Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:20-0128-TMC-TER
04-14-2021
DEMETRIUS ALEXANDER BROWN, PLAINTIFF, v. ANTHONY DENNIS, RANDALL K. STEWART, CHARLES S. BONNER, DEFENDANTS.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Plaintiff, Demetrius Brown ("Plaintiff/Brown"), a self-represented state prisoner, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 13, 2020. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 18, 2020. Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee housed at the Sumter-Lee County Detention Center (hereinafter "SLDC"), South Carolina. On October 23, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure along with a memorandum and affidavits in support of that motion. (ECF No. 41). Because the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised on or about October 26, 2020, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th. Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with additional evidence or counter affidavits could result in dismissal of his complaint. Plaintiff filed a response on November 5, 2020, and Defendants filed a reply on November 12, 2020. (ECF Nos. 45, 46).
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d),DSC. Because this is a dispositive motion, the report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The federal court is charged with liberally construing the complaints filed by pro se litigants, to allow them to fully develop potentially meritorious cases. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The court's function, however, is not to decide issues of fact, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990), nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. If none can be shown, the motion should be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet "the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with ... affidavits, if any." Id. at 322; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
DISCUSSION
ARGUMENT OF PARTIES/ FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights. The Plaintiff has named as Defendants the Sheriff of Sumter County and two investigators who were employed by the Sheriff of Sumter County at the time of this incident in their individual capacities only. Specifically, the following are Plaintiff's allegations in full, quoted verbatim:
Plaintiff asserts that Sheriff Anthony Dennis acted under color of state law along with Deputys Randall K. Stewart and Charles S.Bonner by allowing these Deputies to charge plaintiff with the offenses of murder, unlawful possession of firearm during a violent crime, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon without throughly investigating the use of deadly force in direct violation of South Carolina Code of laws 16-11-440, 16-11-450, and the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the South Carolina State Constitution Article I. Section 3, and the United States Constitution 14th Amendment.
Furthermore Plaintiff was negligently charged and arrested when
Plaintiff was legally protected under the States Immunity Statues under South Carolina Code of laws 16-11-450 pertaining to legal use of deadly force for the alleged offenses, but all were neglected.(ECF No. 10 at 5 and 7 of 15)(errors in original). Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of monetary damages.
Plaintiff asserts that Sheriff Anthony Dennis on Aug. 11, 2018; allowed deputy's Randall K. Stewart and Charles S. Bonner of the Sumter County Sheriff's Office to charge the plaintiff with the offenses of murder, unlawful possession of firearm during a violent crime, and unlawful possession of firearm by a convicted felon without throughly investigation the use of deadly force in direct violation of the South Carolina Code of laws governing lawful use of a deadly force in the State of South Carolina as well as in direct violation of state and federal constitutional rights legally protecting the Plaintiff under the State's immunity statues.
In their motion, Defendants assert that on August 15, 2018, the Plaintiff was arrested in Jacksonville, Florida, and returned to South Carolina, where he was served with an arrest warrant for the murder of Sharmaine Pack. (ECF 41-1, 41-3 and 41-4 with exhibits attached). After the investigative report was turned over to the Solicitor's office, they moved forward with a preliminary hearing on the charges against the Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff was held for trial. Id. The Grand Jury also returned a true bill indictment on all charges against the Plaintiff. Id.
The Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants' motion asserting that Bonner and Stewart willfully misled the magistrate judge "with incomplete and false testimony under oath" to obtain the warrants. (ECF No. 45).
