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dismissing plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief against the New York State Supreme Court as barred by Section 309(c) of the FCIA
Summary of this case from Boddie v. New York State Division of ParoleOpinion
02-CV-4183 (RR)
August 16, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Trevor L. Brooks, a disbarred attorney proceeding pro se, sues defendants the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Department ("First Department"), the court's Disciplinary Committee, the Committee's Chief Counsel Thomas J. Cahill, a Committee Attorney Raymond Vallejo, and his own retained counsel Michael Ross, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 for racial discrimination in connection with his disbarment. Plaintiff demands compensatory damages and an injunction ordering his reinstatement to the New York bar.
The Court notes that it has received a letter written on behalf of an attorney named Michael Jay Ross. The letter explains that plaintiffs complaint was served on Michael Jay Ross in error and that Michael Jay Ross is a different person from the Michael Ross named in the complaint. According to the letter, a copy of the summons and complaint has been forwarded to the correct defendant. Since this case is being dismissed in its entirety, the Court will take no further action regarding the error in service.
Brooks was admitted to practice law in the State of New York by defendant First Department in 1976. According to Brooks's Complaint, in 1996, he decided to relocate to Jamaica and requested from the First Department a two-year leave of absence and/or permission to resign from the practice of law. Apparently, at that time, two disciplinary complaints were outstanding against Brooks. The First Department's decision to pursue these complaints, as well as several others filed against Brooks after he relocated to Jamaica, are at issue in this case.
I. Sua Sponte Dismissal 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) provides that the court shall dismiss a case where it determines that the action is frivolous, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. A complaint "is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact"; i.e., where it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or presents "factual contentions [which] are clearly baseless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see Alaji Salahuddin v. Alaji, 232 F.3d 305, 306-7 (2d Cir. 2000); Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990). Where, as here, the court "can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint could succeed in stating a claim," dismissal is appropriate. Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank., 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous claim sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee). Thus, because Brooks has failed to provide a sound legal basis for his claim, this court hereby dismisses his action sua sponte.
II. Claims Against the Court and Disciplinary Committee
"Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Section 1983 does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against the State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties, as the Eleventh Amendment bars such suits. Id. at 66. The state court is thus not subject to suit under § 1983, rendering Plaintiff's claim meritless. See Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (state court is part of "judicial arm of the state of New York" and thus not subject to suit under § 1983).
Additionally, a state court and, by extension, its members, are immune from a suit for damages for their judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 , 356 (1978). Defendants are alleged to have initiated and conducted disciplinary proceedings against plaintiff in a discriminatory manner in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. These proceedings resulted in the recommended disbarment of plaintiff and said recommendation was confirmed by the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
The absolute judicial immunity of the court and its members "is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice," nor can a judge "be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his authority." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 13 (quotation omitted). The only way that this immunity can be overcome is if the court is alleged to have taken nonjudicial actions or if the judicial actions taken were "in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 11-12.
"State bar disciplinary hearings . . . constitute . . . state judicial proceedings." Whitely v. Comsat Corp., No. 00 Civ. 9401 (WHP), 2001 WL 1135946, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2001) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 433-434 (1982)). In New York, in the matter of attorney disciplinary proceedings, the Appellate Division has exclusive jurisdiction. Paladin v. Finnerty, No. 92 CV 2792 (JG), 1996 WL 1088915, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1996) (citing N.Y. Judiciary Law §§ 90(1)-(2)), aff'd, 104 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1996). State bar disciplinary proceedings have been found to be "clearly judicial in nature," and thus quasi-judicial immunity is available to members of disciplinary committees and panels. Lipin v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitsburgh, PA., 202 F. Supp.2d 126, 134-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Sassower v. Mangano, 927 F. Supp. 113, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)); see also Barbara v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that courts of appeals have extended absolute immunity to members of bar association disciplinary committees).
Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the defendants have taken nonjudicial actions or that the actions taken were done in the absence of all jurisdiction. Indeed, initiating a disciplinary proceeding and confirming a recommendation by the hearing Referee and Hearing Panel is well within the jurisdiction of the defendants. Therefore, plaintiffs first cause of action seeking damages is dismissed as against the state court, the Disciplinary Committee, and defendants Cahill and Vallejo.
