but not at a rapid assembly line pace or with a strict production quota; make simple work-related decisions; able to interact with colleagues
frequently, and with supervisors frequently; and able to interact with the public occasionally. She can tolerate few changes to the routine work setting in terms of work site, work shift, basic pool of colleagues, and core work duties. This individual would be off-task five percent of the eight-hour workday in addition to regularly scheduled breaks to account for factors such as impact of mental health impairments and possible medication side effects. The claimant would be absent from work one day every three months to account for symptom exacerbations and necessary medical appointments.
(10) The claimant still does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).
(11) Since April 14, 2020, the claimant has been a younger individual age 18-49 (20 CFR 416.963).
(12) The claimant has a limited education (20 CFR 416. 964).
(13) Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because claimant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968).
(14) Beginning April 14, 2020, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there have been jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.960(c) and 416. 966).
(15) The claimant's disability ended April 14, 2020, and the claimant has not become disabled again since that date (20 CFR 404.1594(f)(8)).(R. at 12-25.)
The ALJ's decision references January 11, 2018 as Plaintiff's alleged onset date. However, the hearing transcript indicates that Plaintiff's alleged onset date should be January 17, 2018. (R. at 118.) The undersigned therefore construes the ALJ's references to January 11 as unintentional scrivener's errors.
APPLICABLE LAW
I. Relevant Statutory Law
The Act provides that SSI disability benefits shall be available for aged, blind, or disabled persons who have income and resources below a specific amount. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. “Disability” is defined in the Act as the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is not eligible for SSI until the date on which he files an application for benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.501 (stating that a claimant may not be paid SSI for any time period that precedes the first month following the date on which an application was filed); see also Torres v. Chater, 125 F.3d 166, 171 n.1 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that SSI benefits are not payable for any period prior to the filing of an application). Further, an application for benefits remains in effect until the date of the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. § 416.330; see also Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a reviewing court is limited to determining “whether the claimant was entitled to benefits during a specific period of time, which period was necessarily prior to the date of the ALJ's decision”).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of “disability” to a series of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in the Social Security Administration's official Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) has an impairment which prevents past relevant work, and (5) has an impairment which prevents him from doing substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. If an individual is found not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).
The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first four steps of the analysis. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); Patterson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 2017). Once the claimant has established an inability to return to his past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant-considering his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity-can perform alternative jobs and that such jobs exist in the national economy. SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3; Grant, 699 F.2d at 191; Pass, 65 F.3d at 1203; Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2016).
II. Medical Improvement Standard
Where a beneficiary's medical condition improves to the extent that she can engage in substantial gainful activity, the beneficiary will no longer be entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994. To terminate benefits, the Commissioner must show by substantial evidence that medical improvement relevant to the beneficiary's ability to work has taken place. Id. The Commissioner defines “medical improvement” as:
any decrease in the medical severity of your impairment(s) which was present at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision that you were disabled or continued to be disabled. A determination that there has been a decrease in medical severity must be based on changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or laboratory findings associated with your impairment(s)[.]Id.
The medical improvements that are relevant to a disability determination are those that increase an individual's functional capacity to engage in gainful activity, i.e., the ability to do basic work. Id. To determine whether the beneficiary experienced medical improvement such that she will no longer be entitled to benefits, the Commissioner employs an eight-step sequential analysis:
(1) is the beneficiary working;
(2) if not, does the impairment meet or equal a listing;
(3) if not, has there been “any” medical improvement;
(4) if medical improvement, does such improvement relate to the ability to work;
(5) if no improvement, does an exception apply;
(6) if there is an improvement related to work ability, are the current impairments, alone or in combination, “severe”;
(7) if there is a severe impairment, does the beneficiary's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) permit performance of past work;
(8) if not, does the beneficiary have the RFC to perform other work.Id. If the Commissioner finds conclusively that a claimant is disabled at any point in this process, review does not proceed to the next step. Id.