ANALYSIS
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants submitted the affidavits of Scott Bonner, Randy Stewart, Jennifer Thomas, and Robert Burnish. (ECF Nos. 41-3 through 41-5). At the time of the allegations, Thomas, Bonner, and Stewart were employed by the Sheriff of Sumter County as criminal investigators and Burnish was employed as the Captain over investigations. Burnish attests that Investigator Scott Bonner was assigned to investigate the murder of Sharmaine Pack since he was the on-call investigator. (ECF No. 41-6). Bonner began gathering evidence and talking to potential witnesses and asked investigator Thomas and Stewart to assist in interviewing witnesses and gathering evidence. Id. After finishing his work at the scene of the crime, Bonner returned to the Sheriff's department to also talk to the witnesses. Id. Two different witnesses identified Plaintiff as the person who shot and killed Sharmaine Pack. Id. Investigator Bonner discussed the findings of his investigation with Burnish as well as others. Id. Burnish agreed there was probable cause to seek an arrest warrant for murder for Plaintiff and a search warrant for his home. Id. Burnish provided periodic updates to Sheriff Dennis and the Chief on the status of the investigation but they were not involved in the investigation or the decision to move forward with seeking warrants. Id. After discussions and sharing information, investigator Stewart took the information to the Magistrate who found probable cause and signed the arrest warrant for Plaintiff and the search warrant for his residence. Id. Brown had fled the scene after the shooting so it was decided to try to track him by his cell phone. Id. Investigators were able to obtain permission from the phone provider and began tracking Plaintiff's number finding that he had driven from South Carolina to North Carolina to Georgia that night. Burnish attests that he was advised that Plaintiff was captured in Florida and returned to South Carolina where he is awaiting trial on the murder charge. Id. Burnish asserts that Investigator Bonner discussed adding additional charges with him, and Burnish believed that there was probable cause to seek warrants for possession of a weapon during a violent crime and unlawful possession of a weapon. Id. Investigator Bonner went to the magistrate who found probable cause for arrest warrants on the two additional charges. Id. Investigator Bonner also met with the solicitor's office during the investigation and provided all information to the Solicitor's office which is the entity that decides what cases to prosecute. Id. Investigator Bonner continued with investigation and obtained corroborating evidence from A.J. Bradley, who was with Sharmaine Park when the shooting occurred. Id. Burnish attests that he believed there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, which was supported by the Magistrate signing the warrant, the judge at the preliminary hearing binding the matter over to trial, and the grand jury returning an indictment on the murder charge against Plaintiff. Id. Burnish attests that he is not aware of any information that Plaintiff was acting in self-defense at the time of the shooting, as the witnesses all explained that he was the aggressor and he continued to shoot at Sharmaine Pack even when Mr. Pack was on the ground pleading for his life. Id. Burnish believes that Bonner, Stewart and Thomas performed an exceptional and proper investigation that ultimately led to the Plaintiff's arrest. Id.
Bonner attests that on August 11, 2018, he was the on-call investigator for the Sheriff's department and was called to the scene of the shooting of Sharmaine Pack. (ECF No. 41-3). Bonner was informed that witnesses had identified Demetrious Brown as the shooter. Id. Bonner processed the scene and contacted Investigators Thomas and Stewart to go to assist in interviewing the witnesses that were being sent to the Sheriff's department until he could get there. (ECF Nos. 41-3, 41-4, 41-5). Sgt. Clark and Bonner talked to the owner of the shop who showed them where the shooting took place. (ECF No. 41-3). Bonner returned to the Sheriff's department to speak with the witnesses and interview Mayfield Johnson. Id. Mr. Johnson stated that he was a mechanic at the shop where the shooting occurred and was washing up when he heard and saw a Chrysler 300 driven by the victim, pulled up to the shop. (ECF Nos. 41-3, 41-4, 41-5). Johnson saw several people get out of the car and go over to a black Expedition or Explorer being driven by Brown. Id. Mr. Johnson stated that he had seen Brown at his vehicle before the incident occurred. Id. Mr. Johnson advised that he did not hear any arguing or yelling, and it seemed the men from the Chrysler 300 were talking to the person in the black Expedition or Explorer. Id. Mr. Johnson stated that he then heard a gunshot and ducked behind a car and heard two or three more shots. Id. Further, he heard the shooter say something and heard the victim begging for his life. Id. Mr. Johnson positively identified Plaintiff as the person who had been the shooter from a six-person photo line-up. Id. Mr. Johnson also gave a written statement. Id. Investigator Stewart met with George McCain and his daughter and took statements. Mr. McCain was the owner of the shop where the shooting took place, he knew Plaintiff, and he identified Plaintiff as the shooter. Id. Mr. McCain positively identified Plaintiff as the shooter from a six-person photo line-up. Id. Based on the statements and the positive identification of Plaintiff as the shooter by McCain and Johnson, Bonner believed there was probable cause to seek an arrest warrant for murder against Plaintiff. Id. Bonner discussed the findings with Captain Burnish and also shared and received information