Opinion
16-P-52
03-13-2017
William R. BROWN, Third, & others v. Stephanie BROWN.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
William R. Brown, Jr. (the decedent), had three sons, plaintiffs William R. Brown, III; Devin M. Brown; and Shawn M. Brown (collectively, sons). Following the death of their father, the sons brought an action against their father's second wife, Stephanie Brown, claiming, among other things, that they were entitled to the proceeds of the decedent's life insurance policy and that Stephanie was unjustly enriched when she received those proceeds. A Superior Court jury returned a verdict in favor of the sons. In response to special questions, the jury rejected two other theories of liability, undue influence and fraud, but found that Stephanie had been unjustly enriched in the amount of $250,000. Stephanie filed a postjudgment motion (postjudgment motion) for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.), or in the alternative, for remittitur or a new trial, which was denied. This appeal ensued.
As the parties share the same surname, we use first names to avoid confusion.
The case was consolidated for trial with an action brought by a court-appointed estate administrator against Stephanie based on a check she forged from the decedent's account and her improper disbursement of estate funds. She was found liable to the estate on both claims, and she does not appeal from the separate judgment that entered.
Background . We draw the facts from the parties' stipulation of facts and the trial transcript. The decedent and his first wife, the mother of the plaintiffs, divorced in 1991. Pursuant to their separation agreement, the decedent agreed to maintain his life insurance policy and to name their sons as beneficiaries "until such time as all [sons] are emancipated from the Wife." The separation agreement defined emancipation, stating, in relevant part, that a child will be deemed emancipated upon the latter of turning eighteen years old or finishing high school, "except that if the child attends college, the child for purposes of support, will be considered a minor."
The decedent later married Stephanie, and they had a daughter, Christina, in 1998. From the time of his divorce until his death, the decedent maintained a close relationship with his sons. He fulfilled his obligation to maintain life insurance, designating the sons as beneficiaries until October 11, 2007, at which time Stephanie was made the primary beneficiary with the sons and Christina named as contingent beneficiaries.
In May, 2008, the decedent was diagnosed with brain cancer. He gave his sister power of attorney and instructed her to designate his four children as beneficiaries on his life insurance policies. The sister requested information about the policies from the decedent's employer, but the information was sent to the decedent's home, whereupon Stephanie confirmed that she was the primary beneficiary. Thus, when the decedent died on November 8, 2009, Stephanie received the proceeds of the policies in the amount of $333,000. The sons then commenced this action against Stephanie and, as we have previously noted, obtained a jury verdict in their favor.
Discussion . Stephanie acknowledges that the decedent had a duty under the separation agreement to maintain life insurance for the benefit of his unemancipated sons and that the change in the designation on the decedent's policies to Stephanie in October, 2007, violated that agreement. She claims, however, that at the time the decedent died, all three sons were unambiguously emancipated under the terms of the separation agreement and, therefore, the decedent was no longer obligated to maintain the sons as beneficiaries, rendering the verdict improper. She also argues that the sons' claim of unjust enrichment necessarily required a finding of wrongdoing, and the jury found no wrongdoing by virtue of not finding her liable on the undue influence or fraud theories.
1. Emancipation . At trial, the parties stipulated that the eldest brother, William, III, was emancipated. As regards the status of the other two sons, the judge instructed the jury on the definition of "emancipation" as set forth in the separation agreement. He further instructed as follows:
"Under the law, you are also permitted to consider the conduct of the parties after the stipulation [sic ] agreement was entered into ... in determining whether or not each of the boys were or were not emancipated, for purposes of distribution of the life insurance proceeds. While you may find that in this case, the written agreement ... defines emancipation, you are also instructed that emancipation may be determined by facts proven other than the language found in the written divorce agreement between the parties.
"If you find that all of the plaintiffs were emancipated before the decedent's death on November 8, 2009, then you must return a verdict for the defendant on this issue. If you find that one or more of the plaintiffs were not emancipated as of the decedent's date of death, then you must return a verdict for each of the boys who you find are not emancipated, and to what amount you will give to them."
Stephanie did not object to the instructions which, in any event, were correct and became the law of the case. See Steeves v. Berit , 64 Mass. App. Ct. 265, 274 (2005) (evidence of postagreement conduct by parties may show clearly what emancipation clause meant or that they "shared a common understanding of that meaning"), quoting from Sax v. Sax , 53 Mass. App. Ct. 765, 772-773 (2002).
There was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that neither Devin nor Shawn were emancipated when their father died. First, the decedent did not consider all of his sons emancipated. He continued to pay child support until his death, and desired the sons to receive the proceeds of his life insurance as contingent beneficiaries. In addition to the conduct of the decedent, there was evidence that Devin left school to support his father during his final illness and the jury could have inferred that Devin may have returned if he had the money to do so. There was also evidence that Shawn left school to be with his father in the last month of his father's life. We cannot say, therefore, that the jury had no basis to conclude that Devin and Shawn were not emancipated, and the decedent's obligation to maintain them as beneficiaries of his life insurance policies continued until his death. In these circumstances, we discern no error in denying the motions for a directed verdict or the postjudgment motion regarding judgment n.o.v. or a new trial.
2. Unjust enrichment . Stephanie's second argument, that the plaintiffs were required to show wrongdoing on her part is similarly unavailing. "Unjust enrichment is defined as ‘retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience.’ " Santagate v. Tower , 64 Mass. App. Ct. 324, 329 (2005), quoting from Taylor Woodrow Blitman Constr. Corp . v. Southfield Gardens Co ., 534 F. Supp. 340, 347 (D. Mass. 1982). The sons were required to establish that Stephanie received not merely a benefit, but that her receipt of the benefit was unjust—a quality that turns on the reasonable expectations of the parties. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co . v. Cotter , 464 Mass. 623, 644 (2013). While wrongful conduct conceivably may bear on a claim for unjust enrichment, it is not an element of the claim.
3. Remittitur . Lastly, Stephanie argues that the judge should have allowed her motion for remittitur because "[i]t is difficult to imagine that [the decedent] intended to leave [her and their daughter Christina] in such precarious financial circumstances" as were created or exacerbated by the damages assessed for unjust enrichment. This argument is essentially a plea for equity; Stephanie claims that the damages award exacerbates her and Christina's financial difficulties, a result that the decedent would not have wanted.
We review the denial of a remittitur for abuse of discretion. See Griffin v. General Motors Corp ., 380 Mass. 362, 371 (1980). The parties stipulated that the life insurance proceeds totaled $333,000. The jury, however, awarded Devin and Shawn a lesser amount: $250,000. Leaving aside the reason the jury reduced the damages, the record reveals no evidence that would support any further reduction. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's denial of the postjudgment motion regarding remittitur.
The sons suggest that the jury might have determined that Christina was entitled to one third of the sum. Regardless, they do not take issue with the amount of damages awarded.
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Judgment affirmed .
Order denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, or a new trial affirmed .