Opinion
99-CIV-11745(KMW)
February 9, 2001
Plaintiff brought this action to challenge a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner" or "defendant") that denied her applications for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") and Social Security Disability ("SSD") benefits. Plaintiff has moved for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), reversing the final decision of the Commissioner and finding plaintiff eligible for disability benefits. Defendant has moved to remand the case for further administrative proceedings, pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons set forth below, the Court remands the case.
In the alternative, plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commissioner's decision and a remand of the action.
I. Background
Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since 1986 due to physical impairments that include hypertension, arthritis, and diabetes mellitus. See Complaint at ¶ 7. From 1968 until 1986, plaintiff worked at the Jewish Home and Hospital as a building service maid, beauty parlor assistant, and personal assistant. In 1988, plaintiff filed for SSI and SSD benefits. Her application was denied on initial review and again on reconsideration.
In 1994, plaintiff's case was re-opened by the Social Security Administration (SSA) pursuant to a class action decision that invalidated medical conclusions that had been relied upon by the SSA in certain cases, including plaintiff's; however, upon review, the SSA maintained that it would have denied plaintiff's application even in light of the new judicially-imposed standards for consideration of medical evidence.
After this decision by the SSA, plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). On October 9, 1996, the ALJ that heard plaintiff's case concluded that she was not disabled on the ground that she could perform her past relevant work as a "clerk." See Complaint Ex. A. Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision, arguing that she had not worked as a clerk and that she was unable to perform her past relevant work as a building service maid, a beauty shop personal attendant, and a personal assistant. See Complaint Ex. B. On July 10, 1998, the Social Security Appeals Council ("Appeals Council") vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded the case to the ALJ for further consideration of plaintiff's residual functional capacity, her past relevant work as a clerk, and the nature of the jobs that she did at the Jewish Home and Hospital. See Complaint Ex. C.
On November 20, 1998, the ALJ found that plaintiff had only a limited ability to perform sedentary work. Based on this finding, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was disabled because plaintiff lacked the ability to perform her past relevant work and the ability to perform other suitable work. See Complaint Ex. D.
On January 13, 1999, the Appeals Council notified plaintiff that it sought, on its own motion, to review the ALJ's decision in her case because the evidence indicated that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work and retained the ability to perform her past relevant work as a cleaning person, which the Appeals Council considered to be light work. See Complaint Ex. E. On September 28, 1988, the Appeals Council issued a final decision that denied plaintiff's applications for disability benefits. The Appeals Council found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light work because she could stand and walk for six hours, lift ten pounds frequently, and lift twenty pounds occasionally. See Complaint Ex. H.
Plaintiff appealed the Appeals Council decision by filing this action. Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council's decision contains errors of law and is not supported by substantial evidence. See Complaint at ¶ 19.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard for Review
1. Standard of Review
To review a disability determination under 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1), the Court must consider: (1) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles in making his determination, and (2) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is the responsibility of the Court "to conduct a searching inquiry and to scrutinize the entire record, having in mind that the Social Security Act . . . is remedial in purpose." McBrayer v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 712 F.2d 795, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1983).
2. Definition of Disability Under the Act
The Social Security Act requires a claimant to prove: (1) that he or she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months; and (2) that the existence of such impairment is demonstrated by evidence supported by data obtained by medically acceptable clinical laboratory techniques. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Commissioner's analysis of disability claims proceeds under a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. Second, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant has a severe impairment. Third, the Commissioner considers whether the impairment is "listed," which means that the claimant will be found disabled without consideration of vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience. If the claimant does not have a listed disability, the Commissioner considers, fourth, whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform her past work. Fifth, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant can perform other work that exists in the national economy. The claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps. The Commissioner bears the burden of proof as to the fifth step. See Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
In the ordinary case, the Commissioner satisfies his burden by resorting to the applicable medical vocational guidelines. However, these guidelines do not control the disability determination if the claimant suffers from nonexertional limitations. If claimant's nonexertional limitations "significantly limit" the range of work she could otherwise perform in light of her exertional limitations, then the Commissioner must consider vocational testimony or other similar evidence to make his determination. See Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 1986).
B. Plaintiff's Impairments
Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council made at least three errors when it concluded that she was not disabled. First, plaintiff contests the Appeals Council's determination that her past relevant work was light work. Viewing the record as a whole, the Court agrees that the Appeals Council's determination that plaintiff had a residual functional capacity to perform light work is not supported by substantial evidence.
Defendant concedes this point. See Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion for Remand, dated June 19, 2000, at p. 6.