with Sergeant Mike McCauley, Investigator Jennifer Thomas, Investigator Randy Stewart, Sergeant Chris Fostervold, and Sergeant Phillip Clark. (ECF Nos. 41-3 and 41-4). After reviewing all the information, they all agreed there was probable cause to seek an arrest warrant for murder for Plaintiff and a search warrant for his residence. Id. Investigator Stewart went to the magistrate and obtained an arrest warrant and search warrant. Id. As the investigation continued, Investigator Thomas met with the Victim's family and received information for a motive as Plaintiff allegedly owed the victim $550.00 because Brown had sold the victim a stolen car and the victim wanted the money back when he found out the car was stolen. (ECF No. 41-3 and 41-5). The investigators learned that A.J. Bradley was with the victim at the time of the shooting, agreed to talk with Bonner, and gave a written statement. (ECF No. 43-1). Bradley stated that he was at the location when the shooting took place, that he was in the victim's car which the victim had parked in front of Plaintiff's SUV, and that Plaintiff who Bradley called "De" was in the driver's seat. Id. Bradley advised that the victim walked to the driver's door where Plaintiff was and started to talk to him. Id. The conversation did not last long and Bradley saw Brown pull out a black gun. Id. Bradley stated that the victim attempted to close the driver's door on Plaintiff to keep him from shooting but he heard a gunshot. Id. Shortly thereafter, Bradley stated that he heard more gun shots and he jumped over a fence, ran through some flowers, ended up in a friend's car and left. Id. Bonner was informed that Plaintiff was arrested in Jacksonville, Florida, during the night of August 15, 2018. Id. Bonner spoke to Captain Burnish about additional charges and he agreed there was probable cause for them. Id. Therefore, Bonner went to the magistrate's office, who found probable cause and signed two more arrest warrants on Plaintiff. Id. After Brown was returned to Sumter, he immediately requested an attorney and refused to talk to any law enforcement. Id. Bonner completed his investigation report and forwarded the file to the solicitor's office to determine how to proceed. Id. The solicitor's office proceeded with a preliminary hearing on December 6, 2018, and Bonner testified in accordance with his investigative report at the preliminary hearing. Id. Bonner was also advised that the grand jury returned a true bill indictment on the murder charge against Plaintiff. Id. Bonner attests that he found no evidence to support the claim that he was defending himself and a gun was not found at the scene in possession of the victim. Id. The common theme in statements was that Plaintiff was the person who had murdered Sharmaine Pack despite his begging for mercy. Id. Bonner attests that he believes there was probable cause, sought arrest warrants, and turned the case over to the solicitor. Id.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to allege a false arrest claim, under § 1983, "a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant." Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998)(internal citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit reiterated that "a false arrest claim must fail where it is made pursuant to a facially valid warrant." Dorn v. Town of Prosperity, 375 Fed. Appx. 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Based on the filings before the court, Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, and any false arrest claims fail.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to allege a malicious prosecution claim, a claim that one is wrongfully detained because his arrest was made pursuant to a warrant that was not supported by probable cause, is a claim for malicious prosecution. See Porter field, 156 F.3d at 568; see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007). To state a malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff must show at least, that "defendant[s] have seized [plaintiff] pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings [have] terminated in [plaintiff's] favor." Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005)(internal citations and quotations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court provided in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) that until a conviction was set aside or charges finally dismissed without the possibility of revival, a § 1983 claim could not be pursued based on allegations of unlawful circumstances surrounding the criminal prosecution. See also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996). Under the favorable termination rule, the charges must be terminated "for reasons indicative of the innocence;" courts have held that an unexplained nolle prosequi or disposal of charges for reasons other than innocence do not satisfy the Heck "favorable termination" requirement. Restatement(Second) of Torts § 660 (1977); see also Tucker v. Duncan, 499 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1974); Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 802-03 (10th Cir. 2008); Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1997); Posr v. Court Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d 409, 418 (2nd Cir. 1999); Jackson v. Gable, 2006 WL 1487047, at *6 (D.S.C. May 25, 2006); Nicholas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 33 Fed. Appx. 61, 64-65 (D.S.C. 2002). While Wallace held that Heck no longer bars claims of false arrest by pretrial detainees, Heck is still applicable to claims of malicious prosecution. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 n.1, 390 n.2. Plaintiff has not shown that the murder charge connected to his allegations has been favorably terminated in accordance with the above law.
