Summary
In Brophy Coal Co. v. Matthews, 125 Mont. 212, 214, 233 P.2d 397, 399, the action was against the state board of equalization to procure allowance of certain deductions made by employers to a labor union for the miners' health and welfare fund.
Summary of this case from Meens v. Board of EducaOpinion
No. 9049.
Submitted April 25, 1951.
Decided June 28, 1951.
1. Labor relations — Right to organize unions. Employees have a right to organize unions and, through them, to bargain collectively with employers concerning wages, hours, working conditions or other appropriate subject. 2. Taxation — Deductions of payments to union. Where, by virtue of collective bargaining agreement between union, representing employees of coal mining company, and company, as a condition to employing union labor, company was required to make certain payments to union for miners' health and welfare fund from which pensions, health insurance, and disability benefits for the miners were paid, such payments were deductible as "moneys expended for necessary labor" in determining company's net proceeds tax under statute providing that net proceeds shall be ascertained by subtracting from value of gross product all "moneys expended for necessary labor." 3. States — Words and phrases "Suit against the state." Action by coal mining company against State Board of Equalization for a declaratory judgment that certain payments made by company to union for miners' health and welfare fund constituted moneys expended for necessary labor so as to be deductible in determining company's net proceeds tax was not a "suit against the state" within rule requiring that the state must consent to be sued.
Appeal from the district court of Lewis and Clark County; A.J. Horsky, Judge.
Mr. G.J. Jeffries, Roundup, Mr. Ralph J. Anderson, and Mr. Albert C. Angstman, Helena, for appellant.
Mr. Arnold H. Olsen, Atty. Gen., Mr. Charles V. Huppe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mr. H.O. Vralsted, Tax Counsel, Board of Equalization, Mr. Daniel J. Sullivan, Asst. Tax Counsel, Board of Equalization, Helena, for respondent.
Mr. Anderson, Mr. Vralsted and Mr. Sullivan argued the case orally.
Brophy Coal Company, a corporation, plaintiff, brought this action in the district court of Lewis and Clark county, seeking a declaratory judgment against the members of the state board of equalization, defendants. A general demurrer of defendants to plaintiff's complaint was sustained. Plaintiff declined to further plead and a judgment dismissing the action was entered. From the judgment plaintiff appeals.
From the complaint it appears that plaintiff, using union labor, is engaged in mining coal. By virtue of a collective bargaining agreement between the union, representing the employees, and the coal company, plaintiff, as a condition to employing union labor, was required to make certain payments in 1947 and 1948 to the union for the miners' health and welfare fund, from which pensions, health insurance and disability benefits for the miners are paid. Plaintiff contends such payments are deductible in determining its net proceeds tax under R.C.M. 1947, section 84-5403, as "moneys expended for necessary labor." Defendants claim such payments are not deductible.
R.C.M. 1947, section 84-5403, in part, is as follows: "The state board of equalization * * * shall calculate and compute the net proceeds in dollars and cents of said mine yielded to such * * * corporation * * * so engaged in mining, which said net proceeds shall be ascertained and determined by subtracting from the value in dollars and cents of the gross product thereof the following, towit: * * *
"2. All moneys expended for necessary labor, machinery and supplies needed and used in the mining operations and developments. * * *"
The miners producing plaintiff's coal are completely unionized under the jurisdiction of the United Mine Workers of America. They and plaintiff come under the National Labor Relations Act.
29 U.S.C.A. sec. 157, N.L.R.A. sec. 7, as amended June 23, 1947, provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title."
Employees have a right to organize unions and, through them, [1] to bargain collectively with employers concerning wages, hours, working conditions or other appropriate subject. See National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, D.C.D.C. 1948, 78 F. Supp. 146, affirmed 334 U.S. 854, 68 S.Ct. 1529 92 L.Ed. 1776.
Section 13 of the above Act, as amended June 23, 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 163, provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
So that if plaintiff refused to accede to the union's demand [2] for such health and welfare payments, such demand could have been enforced by strike. It became, therefore, just as necessary for plaintiff to agree to and make such health and welfare payments, in order to secure labor to mine coal as it was to agree to a scale of wages or hours of labor per day. The health and welfare payments, required under such agreement, constituted "money expended for necessary labor."
Defendants also contend that such demurrer was properly sustained because the complaint did not allege the State of Montana had consented to be sued under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act of Montana, R.C.M. 1947, secs. 93-8901 et seq.
"Suits against tax officers based upon claimed illegality of [3] their actions in assessing or collecting taxes * * * are not generally considered suits against the state." 49 Am. Jur., States, Territories Dependencies, sec. 94, pp. 308, 309. See also: G.C. Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709, 172 A.L.R. 837; and State ex rel. Boorman v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 109 Mont. 127, 94 P.2d 201.
For the reasons stated the judgment is reversed and the order sustaining the demurrer is set aside.
The cause is remanded to the district court with directions to overrule the demurrer and for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ADAIR and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES METCALF, BOTTOMLY and ANGSTMAN, concur.