Opinion
Civil Action 1:18-cv-02578-PAB-SKC
05-09-2022
JASON BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. 108] & PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. 118]
S. Kato Crews, United States Magistrate Judge.
In October 2016, Plaintiff Jason Brooks injured his right knee during a Fremont Correctional Facility weightlifting competition. [Dkt. 148.] After pursuing a conservative course of treatment, Dr. Susan Tiona ordered an MRI of Plaintiff's knee, which revealed a small tear of the outside cartilage at the back of the knee joint, no tears on the inside cartilage, evidence of a chronic posterior cruciate ligament tear, and a large osteochondral defect. [Id. at p.2.] In October 2017, Plaintiff had arthroscopic surgery to repair the tear. [Id.]
Brooks initiated this action on October 9, 2018, against Dr. Tiona, Correctional Health Partners (CHP), and Jeff Archambeau, the President and CEO of CHP. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as a claim for civil conspiracy and a claim challenging the constitutionality of a Colorado statute. [Dkt. 28.] On August 29, 2019, Chief District Judge Philip A. Brimmer dismissed Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment and statutory-challenge claims in their entirety. [Dkt. 40 at p.2. (adopting report and recommendation (Dkt. 34 at pp.11-4, 16-18).]
The Amended Complaint named John Doe, M.D., as the President and CEO of CHP. In CHP's Answer, it identified Archambeau as the properly named defendant. [Dkt. 31.]
Plaintiff proceeds pro se. Thus, the Court liberally construes his pleadings without acting as his advocate. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
After a period of discovery, Dr. Tiona filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim. [Dkt. 105.] On March 23, 2022, Chief Judge Brimmer entered judgment in Dr. Tiona's favor and concluded no reasonable jury could find Dr. Tiona's exercise of her medical judgment amounted to conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm. [Dkt. 148 at pp.9-10.]
CHP and Archambeau (collectively, “CHP Defendants”) now move for judgment in their favor on the remaining claims against them (Eighth Amendment and civil conspiracy). [Dkt. 108.] In addition, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint alleging he is a third-party beneficiary to a contract between the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) and CHP. He now seeks to add a claim for breach of contract and argues he has been injured by CHP's failure to establish policies and procedures regarding medical necessity. [Dkt. 118.]
The Court has considered both motions and their related briefing, the entire case file, and the applicable law. No hearing is necessary. For the following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS the Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend be DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). “[A] ‘judge's function' at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).
ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
1. The Eighth Amendment
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends the CHP Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He claims CHP's cost-savings/indemnification policy caused Dr. Tiona to make decisions regarding his treatment based on the policy rather than her medical judgment. [Dkt. 28 at ¶¶27-39.] He also asserts Archambeau “adjudicates claims without making any medical decision, in complete disregard to inmates' actual medical needs due to the Contract.” [Id.]
The Court need not engage in a full Eighth Amendment analysis here because, based on the undisputed facts, a reasonable jury could not find the CHP Defendants caused Brooks to be deprived of his Eighth Amendment rights. [See Dkt. 108 at pp.913.] “The plain wording of [§ 1983] contains an element of causation,” and thus, “a defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 unless he or she subjected a citizen to the deprivation, or caused a citizen to be subjected to the deprivation.” McDonald v. Wise, 769 F.3d 1202, 1215 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 518 (10th Cir.1998)).
Concerning Archambeau, the CHP Defendants argue there is no evidence he personally participated in the actions that comprise the alleged Eighth Amendment violation. In his Response, Plaintiff seems to contend that because CHP identified Archambeau as the John Doe, these Defendants conceded Archambeau's personal participation as alleged in the Amended Complaint. [Dkt. 127 at pp.9-10.] But substituting a party does not effectuate that party's confession of the allegations against them. And the CHP Defendants have denied the material allegations against them in any event. [Dkt. 31.]
Regardless, at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff may not simply rely on the allegations from his Amended Complaint. See Dodson v. Bd. Of Cty. Comm'rs, 878 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1239 (D. Colo. 2012). He instead must “go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts' that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant." Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998). He has failed to do that here. The evidence is undisputed that once Dr. Tiona submitted a request for an MRI, CHP immediately approved it and all additional requests related to treatment for Plaintiff's knee. [Dkt. 108 at ¶¶18-23.] Without any disputed issues of material fact regarding Archambeau's personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation, judgment should enter in his favor. Even viewing the facts, and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to Brooks, the Court finds there remains no genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment in favor of Archambeau is warranted.
Even if he could, the Amended Complaint does not contain allegations that Archambeau took any action concerning Plaintiff specifically. Rather, the pleading broadly alleges “[Archambeau] adjudicates claims without making any medical decision, in complete disregard to inmates' actual medical needs due to the Contract.” [Dkt. 28 at ¶31.] Plaintiff does not allege, nor could he, that Archambeau adjudicated Plaintiff's MRI request such that it resulted in delayed medical treatment.
Plaintiff admitted each of these statements of undisputed material fact. [Dkt. 127 at p.2.]