The Commissioner follows an eight-step process for Title II claims (for disability insurance benefits) and a sevenstep process for Title XVI claims (for supplemental security income). The processes are essentially the same with the exception of the first step, which applies only to Title II claims. See Catron v. Saul, No. 1:20-CV-00576, 2021 WL 6689881, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. June 25, 2021), adopted sub nom. Catron v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 214127 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 24, 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b), 404.1594(f)).
III. Standard of Review
The scope of judicial review by the federal courts in disability cases is narrowly tailored to determine whether the Commissioner supported his findings with substantial evidence and applied the correct law. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015); Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2018); Arakas v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 94 (4th Cir. 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Consequently, the Act precludes a de novo review of the evidence and requires that the court uphold the Commissioner's decision as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Pyles v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 846, 848 (4th Cir. 1988); Bird v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Mascio, 780 F.3d at 640; Dowling v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2021); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015)). It is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Pearson, 810 F.3d at 207 (citing Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court does not undertake to “reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95; Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383. “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled,” the reviewing court must defer to the ALJ's decision. Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472).
However, the court does not “reflexively rubber-stamp an ALJ's findings.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2017)). An ALJ may not cherrypick, misstate, or mischaracterize material facts. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 99 (citing Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869). Rather, ALJs “must ‘build an accurate and logical bridge' from the evidence to their conclusions.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95 (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to support his conclusion that Plaintiff experienced significant medical improvement such that her disability ended on April 13, 2020. (Dkt. No. 13 at 17.) In response, the Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports this conclusion. (Dkt. No. 14 at 4-7.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED and that this case be REMANDED for further proceedings.
I. Plaintiff's History
Plaintiff was born on April 2, 1999, making her 23 years old as of today's date. (R. at 135.) She has a history of impaired intellectual ability and behavioral issues. She has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD) and Oppositional Defiant Disorder. (R. at 498-503, 957-61, 968-73, 1010-14.) She was prescribed various medications for these issues in the past but had little success controlling her symptoms due to negative side effects from her medications. (R. at 498-503, 957-61, 968-73, 1010-14.)
Plaintiff was abused by her biological parents and adopted at a young age. (R. at 498-503, 957-61, 968-73, 1010-14.) At certain points throughout her life, she experienced mental health problems such as anxiety and depression. (R. at 498-503, 957-61, 968-73, 1010-14.) She consistently displayed behavioral problems-including anger management issues, lying, stealing, and talking back to her mother-throughout her childhood and adolescence. (R. at 498-503, 95761, 968-73, 1010-14.)
Plaintiff has had several IQ evaluations. (R. at 498-503, 957-61, 968-73, 1010-14.) The highest Full-Scale IQ score she received was 78, which is in the borderline range. (R. at 498-503, 957-61, 968-73, 1010-14.) In school, Plaintiff was enrolled in special education classes and had an Individualized Education Plan. (R. at 498-503, 957-61, 968-73, 1010-14.) She completed high school but did not graduate. (R. at 49.) She is currently enrolled in adult education classes and hopes to get her GED. (R. at 51, 1010-14.) She also works part-time. (R. at 101.)
II. ALJ's Decision
The ALJ began his fourteen-page decision by noting the Appeals Council's instructions on remand. (R. at 12.) He then explained that Plaintiff's hearing was conducted by telephone due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that Plaintiff was present at the hearing along with her mother, who serves as her court-appointed guardian and conservator. (R. at 12.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date and that there was no basis on which to reopen Plaintiff's prior applications for benefits. (R. at 12.) The ALJ continued on to outline the appropriate legal framework under which to analyze Plaintiff's disability claim. (R. at 13-14.) More specifically, the ALJ summarized the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined above. (R. at 13-14.) He then explained that if he were to find that Plaintiff was disabled at any point he must next determine whether her disability continued through the date of the decision. (R. at 14-15.) The ALJ explained that in order to do so he must determine whether Plaintiff experienced medical improvement related to her ability to work. (R. at 14.) The ALJ then outlined the additional multi-step process he must use to evaluate medical improvement. (R. at 15.)
