Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation if a reasonable jury could find: (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See id. (citing Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2019)); accord Brown v. Advocate South Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 2012).

That sort of evidence is rare, see e.g. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 845 ("'smoking gun' evidence of discriminatory intent is hard to come by"), and when an employer has not openly admitted to discrimination "the plaintiffs must construct a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker." Brown v.Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 2006)).

(“ ‘smoking gun’ evidence of discriminatory intent is hard to come by”), and when an employer has not openly admitted to discrimination “the plaintiffs must construct a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir.2012) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir.2006) ). The Seventh Circuit has recognized three types of circumstantial evidence:

But Title VII does not forbid sloppy, mistaken, or unfair terminations; it forbids discriminatory or retaliatory terminations. See Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.2012). Collins has provided evidence showing, at most, that the report's conclusions were wrong.

Because discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981 are essentially identical, courts do not analyze them separately. See Brown v. Advocate So. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1104 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012); Dass v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 675 F.3d 1060, 1068 (7th Cir. 2012). To avoid summary judgment on her race discrimination claim, Lockhart may use either the direct or indirect method of proof pursuant to the familiar burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas framework.

” Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). According to Gordon's declaration in response to the motion for summary judgment, within several days of the filing of the April 2012 charge, Gordon's supervisors “wrongfully denied overtime to [her] even though [she] was listed on the available overtime list,” and Superintendent T. Fowler “directed [her] to come into work at 2:30 in the morning,” despite her usual start time being 5 a.m. (Gordon Decl., Dkt. # 56, Page 17 of 77, ¶¶ 17-21).But

Phillips offers nothing but speculation as to the motives behind the various allegedly adverse employment actions. “[O]ur favor toward the nonmoving party on summary judgment ‘does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture.'” Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012)); see also Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1058 (7th Cir. 2006) (“As we have noted before, if the subjective beliefs of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases could, by themselves, create genuine issues of material fact, then virtually all defense motions for summary judgment in such cases would be doomed.”)

Not everything that “makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 790 (7th Cir. 2009)). Instead, the complained-of action must be “materially” adverse, meaning the action “might dissuade a reasonable worker from” engaging in the statutorily protected activity.

At summary judgment, “the plaintiff[] must produce evidence that a retaliatory motive actually influenced the decision-maker, not merely that it could have.” Brown v. Advoc. S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 2012). “[C]ausation can be established by circumstantial evidence, ” such as “suspicious timing, a pretextual explanation for the [adverse employment action], and evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently.

Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 466 (7th Cir. 2014). Saggu may have felt embarrassed by Binkley's blunt feedback, particularly when other employees were present, but courts have repeatedly held that trivial insults and slights are not actionable under Title VII or the ADEA. See Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 2012) ("personality conflicts" and "snubbing by supervisors" not actionable); Griffin, 356 F.3d at 829 (comments that employee was a "bad influence on the office" not actionable); Blackmon v. City of Chicago, 836 F. Supp. 2d 655, 665 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (being yelled at by supervisor not actionable). Binkley's threat to "write him up" when there was a backlog of mail is also not actionable.