Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2318 c/w 00-3055, 3056, 3057.
October 29, 2001.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are defendants', Fifty-Two Sheriffs ("Sheriffs") and the Clerk of Criminal District Court in Orleans Parish ("Clerk"), motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c). For the following reasons, the Court dismisses plaintiffs' claims.
Seven additional sheriffs defendants adopted the motion of the Fifty-Two Sheriffs: Litchfield, Deen, Prator, Huckabay, Lombard, Champagne, and Jones.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs brought these class actions against all of the sheriffs of Louisiana, individually and in their official capacities, except the Sheriff of Orleans Parish, and against the Clerk of Criminal District Court in Orleans Parish to challenge the constitutionality of Louisiana Revised Statute § 33:1432(9) Louisiana Revised Statute § 13:1381(3), which authorize defendants to collect a fee for processing appearance bonds before a defendant has been convicted of a criminal offense. A similar action was brought against the Sheriff of Orleans Parish challenging the fee statute applicable to Orleans Parish. All of the actions have been consolidated.
The City of New Orleans has filed a separate Motion to Dismiss.
Louisiana Sheriffs and the criminal District Court Clerk of Orleans parish have statutory authority to charge a fee for the taking and filing of appearance bonds in criminal matters. The statute applicable to the Sheriffs is Louisiana Revised Statute § 33:1432, which provides as follows:
The compensation, fees, and costs allowed sheriffs, the parish of Orleans excepted, for all services in criminal matters, shall be the following:
(9) For taking appearance bond when required to do so, fifteen dollars, unless suspended by a judge of the district court of the parish. A judge of a district court shall waive this fee if a defendant has been tried and found not guilty or if the charges against the defendant are dismissed. LA. REV. STAT. § 33:1432(9).
The bail bond system in Louisiana is provided for in the Louisiana Code of Criminal procedure. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 311, et seq. Sheriffs have administrative responsibilities in connection with the bail bond system, such as giving notices required under the bail statutes. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art 344B(1).
The Clerk derives his authority to collect the challenged fee from La. R.S. § 13:1381, which authorizes him to collect fees for processing appearance bonds, as follows:
The following charges may be made for the services of the clerk of the criminal district court:
(3) For filing and processing of appearance or witness bond, five dollars. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1381(3).
The plaintiffs were at one time arrested and determined eligible for bail. Some of the plaintiffs in the suit against the Sheriffs were required to pay the requisite fees for the appearance bonds, while other plaintiffs were required only to promise to pay the fee before being released. Some sheriffs billed a flat fee, and other sheriffs based their calculations on the number of bail bonds posted, which correlates to the number of charges levied against the arrestee. Additionally, the usual practice of the Sheriffs is to retain the money, regardless of whether the charges against an individual are dismissed or he is found not guilty. In the suit against the Clerk, the plaintiffs were all charged a five dollar fee for the filing and processing of appearance bonds pursuant to Section 1381. No plaintiff in either class has ever sought a refund of his money, and the plaintiffs challenging Section 1432 do not allege that they were acquitted or that the charges against them were dismissed.
Plaintiffs sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs contend that the appearance bond fee statutes, Section 1432(9) and Section 1381(3), are facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied. Plaintiffs seek damages, preliminary and permanent injunctions against the enforcement of the statutes, declaratory judgments regarding the constitutionality of the statutes, and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Defendants move to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). The Court converts defendants' motions to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 because matters outside of the pleadings have been presented to and not excluded by the Court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(C).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues or material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. Section 1983
Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. To state a claim under Section 1983 a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See Moore v. Willis Independent School District, 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000). All defendants stipulate that the second requirement for stating a Section 1983 claim is met here. (Trial Stipulations by Fifty-Two Sheriff-Defendants at #2; Trial Stipulations by Clerk of Criminal District Court at #2). The Court will focus on whether plaintiffs' present genuine issues of material fact that their constitutional rights were violated.
Plaintiffs challenge each statute as unconstitutional on its face and as applied. With a facial challenge, the proper inquiry is whether the mere enactment of the statute effects a constitutional deprivation. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. 472 U.S. 491, 501-02, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2800-01 (1985); see also Augustus v. Roemer, 771 F. Supp. 1458, 1462 (E.D. La. 1991). To evaluate such a challenge, the Court "must . . . consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered." See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 494 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1194, n. 5 (1982). In an "as applied" challenge, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 121 S.Ct. 727, 730 (2001).
