'" (Id. at p. 279.) Thus, "[w]here the defendant is a government entity, a fifth element requires that the injury to the plaintiff's personal interest if the government is not estopped outweighs the injury to the public interest if the government is estopped. [Citation.]" (Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. Department of Education (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 681, 693 (Golden Day); accord Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1227 (Brown).) In HPT IHG-2 Properties Trust v. City of Anaheim (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 188 (HPT), the trial court found that the city was equitably estopped from changing the site plan approved in a conditional use permit after the developers were induced by the city's representations to spend $40 million and to cede property to the city to develop the contemplated project.

The gist of an estoppel is a misrepresentation of fact that reasonably induced another (who was justifiably ignorant of the misrepresentation) to take a course of action that led to the other's detriment. (Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1227; 13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Equity, § 191, pp. 527-528.) To subject a government entity to an estoppel, a party must additionally demonstrate that the injury to the party outweighs any injury to the public interest from an estoppel.

We will address whether the trial court erred in finding that CalSTRS was barred under the doctrine of equitable estoppel from making benefit adjustments. Although "the existence of an estoppel is generally a question of fact" ( Albers v. Los Angeles County (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250, 266, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89, 398 P.2d 129 ) that is reviewed for abuse of discretion ( Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1229, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 ), "where the facts are undisputed and only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from them, whether estoppel applies" is a legal question that is subject to de novo review ( Feduniak v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1360, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 591 ( Feduniak )). But CalSTRS's position here is that equitable estoppel cannot be applied because doing so would require CalSTRS to conduct itself in a manner that "directly contravene[s] statutory limitations."

The crux of estoppel is that one party has intentionally misled another to do something injurious to themselves that they otherwise would not have done. (Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1227.) But "simple reliance on a false statement or conduct is not enough."

Given that the COVID-19 crisis is not over and the efforts to combat it are of statewide concern, there can be no doubt that this appeal falls within our discretion. (See Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1219, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 ; California Medical Assn. v. Brian (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 637, 650, 106 Cal.Rptr. 555.) We are mindful that, "[i]n passing judgment on cases requesting declaratory relief, we decide only actual controversies and refrain from issuing advisory opinions."

The existence of fraud is generally a factual question, but the issue can properly be resolved on a summary judgment motion if reasonable people can come to only one conclusion based on the facts. (See Blankenheim v. E.F. Hutton & Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1475; see also Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. The Americana at Brand, LLC (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1239; Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1229.) B. Breach of Contract

To invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the reliance must be reasonable. (Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1227.) Equitable estoppel is not limited to intentional fraud.

(Italics added.) (See also Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1226, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 [State Controller's arguments linked furloughs and other cutbacks in budgeted employee compensation to reductions in “departmental personal services budgets”].) We have no reason to conclude the phrase “personal service limitations” as used in Water Code section 13177.7, subdivision (b) and Health and Safety Code section 25353.5, subdivision (b) have any meaning different than “personal service” as used in the context of budget legislation.

"A valid claim for equitable estoppel requires: (a) a representation or concealment of material facts; (b) made with knowledge, actual or virtual, of the facts; (c) to a party ignorant, actually and permissibly, of the truth; (d) with the intention, actual or virtual, that the ignorant party act on it; and (e) that party was induced to act on it. [Citation.] There can be no estoppel if one of these elements is missing." (Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570, 584 (Simmons); see also Young, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131; Gorlach v. Sports Club Co. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505-1506 (Gorlach); Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1227; Futrell v. Payday California, Inc. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1436-1437; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1110; Jovine v. FHP, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1528.) In its briefs to us, Delta overlooks this clear—and controlling—statement of the law.

(Italics added.) (See also Brown v. Chiang (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1226, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 [State Controller's arguments linked furloughs and other cutbacks in budgeted employee compensation to reductions in “departmental personal services budgets”].) We have no reason to conclude the phrase “personal service limitations” as used in Water Code section 13177.7, subdivision (b) and Health and Safety Code section 25353.5, subdivision (b) have any meaning different than “personal service” as used in the context of budget legislation.