Even if the claims of malicious prosecution were not barred pursuant to Heck, the claim fails. Section 1983 claims premised on false arrest or false imprisonment are analyzed as Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims. See Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001). "Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979). Thus, to succeed on either claim, Plaintiff must show that the seizure was effected without probable cause. Id.; see also Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002). Probable cause means that the "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge [ ] are sufficient to warrant a prudent person ... in believing ... that the suspect has committed ... an offense." United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). Evidence sufficient to convict a suspect is not required. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
Probable cause is determined by a "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). "The probable-cause inquiry turns on two factors: 'the suspect's conduct as known to the officer, and the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct.' " Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016)). "A court should only consider the information the officers had at the time they sought the warrant." Id. Due to the existence of probable cause, "a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant." Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998). However, an officer's material false statements or material omissions in obtaining the warrant can negate a finding of probable cause. See Miller v. Prince George's Cty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007).
Here, there is no evidence that the investigators gave an inaccurate account of the investigation or attempted to mislead the magistrate judge issuing the warrants. When Stewart sought the arrest warrant, he possessed eye witness statements identifying Plaintiff as the shooter. The magistrate judge found probable cause and the grand jury returned a true bill indictment. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is unable to establish a constitutional violation because the prosecution was plainly supported by probable cause, as conclusively established by the indictment. It has long since been settled by the Supreme Court that "an indictment, 'fair upon its face,' returned by a 'properly constituted grand jury,' conclusively determines the existence of probable cause." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (recognizing that grand jury "indictment ... valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits"). Notwithstanding the conclusive effect of the indictments, our precedents instruct that "a grand jury's decision to indict ... will [not] shield a police officer who deliberately supplied misleading information that influenced the decision." See, e.g., Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir.1989) (quoting favorably Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir.1988)), overruled in part by, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994); see also Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 475 F.3d 621, 632 (4th Cir.2007) (observing that "the Constitution did not permit a police officer ... with reckless disregard for the truth, to make material misrepresentations or omissions to seek [an arrest] warrant that would otherwise be without probable cause"); Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 188-89 (4th Cir. 2012).
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges generally his equal protection rights were violated. The Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To show that his equal protection right was violated, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he was treated differently from similarly situated persons and the discrimination was intentional or purposeful. Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff's allegations as filed fail to state a claim of violation of equal protection.
Defendant Sheriff Dennis
Defendants argue that Defendant Sheriff Dennis should be dismissed from the action because Plaintiff has failed to show that he had any personal involvement in the alleged deprivations other than he allowed the two investigators to charge Plaintiff. Defendants submitted the affidavit of Captain Burnish who attests that he gave periodic updates to Sheriff Dennis but that Dennis did not have any involvement in the investigation or the decision to move forward with the warrants. (ECF No. 41- 6).
In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must plead facts indicating that a defendant acted personally in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977); Faltas v. South Carolina, No. 3:11-cv-3077-TLW-SVH, 2012 WL 988105, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988083 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012), aff'd, 489 F. App'x 720 (4th Cir. 2012). When a complaint contains no personal allegations against a defendant, that defendant is properly dismissed. See, e.g., Reaves v. Richardson, No. 4:09-cv-820-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 2119318, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2011) ("without such personal involvement, there can be no liability under section 1983"), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2112100 (D.S.C. May 27, 2011); Fox v. Drew, No. 8:12-cv-421-MGL, 2013 WL 4776706, at *11 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2013) (explaining that a defendant is liable in his individual capacity only for his personal wrongdoing), aff'd, 563 F. App'x 279 (4th Cir. 2014).
The amended complaint does not allege that Defendant Dennis actually had any involvement in the allegations. Plaintiff's allegation, without more, fails to establish the requisite personal involvement on the part of Sherif Dennis. See Johnson v. Myers, No. 0:19-cv-756-HMH-PJG, 2019 WL 1517105, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 8, 2019) ("Because Plaintiff does not explain how the named defendants were involved in the purported violation of Plaintiff's rights, Plaintiff fails to meet the federal pleading standards."). Accordingly, Defendant Dennis should be dismissed. See Halcomb v. Ocean, No. 819CV01095JMCJDA, 2020 WL 2813750, at *9 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:19-CV-01095-JMC, 2020 WL 1080444 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2020). Additionally, as set forth above, Plaintiff fails to show evidence to create an issue of fact on any constitutional violation.
Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional violation, the court does not need to address the issue of qualified immunity with regard to these claims.
STATE LAW CLAIMS
Assuming Brown's federal claims are found to be without merit and are dismissed, it is recommended that the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action raised by the plaintiffs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1996); Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case).
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 41) be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
s/Thomas E. Rogers, III
Thomas E. Rogers III
United States Magistrate Judge April 14, 2021
Florence, South Carolina
The parties' attention is directed to the important information on the attached notice.