Next, the ALJ confirmed that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (R. at 16.) He found that Plaintiff had severe impairments (including borderline intellectual functioning, attention deficit/hyperactive disorder, and major depressive disorder) from her alleged onset date through April 13, 2020. (R. at 16.) He determined that the severity of these impairments met the criteria of Listing 12.11 “Neurodevelopmental Disorders” for the same period. (R. at 16.) The ALJ explained that “[w]hile there is evidence suggesting that the claimant's mental impairment does not meet Listing 12.05 (i.e. the recent psychological consultative examination in October 2019), the overall evidence supports that she does meet 12.11 - Neurodevelopment Disorders for Attention Deficit/Hyperactive Disorder with combined effects of Borderline Intellectual Functioning.” (R. at 17.) This listing requires:
A. Medical documentation of the requirements of paragraph 1, 2, or 3:
1. One or both of the following:
a. Frequent distractibility, difficulty sustaining attention, and difficulty organizing tasks; or b. Hyperactive and impulsive behavior (for example, difficulty remaining seated, talking excessively, difficulty waiting, appearing restless, or behaving as if being “driven by a motor”).
2. Significant difficulties learning and using academic skills; or
3. Recurrent motor movement or vocalization.
AND
B. Extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of mental functioning (see 12.00F):
1. Understand, remember, or apply information (see 12.00E1).
2. Interact with others (see 12.00E2).
3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 12.00E3).
4. Adapt or manage oneself (see 12.00E4).20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 at § 12.11.
The ALJ explained that the “paragraph A” criteria of Listing 12.11 were satisfied because Plaintiff “had medical documentation of the requirements of frequent distractibility, difficulty sustaining attention, and difficulty organizing tasks, or hyperactive and impulsive behavior ....” (R. at 17.) The ALJ noted that the “paragraph B” criteria of Listing 12.11 were satisfied because Plaintiff's impairments “caused a marked limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information, a moderate limitation in interacting with others, a marked limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and a marked limitation in adapting or managing oneself.” (R. at 17) (emphasis in original). The ALJ then summarized the evidence in the record that supported such findings, including: teacher questionnaires, a third party function report completed by Plaintiff's mother, testimony from Plaintiff's mother, a 2018 consultative evaluation report, notes from Plaintiff's primary care physician, legal documents relating to Plaintiff's guardianship, Plaintiff's Individualized Education Plan, and medical opinions from several of Plaintiff's treatment sources. (R. at 18-20.) After summarizing this evidence, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was under a disability from her alleged onset date through April 13, 2020. (R. at 20.)
The ALJ then noted that Plaintiff had not developed any new impairments since April 14, 2020, the date that her disability ended. (R. at 20.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not had an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listing since that date. (R. at 20.) In support of that conclusion, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff did not suffer from a marked limitation in two areas of mental functioning beginning on April 14, 2020. (R. at 21.)
The ALJ explained that Plaintiff's prescription medication was reviewed and changed in February of 2020. (R. at 21.) Plaintiff's prior prescription of 5mg of Adderall was increased to 10mg of Adderall XR. (R. at 21.) Further, the ALJ noted that “both the claimant and her mother reported that she was calmer on the Adderall XR, staying at home, and behaving herself” at an April 13, 2020 appointment. (R. at 21, referencing R. at 1016). The ALJ mentioned that Plaintiff's mother reiterated this sentiment at the October 22, 2020 hearing. (R. at 21, referencing R. at 91123.) The ALJ also explained that the medical records from Plaintiff's April 13, 2020 appointment “showed that she was cooperative; her speech was at normal rate, amplitude, and prosody; her mood euthymic; affect mildly constricted; and thought process linear.” (R. at 21, referencing R. at 1017.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff still displayed poor insight, impaired judgement, poor impulse control, and impaired attention. (R. at 21, referencing R. at 1017.) The ALJ also explained that Plaintiff began working part-time after changing her medication, and that such work indicated functional improvement. (R. at 21.) Based on these changes, the ALJ determined that medical improvement occurred as of April 14, 2020. (R. at 22.)
