Opinion
Case No. 2:17-cv-01690-SU
12-06-2018
KRYSTAL WINONA BROWN; and GEOFFREY M. BROWN, Incarcerated, Plaintiffs, v. BAKER COUNTY DEPT OF HUMAN SERVICES, BROOKE MYERS, MOUNTAIN VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, TRISH HILT, CHRIS BLACK, and TAMMY CLAUSEL, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
:
Pro se plaintiff Krystal Winona Brown brings this civil rights action, purportedly on behalf of herself and her son, Geoffrey M. Brown, relating to the mental health services provided to Mr. Brown and his removal from her custody. Defendants are the Baker County Department of Human Services ("DHS"), Brooke Myers, Mountain Valley Mental Health Services ("MVMHS"), Trish Hilt, Chris Black, and Tammy Clausel. Defendants Clausel and MVMHS have moved to dismiss (Docket No. 61), as have defendants Hilt, Myers, DHS, and Black (Docket No. 62). Plaintiff opposes the Motions. (Docket Nos. 65, 66). The Court heard oral argument on November 15, 2018. (Docket No. 69).
For the following reasons, the Court should GRANT the Motions to Dismiss, with prejudice. Additionally, Mr. Brown is DISMISSED as a plaintiff in this action.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Because plaintiff's pro se form Complaint contains minimal factual allegations, the Court also relies on plaintiff's factual allegations from her three "Deposition[s] of Events" (Docket Nos. 45-47) and her Responses to defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 65, 66).
The Court also takes judicial notice of certain state court orders entered in relation to Mr. Brown's custody (Baker County Circuit Court, Juvenile Department, Case No. 5450J, Petition No. 5450J01), attached to the Schneider Declaration: Exhibit 3, the Shelter Order, entered on August 7, 2009; Exhibit 4, the Jurisdiction and Disposition Judgment, dated November 4, 2009; and Exhibit 7, the Order Terminating Jurisdiction, Guardianship and Closing Case, dated January 16, 2015. (Docket No. 64).
Clausel was Mr. Brown's therapist at MVMHS. Pl. Depo. 2 ¶¶ I.1 (Docket No. 46). In May 2008, Clausel instructed Mr. Brown to say that Ms. Brown "was not feeding him." Id. Clausel then reported Ms. Brown and Mr. Brown to DHS regarding Ms. Brown's care of Mr. Brown, including potential malnutrition, and warned Ms. Brown that "if [she] didn't say that [she] wasn't feeding him," DHS would remove Mr. Brown from her care. Pl. Depo. 1 ¶¶ I.1-4 (Docket No. 45). At some point thereafter, Clausel reported Ms. Brown to DHS, and after DHS went to Ms. Brown's home to talk to Mr. Brown "without [Ms. Brown's] permission," Mr. Brown on July 22, 2009, "was more defiant and argumentative and physically abuse to [Ms. Brown] and abusive with the pets." Pl. Resp., at 1 (Docket No. 65).
On August 5, 2009, Mr. Brown had a therapy session with Clausel, after which he became violent and assaulted Ms. Brown. Pl. Depo. 1 ¶ III.1 (Docket No. 45); Pl. Resp., at 2 (Docket No. 65). Ms. Brown had Mr. Brown arrested for assault "and the police took him." Pl. Depo. 1 ¶ III.1 (Docket No. 45); Pl. Resp., at 2 (Docket No. 65).
On August 6, 2009, Mr. Brown was released from custody to Clausel without Ms. Brown's consent. Pl. Depo. 1 ¶ III.1 (Docket No. 45); Pl. Resp., at 2 (Docket No. 65). On August 7, DHS removed Mr. Brown from Ms. Brown's care, because, "by stipulation of the parties," the court found that there was "good cause to believe that [Mr. Brown] ha[d] been neglected and or abused or placed at significant risk of neglect or abuse." Schneider Decl., Ex. 3, at 1-2 (Docket No. 64); see also Pl. Depo. 1 ¶ III.1 (Docket No. 45). Plaintiff alleges that MVMHS and DHS caused Ms. Brown to be "put on the 'Child Registry' list for abuse," and Ms. Brown was "charged with Criminal Mistreatment which was later dismissed." Id.
On September 23, 2009, David R. Starr, Ph.D., conducted a psychological evaluation of Mr. Brown "[i]n which they used his report against [Ms. Brown]." Pl. Resp., at 4 (Docket No. 65). On October 14, 2013, J. Wilson Keiney, Ph.D., executed a "psychosexual psychological report" regarding Mr. Brown, which concluded that he "should be considered High Risk for sexually harming females, regardless of age and at a moderate risk for sexually harming young males." Id. The report recommended therapy as treatment, id., but this "psychosexual therapy . . . was never received," Pl. Depo. 1 ¶ III.1 (Docket No. 45).
