Harrell v. Badger , 171 So.3d 764, 769 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).The definition of a "qualified beneficiary" was addressed in Brown–Thill v. Brown , 929 F.Supp.2d 887 (W.D. Mo. 2013), where the federal district court considered whether the co-trustee's children, who were also the grandchildren of the settlor, were qualified beneficiaries under Florida law. In Brown–Thill , the settlor (Eugene) created a revocable trust.

Courts applying Missouri law have routinely held that beneficiaries are necessary parties in actions seeking an accounting or affecting the trust corpus because of their interest in that corpus. See Roth v. Lehmann, 741 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that beneficiaries are necessary parties in suit seeking final accounting because "[e]ach beneficiary has an interest in that accounting, and in challenging it"); Lynch v. Porter, 446 F.2d 225, 227 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1971) ("All beneficiaries are normally deemed indispensable parties to an equitable suit seeking restoration of the res."); Pauli v. Spicer, No. ED 101231, 2014 WL 5139384, at *7 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2014) (holding that trustees and beneficiaries are necessary and indispensable parties in actions involving trust property);see also Brown-Thill v. Brown, 929 F. Supp. 2d 887, 898-900 (W.D. Mo. 2013) (noting that, in various cases deciding the issue under Missouri law, "the beneficiaries were necessary parties because an accounting was involved [or] the trust itself would somehow be affected by the judgment"), aff'd as modified, 762 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2014). Certus's claims, which seek both an accounting and actions affecting the res, thus render MDNR a required party. MDNR indisputably has an interest in the trust property, and in MDNR's absence, the Court's rulings might "as a practical matter impair or impede [MDNR]'s ability to protect the interest" or "leave [AELS] subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations . . . ."

However, the Carey court next noted that "to this rule there are several exceptions," id., and courts have recognized that the general rule in Carey "is not a strict rule." Brown-Thill v. Brown, 929 F. Supp. 2d 887, 898 (W.D. Mo. 2013); see also W.W. Allen, Trust Beneficiaries as Necessary Parties to Action Relating to Trust or its Property, 9 A.L.R. 2d 10 (1950) (noting that the general rule "is honored more in the exception than in the application" and that "[o]ne may even find authority to the effect that the rule is in large part the direct opposite of that stated above"). Indeed, many courts have held that trust beneficiaries are not required parties to actions involving a trust where their interests are adequately represented by the trustee or other beneficiaries. See, e.g., Markham v. Fay, 74 F.3d 1347, 1355 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that beneficiaries of trust were not necessary parties to action seeking to recover trust property because the interest of the trustee, who was also a beneficiary, was at least as strong as that of the other beneficiaries); Harvill, 2013 WL 1245729, at *4.