C. Fourth Amendment Claim
The Fourth Amendment establishes the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and requires that no warrants issue except upon probable cause. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. The "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803 (1991). Traditionally, the reasonableness inquiry is applied to Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force during arrest, investigatory stops, or other seizures. See Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (applying the reasonableness standard to a claim of illegal arrest based on mistaken identity). When it applies the reasonableness test, the Supreme Court "eschew[s] bright line rules," and emphasizes the "fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 (1996). Although this case does not deal with excessive force, the reasoning of Graham is equally applicable to the plaintiffs' claims of unlawful seizures of their person and property. See Blackwell, 34 F.3d at 302.
Plaintiffs allege that they were forced to pay or promise to pay the challenged fees or face further pretrial detention even though they qualified for bail and posted bond. (00-3055 Pl.'s Cmpl. ¶ ¶ 19(a)-(b); 00-3057 Pl.'s Cmpl. ¶ ¶ 16-17). Under even the most generous reading of these facts, plaintiffs cannot make cut a claim that the statutes are unconstitutional as applied to them. First, plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of their arrests and do not claim that they were improperly in police custody at the time the fees were assessed by the Sheriffs or the Clerk. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not allege that they were detained for any length of time beyond the point at which they posted their bail bonds. In fact, the plaintiffs admit that they paid the fees and were released. (00-3055 Pl.'s Cmpl. ¶ ¶ 19(a)-(b); 00-3057 Pl.'s Cmpl. ¶ 17). Therefore, because plaintiffs have not shown that they were unlawfully seized or detained for any unreasonable length of time, the plaintiffs have failed to snow that there is a genuine issue of material fact on their Fourth Amendment claim that the statutes are unconstitutional as applied to them.
A facial challenge to the statutes on Fourth Amendment grounds also fails. The statutes simply authorize sheriffs and clerks to collect an administrative fee for the bail bond system. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 484-85 (1972) (declaring that a bail fee statute "smacks of administrative detail and of procedure and is hardly classified as a fundamental right . . ."). The statutes provide for the collection of fees from arrestees in exchange for the benefit of participating in the bail bond system that relies on the fees to fund its administration. Clearly, the mere enactment of the statutes does not effect a constitutional deprivation; it simply creates a system for funding a program that benefits the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court finds the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the statutes on Fourth Amendment grounds to be without merit.
D. Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2683 (1991). It provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, no excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Eighth Amendment protects only those who have been convicted of a crime. See Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 671-72, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1408, 1412-13 (1977)). It does not protect pretrial detainees. See id. ( citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 n. 16 (1979). The Court explained in Ingraham that if a state seeks to impose punishment before there is a conviction of a crime, the proper inquiry is under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions . . . [T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 430 U.S. at 671 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. at 1412 n. 40
Because the plaintiffs were pretrial detainees when they sustained their alleged injuries, their claims under the Eighth Amendment are without merit. The Court will analyze these claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
E. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim
To prevail on a substantive due process claim a plaintiff must first establish that it held a constitutionally protected right to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection applies. See SIMI Investment Company, Inc. v. Harris County, 236 F.3d 240, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the right has been established, the court must consider whether the denial of the right is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See id. at 251.
The Supreme Court has already declared that the Excessive Bail Clause "of course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2104 (1987). What defendants do have is a right to be free from excessive bail in those cases in which it is proper to grant bail. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46, 72 S.Ct. 525, 536-37 (1952). Although the Supreme Court has never actually applied the Excessive Fines Clause, it has explained that at the time the Constitution was adopted, "the word `fine' was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2033 (1998) (quoting Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2915 (1989)). The Excessive Fines Clause thus "limits the government's power to extract payments for some offense." See id. at 328 (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-610, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2805 (1993) (emphasis deleted)).
Plaintiffs argue that the payment of or the promise to pay the challenged fees constructively denied them their "fundamental substantive due process right to access the bail system." (Pl.'s Tr. Brief and Opp. to Def's Mot. to Dis. 27). Second, they contend that the levy of a pretrial fee on an individual who is presumed innocent is per se excessive and prohibited by the Excessive Fines Clause. (Pl's Tr. Brief and Opp. To Def's Mot. to Dis. 27-28).
In Schilb v. Kuebel, petitioner challenged the constitutionality of a bail bond fee statute under which 1% of the amount of bail was retained by the clerk as bail bond costs. The statute applied to any person who secured his release on a bail bond by posting a cash deposit equal to a percentage of the bail amount. The fee was imposed upon those who were acquitted, as well as upon those who were found guilty. The Supreme Court in Schilb unequivocally stated that the bail fee law did not involve any fundamental rights under the Bail Clause or raise any constitutional issue of excessive bail:
"[W]e are not at all concerned here with any fundamental right to bail or with any Eighth Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment question of bail excessiveness . . . This smacks of administrative detail and of procedure . . ." Schilb, 404 U.S. at 365, 92 S.Ct. at 485.Schilb disposes of plaintiffs' arguments that the pretrial bail bond fee is per se excessive or that such a fee violates any fundamental right. Further, fees of fifteen dollars (or multiples thereof) and five dollars do not make bail excessive. In fact, plaintiffs admit that they were able to pay the fees in order to obtain their release from jail and do not allege that they were indigent. (00-3055 Pl.'s Cmpl. ¶ ¶ 19(a)-(b); 00-3057 Pl.'s Cmpl. ¶ 17). Further, the Court finds that the statutes are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose of financing the administration of the bail bond system. See discussion, infra, at 20-21.