The ALJ explained that Plaintiff's medical improvement was related to her ability to work. (R. at 22.) He then determined that, beginning on April 14, 2020, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with certain non-exertional limitations, including: a low stress work environment; simple, routine tasks with no rapid assembly line pace or strict production quota; simple work-related decisions; frequent interaction with colleagues and supervisors, but only occasional interaction with the public; few changes to the routine work setting; five percent time off-task, in addition to regularly scheduled breaks; and one absence every three months. (R. at 22.)
The ALJ supported this RFC determination by first summarizing testimony from Plaintiff and her mother. (R. at 22-23.) He then summarized the relevant medical records relating to Plaintiff's appointments after April 2020. (R. at 23.) In doing so, the ALJ noted that these records reflected that Plaintiff was responding well to Adderall XR. (R. at 23, referencing R. at 1046-52.)
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff's June 2020 and September 2020 mental status examinations were consistent with the April 2020 mental status examination reflecting that Plaintiff was calmer, staying home, behaving herself, and responding well to her new prescription. (R. at 23, referencing R. at 1046-52.) The ALJ mentioned that Plaintiff was described as calm and pleasant at her September 2020 examination. (R. at 23, referencing R. at 1046-52.) Before concluding his explanation of Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ stated:
In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the evidence of record. The claimant's mother testified to improvement in April 2020 due to adjustment of ADHD medication. In fact, the mental status examinations in treatment notes . . . show some improvement but also continued struggles. The record overall fails to establish that claimant continued to meet listing criteria after the end of the closed period, but only by a narrow margin. Again, the examination report submitted by Dr. O'Leary (See Exhibit 23F), coupled with the somewhat successful medication adjustment and the at present successful entry to somewhat socially demanding part-time employment do serve to establish medical improvement sufficient so as to find that the claimant should be able to perform full-time work within the identified residual functional capacity.(R. at 23, referencing R. at 20.)
After determining that Plaintiff did not have past relevant work, was a younger individual, had a limited education, and that transferability of job skills was not an issue, the ALJ determined that jobs that Plaintiff could perform existed in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. at 24.) Specifically, he determined-based on the vocational expert's testimony-that Plaintiff could perform occupations such as a cleaner, floor waxer, and/or hand packager. (R. at 24.) As such, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's disability ended on April 14, 2020. (R. at 24.)
III. Analysis
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred because “the record does not show medical improvement to a degree that would indicate that Brown no longer meets the listing criteria.” (Dkt. No. 13 at 17.) To support her arguments, Plaintiff points to medical records spanning 2008 to 2018 reflecting “a long history of intellectual difficulties.” (Id. at 17-19.) Plaintiff contends that these records indicate Plaintiff has “a lifelong intellectual limitation that was unlikely to significantly improve in the way the ALJ found.” (Id. at 18.)
Plaintiff also takes issue with the evidence the ALJ uses to support his finding that Plaintiff medically improved beginning April 14, 2020. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly relied on such evidence because Plaintiff was working only part-time and because Plaintiff's mother testified that Plaintiff still had behavioral issues despite her improvements. (Id.)
By contrast, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ “articulated more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support his findings that Plaintiff had no more than moderate limitations in the paragraph B criteria,” and, therefore, adequately supported his finding that Plaintiff no longer met the criteria for Listing 12.11 beginning on April 14, 2020. (Dkt. No. 14 at 5.) The Commissioner contends that the ALJ supported his decision with medical evidence documenting a change to Plaintiff's Adderall prescription, medical evidence reflecting Plaintiff's improvement after such change, testimony from Plaintiff and her mother confirming Plaintiff's improvement, and evidence of Plaintiff beginning to work part-time as a result of such improvement. (Id. at 5-6.) The Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff asks the Court simply to reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion; however, “Plaintiff's disagreement with the ALJ's findings does not undermine the substantial evidence upon which the ALJ relied.” (Id. at 7.)