The Court also recommends judgment in CHP's favor. Plaintiff's theory of liability against CHP is contingent on a determination that CHP's cost-savings/indemnification policy influenced Dr. Tiona's decision to delay requesting an MRI. [See Dkt. 28 at ¶¶9-15, 28-33; Dkt. 127 at pp.10-16.] But this Court already found that while Dr. Tiona was aware of the CHP policy, there was “no factual dispute that Dr. Tiona's decisions were based on anything other than her medical judgment.” [Dkt. 144 at pp.7-8.] In adopting this Court's Recommendation and entering judgment for Dr. Tiona, Chief Judge Brimmer concluded Plaintiff “failed to show how a reasonable jury could find that Dr. Tiona consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff between his first appointment and when she ultimately ordered the MRI.” [Dkt. 148.] Consequently, based on the prior rulings in this case, no reasonable jury could find the alleged CHP policy was the proximate cause of any constitutional violation or injury in this case.
2. Civil Conspiracy
“Under Section 1983, the Tenth Circuit recognizes a claim for civil conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional or federally protected right under color of state law.” Fisher v. Lynch, 531 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1265 n.6 (D. Kan. 2008). “[T]o recover under a § 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights; pleading and proof of one without the other will be insufficient.” Dixon v. City of Lawton, Okl., 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990). The Court has already determined no reasonable jury could find the CHP Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights, and therefore, judgment should also be entered in their favor on this conspiracy claim.
B. Motion to Amend
Two years after the November 15, 2019 deadline to amend the pleadings, Brooks filed a Motion to Amend seeking to add a breach of contract claim. Where a party seeks to amend their pleadings after the deadline established in the scheduling order, “the majority of courts have held that a party must meet the two-part test of first showing good cause to amend the scheduling order under Rule 16(b), and then showing that amendment would be allowed under Rule 15(a).” Ayon v. Kent Denver Sch., No. 12-cv-2546-WJM-CBS, 2014 WL 85287, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 9, 2014) Cf. Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat'l Bank Ass'n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 2014) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by using “Rule 16's good cause requirement as the threshold inquiry to consider whether amendments should be allowed after a scheduling order deadline has passed;” “[t]he district court did not err in dismissing the motion to amend if [the plaintiffs] were unable to show good cause for their delay”).
Even assuming Plaintiff could establish good cause for this late amendment, the Court finds the Motion to Amend does not satisfy Rule 15(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 15(a) unquestionably is to facilitate a decision on the merits. Bob Marshall All. v. Lujan, 804 F.Supp. 1292, 1298 (D. Mont. 1992) (the court's exercise of discretion must “be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 - to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities”). However, “there is no absolute right to repeatedly amend a complaint.” Fluker v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02426-CMA-CBS, 2009 WL 1065986, at * 4 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009).
In considering the “needs of justice,” the court must take into consideration the interests of all parties.
Several factors are typically considered by the courts in determining whether to allow amendment of a complaint. These include whether the amendment will result in undue prejudice, whether the request was unduly and inexplicably delayed, was offered in good faith, or that the party had sufficient opportunity to state a claim and failed. Where the party seeking amendment knows or should have known of the facts upon which the proposed amendment is based but fails to include them in the original complaint, the motion to amend is subject to denial. Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far W. Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Dow Chem. Co., 886 F.Supp. 762, 765 (D. Colo. 1995) (“Leave to amend should be freely given based on the balancing of several factors, including futility, delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and prejudice to the opposing party.”). Ultimately, a motion to amend must be left to the sound discretion of the district court. State Distribs., Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 738 F.2d 405, 416 (10th Cir. 1984).
Brooks filed the Motion to Amend very late. Discovery is closed. Dispositive motions have been submitted and partially resolved. Both the Court and Defendants are entitled to expect that by a date certain, Plaintiff's claims will be fixed, and the case will proceed on that basis. Cf. Carbajal v. St. Anthony Cent. Hosp., No. 12-cv-02257-REB-KLM, 2015 WL 1499864, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 27, 2015) (denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend filed after the close of discovery and after motions for summary judgment had been filed and observing the liberalized pleading rules do not permit a plaintiff to wait until the last minute to refine the theories upon which they will pursue their case). Adding a new claim to the case at this late stage would cause undue delay, wreak havoc on the Court's docket, and prejudice the Defendants. To be sure, the CDOC (which was previously dismissed) would need to be readded as a defendant. In addition, Dr. Tiona has already been granted summary judgment, and this Court has recommended the same for the CHP Defendants. A new claim would require reopening discovery and issuing a new Scheduling Order to govern additional pretrial proceedings. This case has been pending for three and a half years, since October 2018. The interests of justice in this matter weigh against amendment.
Additionally, since Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Dr. Tiona have been dismissed, and this judicial officer now recommends judgment enter in the CHP Defendants' favor on the remaining constitutional claims, jurisdiction over the state law contract claim is only supplemental. The Court recommends declining such jurisdiction based on the dismissal, or recommended dismissal, of the constitutional claims on summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3 ); Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”).
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS finding no reasonable jury could find Archambeau or CHP were the proximate cause of any constitutional violation or injury in this case. It FURTHER RECOMMENDS their Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and judgment be entered in their favor on Brooks' Eighth Amendment and conspiracy claims. [Dkt. 108.]
The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's Motion to Amend be DENIED. [Dkt. 118.]
The parties have 14 days after service of this recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz , 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Moore v. United States , 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).