As to the "Excessive Fines" claim, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how the fees can be described as punishment, especially when the Sheriffs and the Clerk of Court perform administrative functions in connection with the appearance bonds. Indeed both statutes describe the fees as imposed for administrative services in connection with the bonds. Further, Section 1432(9) provides for the "waiver" of the fees upon the dismissal of the charges or a not-guilty verdict. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 327, 118 S.Ct. at 2033. Even if it did not, this would not be fatal to its legality. The Court in Schilb rejected an argument like the one made here that a bail bond fee assessed on the guilty and acquitted alike was a vehicle for imposing the costs of prosecution upon the innocent, which was prohibited by Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 86 S.Ct. 518 (1966). Rather, the Court held that the fee was an administrative cost imposed upon all who sought the benefit of the bail bond statute. See Schilb, 404 U.S. at 370-71, 92 S.Ct. at 487. Futher, Louisiana expressly prohibits the imposition of the costs of prosecution upon acquitted defendants. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 887. See also Schilb, 404 U.S. at 370-71, 92 S.Ct. at 487. Based upon Schilb and the nature of these charges as administrative costs of the appearance bonds, plaintiffs' arguments under Giaccio are unavailing. Therefore, the Court finds that the plaintiffs' substantive due process claims are without merit.
F. Other Due Process Claims
Plaintiffs assert that the statutes are infirm under the rationale of cases like Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58, 93 S.Ct. 80, 82 (1972), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437 (1927). Both of these cases found constitutional violations when mayors acted as judges in cases in which the mayors or their offices benefitted financially from every conviction. The Court said that the test under these circumstances is whether the public official's situation "is one which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused." Ward, 409 U.S. at 60, 93 S.Ct. at 83 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S. Ct. at 444). Plaintiffs assert that the statutes at issue tempt sheriffs to impose multiple bookings upon arrestees to raise revenue for the sheriff's office in violation of the principles of Tumey and Ward. (Pl's Tr. Brief and Opp. to Def's Mot. to Dis. 29).
Ward and Tumey have no application here. This case does not involve the determination of the plaintiffs' guilt or innocence, nor does it involve placing the Sheriffs or the Clerk in conflicting prosecutorial and judicial roles. The Clerk acts as neither a prosecutor nor a judge in handling appearance bonds, and the Sheriff is not performing a judicial function when he decides on the number of charges on which he will book a defendant. In Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1451 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit held that an arrestee's due process rights were not violated when he was arrested by a constable who was compensated under Mississippi law for each arrest that resulted in a conviction. The Court found Ward and Tumey to be inapplicable because the constable was not expected to be neutral, and he performed no judicial function. The same reasoning applies here.
Plaintiffs also argue that the Louisiana statutes are facially unconstitutional because they fail to provide procedures or standards for waiving or refunding the fees. (Pl's Tr. Brief and Opp. to Def's Mot. to Dis. 30-33). As noted, Schilb indicates that constitutional validity does not depend on whether the fee is refunded to chose who ultimately are not convicted Further, the Schilb court refused to invalidate the fee statute for lack of standards. Here, the Louisiana statutes, like the one in Schilb, are nothing more than administrative costs imposed upon those who take advantage of the State's bail bond system. section 1432(9) even provides a procedure for the return of the funds:
A judge of the district court of the parish shall waive this fee if a defendant has been tried and found not guilty or if the charges against the defendant are dismissed. LA. REV. STAT. § 33:1432(9).
Plaintiffs' lack of standards argument is therefore without merit.
Although plaintiffs argue that the Sheriffs ultimately retain the fees, even when charges are dropped or there is an acquittal, this would not render Section 1432(9) vague on its face, since its language is clear. Additionally, it is not the Sheriffs who are charged with waiving the fees, but the district courts. Moreover, plaintiffs fail to show that the class representative who challenges Section 1432(9) had the charges against him dropped or was acquitted, or that any class member asked for and was denied a waiver of the fee after he was acquitted or had the charges dropped.