Based on a thorough review of the parties' briefs, the ALJ's decision, and the record before the Court, the undersigned finds that the ALJ failed to adequately support his decision that Plaintiff medically improved to the extent that she could perform substantial gainful activity after April 13, 2020. First, the ALJ did not support his conclusion that Plaintiff no longer met the “paragraph B” requirements of Listing 12.11 with substantial evidence. (R. at 21.) When explaining this conclusion, the ALJ noted a change in Plaintiff's prescription medication and referenced medical records indicating that Plaintiff improved following such change. (R. at 21.) He also cited to hearing testimony from Plaintiff and her mother demonstrating that she had been working parttime since going on the new medication. (R. at 21.) Based on Plaintiff's updated prescription and newfound part-time work, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had functionally improved to the extent that she had only moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing herself. (R. at 21.) In other words, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff no longer had marked limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting and managing herself. (R. at 17, 21.) Because Listing 12.11 requires marked limitation in two or more areas of mental functioning, Plaintiff no longer met the “paragraph B” criteria of Listing 12.11. (R. at 17, 21.)
However, the ALJ failed to explain how Plaintiff's updated prescription and part-time work supported significant improvement in these areas of mental functioning. (R. at 21.) The ALJ merely stated that “both the claimant and her mother reported that she was calmer on Adderall XR, staying at home, and behaving herself.” (R. at 21.) It is unclear how Plaintiff being calm, staying home, and behaving herself reflect an improvement in her ability to understand, remember, or apply information, or her ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace.
The ALJ continued on to say that the results of Plaintiff's mental status examinations “showed that she was cooperative; her speech was at a normal rate, amplitude, and prosody; her mood euthymic; affect mildly constricted; and thought process linear.” (R. at 21.) Again, this evidence supports only a finding that Plaintiff had improved in her ability to adapt and manage herself. These observations provide little context as to Plaintiff's ability to understand, remember, or apply information, and concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. (R. at 21.) Moreover, Plaintiff's medical records reflect these same observations well before Plaintiff's purported medical improvement in April 2020. (R. at 1020, 1023, 1026.)
The ALJ then noted that Plaintiff had attempted part-time employment following the change to her medication. (R. at 21.) He found that her job, “which the claimant confirmed at the hearing does involve interacting with customers, does suggest functional improvement.” (R. at 21.) Yet again, the ALJ does not make a connection between Plaintiff's ability to “interact with customers” and her ability to understand, remember, or apply information, or concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. (R. at 21.)
Further, the ALJ does not explain why or how Plaintiff's part-time job indicates that she is capable of full-time employment constituting substantial gainful activity. (R. at 21.) In fact, the ALJ notes that Plaintiff's mother still helps her with her job and that Plaintiff's mother believed Plaintiff continues to have trouble functioning in the “real world” alone. (R. at 22-23.) The ALJ explains that “both the mother and claimant reported the Adderall seems to help with work.” (R. at 23.) Still, he does not explain how Plaintiff's success working part-time translates to an ability to perform full-time employment on a consistent basis. (R. at 23.) What is more, the ALJ fails to mention that Plaintiff's mother testified that she did not believe Plaintiff was capable of full-time work because of her attention span and difficulty understanding things and that she thought it was only a matter of time before Plaintiff stopped working (though she noted that Plaintiff “may surprise [her]”). (R. at 114, 116.) The ALJ's omission of this testimony is particularly concerning in light of the fact that Plaintiff has historically been unable to hold a job despite various attempts at part-time employment. (R. at 56-57, 74-75, 176.)
As noted, ALJs may not cherry-pick evidence from the record, and “must ‘build an accurate and logical bridge' from the evidence to their conclusions.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95, 99 (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). The ALJ failed to do so here, and the undersigned simply cannot decipher how the evidence cited by the ALJ supports his conclusion that Plaintiff's functional capacity improved to the extent that she no longer met Listing 12.11 after April 13, 2020. (R. at 21.) Similarly, the undersigned cannot decipher the ALJ's reasoning as to how Plaintiff's part-time employment rendered her capable of full-time work. As such, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED and that the case be REMANDED for further consideration of whether Plaintiff experienced medical improvement sufficient to enable her to perform substantial gainful activity during the relevant period.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision be REVERSED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and that the case be REMANDED for further consideration of whether Plaintiff experienced medical improvement sufficient to enable her to perform substantial gainful activity during the relevant period.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).