On November 4, 2009, Mr. Brown was declared a ward of the court, because he was "dependent for care and support on a public or private ward caring agency that needs the services of the Court in planning for the best interests of the ward." Schneider Decl., Ex. 4, at 1 (Docket No. 64).
On January 16, 2015, after Mr. Brown had turned 18 years old, DHS and court jurisdiction and guardianship over Mr. Brown were terminated and his juvenile court case was closed. Schneider Decl., Ex. 7, at 1 (Docket No. 64).
"On April 12, 2016, [Mr. Brown] was arrested for charges due to never receiving the necessary treatment from DHS while in dependency." Pl. Depo. II, at 3. (Docket No. 47). Mr. Brown had also been arrested in 2015 "for sexual charges." Pl. Resp., at 5 (Docket No. 65).
Plaintiff alleges that DHS did not provide Mr. Brown with "proper services," and "[he] was not given the tools to make correct choices which landed him in prison." Pl. Depo. 1 ¶ III.1 (Docket No. 45). Ms. Brown has, as a result, suffered "emotional, physical and mental abuse from the results of his conviction and from the media, polices who are friends of the defendants as well as the community." Id.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In her Complaint, plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 41 U.S.C. § 6503 ("Breach or violation of required contract terms"), "CR 446," and Or. Rev. Stat. § 430.210 ("Rights of persons receiving services"). Compl., at 3 (Docket No. 1). In the Depositions of Events, plaintiff states that the constitutional violations include a violation of her "right to be free from threats, duress, coercion, or intimidation in their dealings with the State," her "6th Constitutional Amendment" right "to not be subjected to hearsay evidence against them," and her "constitutional right of due process" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pl. Depo. 1, ¶¶ I, I.2, III (Docket No. 45).
Plaintiff originally filed four distinct actions, each titled "Brown et al v. Baker County Dept of Human Services et al": Nos. 2:17-cv-01689-SU, 2:17-cv-01690-SU, 2:17-cv-01691-SU, and 2:17-cv-01692-SU. The parties, allegations, and claims in the cases largely overlapped. In a Motion Hearing on April 24, 2018 (Docket No. 42) held in the -1690 matter, the Court granted defendants' unopposed Motions to Consolidate (Docket Nos. 38, 39), dismissed the other cases, and held that proceedings would continue in the -1690 matter. The present case encompasses all the parties, allegations, and claims from the three dismissed actions.
LEGAL STANDARD
A well-pleaded complaint requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A claimant is not required to detail all factual allegations; however, the complaint must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. While the Court must assume that all facts alleged in a complaint are true and view them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it need not accept as true any legal conclusion set forth in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a plausible claim for relief, the complaint "must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts" to support its legal conclusions. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent' with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
ANALYSIS
I. Mr. Brown as Plaintiff
Ms. Brown brings this action pro se. As such, she may represent only herself. She may not represent another plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 2008). Although Ms. Brown purports to name Mr. Brown as a plaintiff, he has not brought this action on his own behalf by making an appearance or signing the pleadings. Mr. Brown is thus not a proper plaintiff in this action.
For these reasons, at the November 15, 2018 hearing, the Court DISMISSED Mr. Brown as a plaintiff in this action. (Docket No. 69). II. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations for plaintiff's § 1983 actions in Oregon is two years. Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 666 F.3d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2012). Regarding plaintiff's state law claims, the statute of limitations for "an action arising from any act or omission of a public body or an officer, employee or agent of a public body" is also two years, Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.275, as is the statute of limitations for personal injury actions, id. § 12.110.
Plaintiff's claims all pertain to the mental health care that Mr. Brown received, or should have received, while as a minor, or to state court proceedings relating to his custody and guardianship. However, by January 16, 2015, as reflected in the Order Terminating Jurisdiction, Guardianship and Closing Case, Schneider Decl., Ex. 7, at 1 (Docket No. 64), Mr. Brown had reached eighteen years of age; therefore, DHS and court jurisdiction and custody had terminated. Thus, any claims relating to the treatment, care, or custody of Mr. Brown—which encompass all of plaintiff's claims—would have accrued, at the latest, by January 16, 2015. Plaintiff would have to have commenced this action within two years, by January 16, 2017. Plaintiff filed this action on October 23, 2017. (Docket No. 1). Thus, all of plaintiff's federal and state law claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Because these claims would have had to accrue at least by the time Mr. Brown was released from DHS guardianship, and it is undisputed that this occurred more than two years before this action commenced, any further amendment of the pleadings would also be time-barred, and would be futile. See Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court should, therefore, grant defendants' Motions to Dismiss with prejudice. III. Other Arguments
It is undisputed that the services MVMHS provided to Mr. Brown terminated in 2012. Hendricks Decl. ¶ 4 (Docket No. 62).