This Court has found no circuit court authority that has invalidated appearance bond fees on due process grounds. Moreover, in Enlow v. Toshmingo County, MS, 1990 WL 366913 (N.D. Miss. 1990), aff'd, 45 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to invalidate a Mississippi bond fee statute, and the Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Buckland v. County of Montgomery, 812 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that bail fee statute did not deny due process).
Based on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Enlow, plaintiffs mistakenly rely on Augustus v. Roemer, 771 F. Supp. 1458, 1462 (E.D. La. 1991). Enlow, not Roemer, is binding authority.
In Enlow, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that "a bond fee would be afforded the same favorable constitutional consideration" as the Fifth Circuit afforded the requirement that a defendant post bond as a pre-condition of release following arrest. See id. The Fifth Circuit had already held that requiring defendants to post bond as a precondition to release following arrest does not violate due process. See Gladden v. Roach, 864 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3192 (1989). The bond fee statute found constitutional in Enlow provided:
Upon every defendant charged with a criminal offense who posts a cash bail bond, a surety bail bond or property bail bond conditioned for his appearance at trial, there is hereby imposed a fee equal to two percent (2%) of the face value of each bond or twenty dollars ($20), whichever is greater. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-1-39(2) (repealed by Act of March 12, 1990, Ch. 329, § 12, 1990 Miss. Laws)
A related provision provided for the return of the two percent bail fee when the defendant was acquitted. See Enlow, 1990 WL 366913 at *2.
The district court in Enlow found no due process problem, pointing out that, "[p]laintiffs have presented no case, Fifth Circuit or otherwise, which likens the payment of a bond fee to such a heightened level of private interest" as is afforded the garnishment of a person's wages or the seizure of a debtor's bank account. Enlow, 1990 WL 366913 at *5 (finding that sufficient procedures existed because a person acquitted could seek return of the fee). Balancing all of the factors: a relatively minor private interest (an administrative fee), a low risk of erroneous deprivation (determining the amount of fees charged is simply tied to the number of charges on which individual is arrested), versus the government's interest in maintaining the bail bond system and the administrative burdens inherent in additional procedural requirements, this Court finds that the waiver procedure provided for in Section 1432(9) more than satisfies due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, that Section 1381 does not provide a waiver procedure for the minimal five dollar fee does not render it unconstitutional, because Schilb does not require administrative costs to be refunded to those who are not convicted.
The Court therefore finds that the plaintiffs' procedural due process claims are without merit.
G. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs argue that the State lacks a compelling reason and even a rational basis for having different fees in different parishes. Since we are "not at all concerned here with any fundamental right to bail or with any Eighth Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment question of bail excessiveness," the Court need apply only the rational basis test to plaintiffs' equal protection challenge. Schilb, 404 U.S. at 365, 92 S.Ct. at 484-85 (dismissing an equal protection attack on Illinois statute). The rational basis test is applied when neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right is involved. See Tigner v. Cockrell, 2001 WL 987719, *4 (5th Cir. 2001). Under the test, the Court must uphold a governmental classification if it rationally promotes a legitimate governmental objective. See id.
In Buckland, the Third Circuit addressed the argument advanced by plaintiffs that because bail bond fees are applied at different rates in different counties, the bail bond statute is unconstitutionally vague. See Buckland, 812 F.2d at 148-49. (statute permitted counties to apply "reasonable fee"). The Buckland court dismissed the argument, stating that "the fact that a variation exists among the fees charged in different counties may simply reflect the range of experience and expense in those locations. The rule gives flexibility to the counties to meet local conditions." Buckland, 812 F.2d at 149. As the Third Circuit pointed out, "[t]he rule links the fee to the cost of administering the program, a measurement that has an ascertainable basis." Id. The Louisiana statutes are also linked to the administration of the bail bond system; they were levied for the "taking" and "filing and processing" of appearance bonds. See Section 1432(9). Further, the Louisiana bail law requires Sheriffs to provide appearance notices to those who post bail bonds. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art 344. The fees make it possible for the Sheriffs to provide the required notices. Although the administrative needs of the parishes may vary, resulting in differences in the amounts collected, the fees are limited to a maximum of fifteen dollars per booking under Section 1432 and five dollars per booking under Section 1381(3). Further, they are linked to a legitimate government purpose of providing funds for the administration of the bail bond system, including the taking, filing and processing of bonds, and giving notices required by Louisiana law. See Buckland, 812 F.2d at 149. Therefore, the Court finds that the statutes are rationally related to legitimate governmental ends, and the plaintiffs' equal protection claims are without merit.
III. Conclusion
In sum, all of plaintiffs' claims are without merit. The Court hereby GRANTS summary judgment dismissing all of the plaintiffs' claims against the Sheriffs and the Clerk.