Light work generally requires an individual to stand or walk most of the workday; frequently lift and carry objects weighing up to ten pounds; and occasionally lift a maximum of twenty pounds. See Social Security Ruling 83-10, 83-14. Medium work, on the other hand, requires a worker to stand or walk most of the workday; frequently lift and carry objects weighing up to twenty-five pounds; and lift a maximum of fifty pounds. Medium exertion work also more typically includes kneeling and crawling as part of the work requirements. See id.
Claimant worked from 1982-86 as a building service maid; from 1976-82 as a beauty parlor assistant; and from 1968-1977 as a personal assistant. As a building service maid, she cleaned more than five rooms a day, standing for six hours, kneeling to scrub floors, and carrying cleaning supplies such as pails of water and mops. (Tr. 51-52, 90). As a beauty parlor assistant, she made appointments and assisted elderly individuals from their wheelchairs and walkers into the shampoo and beautician's chairs. (Tr. 91- 92). As a personal assistant, she ensured that elderly individuals took their baths and kept appointments, often assisting residents, who weighed as much as 200 pounds, who had fallen on the ground. (Tr. 92-93). Based on this evidence, the Court notes that claimant did at times perform what the ALJ referred to as "arduous physical labor." (Tr. 93).
Second, plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council's determination that her medically determinable impairments produced no nonexertional limitations is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court agrees. Nonexertional limitations are restrictions that affect the claimant's ability to meet the demands of jobs other than the strength demands. Nonexertional limitations include postural-manipulative impairments, such as the ability to reach, hold, kneel, stoop, or crouch. See Social Security Regulations 85-15. The Court finds that the record indicates that plaintiff has difficulty kneeling and crouching based on evidence that she suffers from, among other ailments, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine (Tr. 197), degenerative disc disease of the right hip (Tr. 372), and mild degenerative arthritis of the left knee (Tr. 300).
Third, plaintiff contests the Appeals Council's determination that she retained the ability to perform a full range of light work. The Court notes that plaintiff's treating physician recommended that she not resume moderate to severe work activity because of her congestive heart failure (Tr. 171, 207). In addition, the record indicates that the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has "a combination of severe impairments," including those mentioned above. (Tr. 24).
C. Disposition
Based on the above conclusions, the Court must decide: (1) whether to remand the case for further administrative proceedings, or (2) whether to reverse the final decision of the Commissioner and remand the case for the calculation and payment of benefits. Defendant seeks a remand for further administrative proceedings on the ground that the record has not been fully developed with respect to the precise requirements of plaintiff's past work. Plaintiff, on the other hand, seeks judgment on the pleadings that she is entitled to disability benefits. The Court concludes that a remand for further administrative proceedings is most appropriate in this case.
The Court "may, on motion of the Commissioner of Social Security made for good cause shown before the Commissioner files the Commissioner's answer, remand the case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further action by the Commissioner of Social Security. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In this case, the Commissioner has made a motion for further proceedings prior to filing his answer. Moreover, the Court determines that the Commissioner has set forth good cause for the remand. Good cause exists in cases where the Commissioner has made errors, such as in this case. See, e.g., Seaborn v. Sullivan, 822 F. Supp. 121, 123-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citation omitted) (explaining that good cause exists where errors of law have been committed).
In the present action, the Court concludes that there is a need for further development of the precise requirements of plaintiff's past relevant work. As the Commissioner sets forth, neither plaintiff's vocational report nor the hearing before the ALJ clarified the exact nature of plaintiff's previous work experience. In her vocational report, plaintiff stated that she walked eight hours a day and never did any bending. (Tr. 130). However, she did not fill out the portion of the report that should have indicated how much weight she lifted. At the hearing, plaintiff described her work as heavy work but did not clearly detail what work she did in each of the positions that she held. (Tr. 52). For instance, the record does not indicate how frequently she lifted heavy things and kneeled. Without such information, the Court is not able to determine whether her past relevant work qualifies as light or medium work.
The Court disagrees with plaintiff that the case is appropriate for judgment on the pleadings. According to Second Circuit law, such a disposition is appropriate "when the record provides persuasive proof of disability and a remand for further evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose." Parker, 626 F.2d at 235 (citation omitted); see also Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986 (holding that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate "where application of the correct legal principles to the record could lead to only one conclusion") (citation omitted). The present action does not represent such a case. The determination of whether plaintiff is disabled depends on whether or not her past work qualifies as light or medium work, and the Court is unable to make this determination based on the existing record.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court remands this action for further administrative proceedings, pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
SO ORDERED