Plaintiff's claims also fail as a matter of law for various additional reasons.
A. "Right to Be Free from Threats, Duress, Coercion, or Intimidation"
Plaintiff alleges that "Under the Constitution of the United States of America, all Americans have the right to be free from threats, duress, coercion, or intimidation in their dealings with the State." Pl. Depo. 1 ¶ I (Docket No. 45). However, plaintiff identifies no source, constitutional or statutory, for such a right. Further, the parties who allegedly harassed plaintiff ("media, polices who are friends of the defendants as well as the community," id. ¶ III.1), are third parties, and not defendants in this action. While MVMHS was contractually related to DHS, it is not clear that this made MVMHS a "state actor" for purposes of § 1983. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982); Hendrick Decl. ¶ 2. (Docket No. 62). Nor was Ms. Brown a client of MVMHS. Id.
Plaintiff argues in opposition to defendants' Motions that she was wrongly prosecuted by the Baker County District Attorney. However, any claim for wrongful prosecution is not properly before the Court against the defendants named in the Complaint.
B. Sixth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that the "Department of Human Services removed [Mr. Brown] from my care based on what Tammie Clausel said. This violated my 6th Constitutional Amendment that All Americans have the right to not be subjected to hearsay evidence against them." Depo. 1 ¶ II.1 (Docket No. 45). However, "the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal prosecutions," United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005), and does not secure any rights in other proceedings, such as a DHS removal proceeding, e.g., Carty v. Nelson, 426 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005).
C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Plaintiff alleges that the removal of Mr. Brown from her care and his placement with DHS and as a ward of the court violated her Fourteenth Amendment "right of due process." Depo. 1 ¶ III.1 (Docket No. 45). Because such a federal court challenge "complain[s] of an injury caused by a state court judgment, and seek[s] federal court review and rejection of that judgment," the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars plaintiff's claims. Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013); see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Plaintiff's action would act as a "de facto appeal of a state court decision" and "seek to litigate an issue that is 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court judicial decision," thus bringing it within Rooker-Feldman. Bell, 709 F.3d at 897. Plaintiff cannot challenge the state court custody and guardianship proceedings in federal court.
See, e.g., Safouane v. Fleck, 226 F. App'x 753, 758 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether the proceedings regarding parental rights with respect to five of the . . . surviving children were valid, because those proceedings were concluded before the filing of this action."), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (July 26, 2007); Delaney v. Souther-Wyatt, No. CIV. 00-35-AS, 2000 WL 33201931, at *8 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2000) ("This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker/Feldman doctrine over all claims related to defendants' conduct with regard to the underlying child custody proceeding.").
41 U.S.C. § 6503 "applies in case of breach or violation of a representation or stipulation included in a contract under section 6502 of this title." Id. § 6503(a). Section 6502 in turn sets forth requirements for any "contract made by an agency of the United States for the manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, or equipment, in an amount exceeding $10,000." Plaintiff's allegations pertain to mental health services provided by, and the actions taken by, a local mental health provider. They do not pertain to contracts made by United States agencies. Plaintiff may not bring a claim under 41 U.S.C. § 6503.
E. "CR 446"
In her Pro Se Form Complaint, under the section "If the Basis for Jurisdiction Is a Federal Question," and under the instruction "List the specific federal statutes, federal treaties, and/or provisions of the United States Constitution that are at issue in this case," plaintiff writes, inter alia, "CR 446." She does not elsewhere refer to "CR 446." The Court is not able to discern what "CR 446" may refer to, and plaintiff's filings leave it entirely unclear. Despite extensive research, the Court has identified no source of law, or entitlement to relief, federal or state, that "CR 446" could refer to.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 430.210 enumerates certain rights guaranteed to persons receiving mental health and developmental disability services in Oregon. It provides that "[t]he rights described in this section may be asserted and exercised by the person, the person's guardian and any representative designated by the person." Id. § 430.210(3). Mr. Brown was the party receiving mental health services, not plaintiff. Plaintiff is not Mr. Brown's guardian or representative (and would have ceased to be at the latest by 2015). Plaintiff may not seek relief under Or. Rev. Stat. § 430.210.
* * *
For these additional reasons, each of Plaintiff's claims fails as a matter of law, and the Court should dismiss them with prejudice.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For these reasons, the Court should GRANT defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 61, 63), with prejudice. Additionally, Mr. Brown is DISMISSED as a plaintiff in this action.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The above Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a United States District Judge for review. Objections, if any, are due December 20, 2018. If objections are filed, a response to the objections is due fourteen days after the date the objections are filed and the review of the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 6th day of December, 2018.
/s/ Patricia Sullivan
PATRICIA SULLIVAN
United States Magistrate Judge