The Court's inquiry does not end there however, for plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement to the practice of law or a hearing regarding the alleged violations. Plaintiff citesSupreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980). as authority which allows a state court to be sued for declaratory or injunctive relief under section 1983 for acts performed in its enforcement capacity. Subsequent to this decision, the Supreme Court extended this doctrine in Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984), and ruled that prospective injunctive relief could be granted against a judicial officer acting in his or her judicial capacity. However, in 1996 Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 ("FCIA"), Pub.L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983), which effectively reversed the Court's ruling in Pulliam. Section 309(c) of the FCIA bars injunctive relief in any section 1983 action "against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." Therefore, plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is also dismissed.
III. Plaintiff's Claim against his Attorney
Plaintiff has also filed a claim against his former attorney, defendant Michael Ross, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His allegations against defendant Ross, however, consist of allegations of professional misconduct rather than constitutional violations. A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege "the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . which has taken place under color of state law." Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997). There are no such allegations here.
Even if Plaintiff had alleged constitutional violations on the part of defendant Ross, such claims would fail to state a claim under § 1983 because a lawyer is generally not considered to be "a state actor `under color of state law' within the meaning of § 1983." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (recognizing the general consensus among the Courts of Appeals); see generally Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956) ("The word `officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word `officer' as applied to people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that term.").
It is well settled that public defenders, Polk County, 454 U.S. at 325, and court-appointed attorneys, Rodriguez, 116 F.3d at 65, do not act under color of state law when representing criminal defendants. The role of a privately retained attorney is even more remote to the state than that of public defenders and court-appointed attorneys in that he has an obligation to advance the undivided interests of his client see Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318-319, and his license to practice law does not place him "so close to the core of the political process as to make him a formulator of government policy." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973). Consequently, a privately retained attorney does not act under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 when representing a client in a civil matter. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendant Ross did not act under color of state law and cannot be held liable under section 1983.
Section 1983 "was enacted to redress civil rights violations by persons acting under color of State law" and should not be used by clients disappointed with the performance of their attorneys. Mitchell v. Cohen, No. 90 CV 1836 (TCP), 1990 WL 100254, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 13, 1990). Complaints about the behavior or performance of an attorney should be addressed to the Grievance Committee of the appropriate State Appellate Division. Id.
IV. Younger Abstention
Furthermore, even if plaintiff were not barred for the reasons noted above, this Court would have to abstain from considering this case pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which holds that federal courts should refrain from interfering with pending state judicial proceedings except under special circumstances. "Where vital state interests are involved, a federal court should abstain `unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.'"Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979)). The State of New York obviously has an important interest in regulating the conduct of attorneys licensed by the state and the New York courts are "competent to consider and determine federal constitutional questions." Hayes v. State of New York, No. 01-CV-0545E(SR), 2001 WL 1388325, at *34 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2001). Here, plaintiff notes that he has appealed his disbarment to the New York State Court of Appeals and expects a ruling sometime in August 2002. TheYounger doctrine is not only applicable to any ongoing attorney disciplinary proceeding, id. at 3, but it is also applicable to the pending appeal in state court. See Davidson v. Garry, 956 F. Supp. 265, 269 n. 2 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (Bartels, J.) (citing New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) in extending the Younger principles to state civil proceedings), aff'd, 112 F.3d 503 (2d Cir. 1997)). "[W]hen Younger abstention is applicable, abstention is mandatory." Hayes, 2001 WL 1388325 at *3 (citing Schlagler v. Phillips, 166 F.3d 439, 441 (2d Cir. 1999)).
V. Conclusion
For all of the above stated reasons, plaintiffs complaint is dismissed and his request for a preliminary injunction is denied.
CIVIL JUDGMENT
Pursuant to the order issued August 16, 2002 by the Honorable Reena Raggi, dismissing the complaint and denying the request for a preliminary injunction, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: That the complaint is hereby dismissed and the request for a preliminary injunction is hereby denied.