But civil conspiracy requires an agreement to accomplish "by some concerted action" an "unlawful purpose" through a "tortious" act. Brooks v. Ross, 2008 WL 5082995, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2008), aff'd, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ill. Non-Profit Risk Mgmt. Ass'n v. Human Serv. Ctr., 884 N.E.2d 700, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)). But none of the targeted statements are defamatory, so there is no premise for a conspiracy claim.

But civil conspiracy requires an agreement to accomplish "by some concerted action" an "unlawful purpose" through a "tortious" act. Brooks v. Ross , 2008 WL 5082995, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2008), aff'd , 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ill. Non–Profit Risk Mgmt. Ass'n v. Human Serv. Ctr. , 378 Ill.App.3d 713, 318 Ill.Dec. 732, 884 N.E.2d 700, 711 (2008) ). But none of the targeted statements are defamatory, so there is no premise for a conspiracy claim.

Under Illinois law, "[c]ivil conspiracy consists of (1) an agreement between two or more persons (2) for the purpose of accomplishing by some concerted action either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means, and (3) some tortious or illegal act by a party to the agreement in furtherance of the agreement." Brooks v. Ross, No. 08 CV 2417, 2008 WL 5082995, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2008), aff'd, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ill. Non-Profit Risk Mgmt. Ass'n v. Human Serv. Ctr., 884 N.E.2d 700, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, "the complaint must contain more than the conclusion that there was a conspiracy, it must allege specific facts from which the existence of a conspiracy may properly be inferred." Fritz v. Johnston, 807 N.E.2d 461, 471 (Ill. 2004).

While the cases cited above explicitly considered the division of authority as to the proper standard for prosecutorial immunity against state law claims in Illinois, many more decisions simply adopted the approach of White without considering Aboufariss or public official immunity. See Van Guilder v. Glasgow, 588 F.Supp.2d 876, 880 (N.D.Ill.2008) (citing White for the proposition that Illinois courts considering immunity issues apply the same approach to state law claims against prosecutors as the Supreme Court applies to federal claims against prosecutors); Patterson v. Burge, No. 03 C 4433, 2010 WL 3894433, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 27, 2010) (discussing and ultimately following White );Fonseca v. Nelson, No. 08–CV–0435–MJR–PMF, 2009 WL 78144 (S.D.Ill. Jan. 12, 2009) (citing White for the proposition that “Illinois courts apply the same principles in determining whether absolute immunity protects a prosecutor from liability for state law claims”); Brooks v. Ross, No. 08 CV 2417, 2008 WL 5082995, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 25, 2008) (“A prosecutor acting as an advocate, engaging in activities ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,’ is absolutely immune from prosecution.”); Young v. Rogers, No. 06 C 6772, 2008 WL 5235366 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 15, 2008) (citing White for the proposition that “[b]ased on the Buckley and Imbler decisions, Illinois courts recognize the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity as applied to state law causes of action”).

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' use of a disjunctive construction (“or” instead of “and”) means they have not sufficiently tied the three individuals to the alleged violations. In support, Defendants cite Brooks v. Ross, 2008 WL 5082995, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 25, 2008), which dismissed a § 1983 claim where the plaintiff “alleg[ed] constitutional deprivations by ‘one or more of the Defendants.’ ” This case is distinguishable.