We have repeatedly interpreted the phrase "discovered the injury" as meaning discovering the "injury and the negligence which resulted in the injury," also referred to as "legal injury." Foil v. Bollinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979); see also Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338-39 (Utah 1987)("This Court has defined discovery of the injury as knowledge of a legal injury; that is, the plaintiff must know of the injury and of the negligence which caused the injury."). The application of this test to a factual scenario where multiple medical events may have caused the plaintiffs alleged injury is an issue of first impression for this court.

In reviewing a summary judgment, we affirm only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. E.g., Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 324 n. 1; Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1992); Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Utah 1987). In reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. E.g., Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).

Our cases make clear that "in reviewing a summary judgment, this Court will view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and will allow the summary judgment to stand only if the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts." Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Utah 1987) (quoting Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted)). Plaintiff Jennifer Chapman was born on August 10, 1972.

(emphasis added)); Collins , 1999 UT 56, ¶ 19, 984 P.2d 960 ("[T]he two-year statute of limitations period commences to run only when the injured person knew or should have known of an injury and that the injury was caused by a negligent act." (emphasis added)); Brower v. Brown , 744 P.2d 1337, 1338–39 (Utah 1987) ("This Court has defined discovery of the injury as knowledge of a legal injury; that is, the plaintiff must know of the injury and of the negligence which caused the injury." (emphases added)); Deschamps v. Pulley , 784 P.2d 471, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff knew or should have known her mother's injury was a result of medical negligence more than two years before filing an action).

Id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, ¶ 19, 984 P.2d 960; see also Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) (noting that “the two-year limitations period does not commence to run until the injured person knew or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent action” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338–40 (Utah 1987) (explaining that a plaintiff has discovered her legal injury when she knew or should have known both of her injury and that it resulted from negligence); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979) (“[W]e hold that the term discovery of ‘injury’ ... means discovery of injury and the negligence which resulted in the injury.”). Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 22, 108 P.3d 741 (“Once the triggering event identified by the statutory discovery rule occurs—i.e., when a plaintiff first has actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant facts forming the basis of the cause of action—the statutory limitations period begins to run and a plaintiff who desires to file a claim must do so within the time specified in the statute.”). Foil, 601 P.2d at 147. Id.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party and affirm only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact or if, accepting the facts as contended for by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. D L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (citing Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979)); Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Utah 1987). The grant of a motion to dismiss is reviewed in substantially the same manner.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(1) (2008). The Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly interpreted the phrase `discovered the injury' as meaning discovering the `injury and the negligence which resulted in the injury,' also referred to as `legal injury.'" Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ¶ 25, 640 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (quoting Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979)); see also Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338-39 (Utah 1987) ("[T]he plaintiff must know of the injury and of the negligence which caused the injury.");Foil, 601 P.2d at 148 ("[T]he two-year provision does not commence to run until the injured person knew or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent action."). For the convenience of the reader, we reference the 2008 codification of section 78B-3-404 because the renumbered statute contains language identical to the version in effect when Roth's cause of action arose.

"In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court will view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and will allow the summary judgment to stand only if the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts." Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Utah 1987) (citing Barlow Soc'y.v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986)). See also D L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989).