Opinion
No. 71113
08-29-2017
BRYAN PAUL BROOKS, Appellant, v. AMY KARISA BROOKS, Respondent.
ORDER
On June 29, 2017, this court entered an Order of Reversal and Remand. On July 21, 2017, respondent filed a "Motion to Dismiss Appeal or Alternatively to Stay Remittitur." In that motion, respondent explains that on May 9, 2017, the "district court entered a 'Stipulation and Order,' that included the parties' agreement that this appeal would be dismissed. Further, respondent noted that appellant was seeking an order to set aside the Stipulation and Order in the district court. On August 18, 2017, respondent filed a supplement to the motion to dismiss, informing this court that the district court had heard appellant's motion to set aside the May 9, 2017, Order and Stipulation, and denied the motion. Thus, respondent avers that this appeal is moot due to the district court's order and should be dismissed. Appellant has filed an opposition to the motion.
We note that, generally, the filing of "a timely notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to act and vests jurisdiction in [the appellate] court." Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987). Once an appeal is perfected, the district court is divested of jurisdiction to revisit issues that are pending before the appellate court. Id. at 688-89, 747 P.2d at 1380. A district court may, however, enter an order on matters that are collateral to and independent from the appealed order, i.e., matters that in no way affect the appeal's merits. See Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 895, 8 P.3d 825, 830 (2000) (citing Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 579 P.2d 1246 (1978)).
Here, respondent notes that the parties reached a global settlement and that the purported district court "Stipulation and Order" resolved all matters related to this appeal. However, as the district court was divested of jurisdiction to act as to any issues being considered in this appeal, that "Stipulation and Order" is without legal effect as to the issues on appeal. In such circumstances, i.e., where the district court is inclined to grant any post-judgment relief as to issues that are currently being challenged on appeal, the proper procedure to follow is set forth in Huneycutt v. Huneycutt, 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). Specifically, the party seeking such relief should file a motion in the district court requesting that court to certify its intent to grant the requested relief. If the district court grants such certification, the moving party may then file a motion with the appellate court seeking a proper remand to the district court.
See also Foster v. Dingwall 126 Nev. 56, 228 P.3d P.3d 453 (2010) (clarifying the remand procedure set forth in Huneycutt); and Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 138 P.3d 525 (2006) (clarifying the remand procedure set forth in Huneycutt, as it relates to matters involving child custody issues).
In the interest of judicial economy, we elect to treat the district court's August 9, 2017, "Amended Stipulation and Order," which approves the parties' settlement terms, as a certification that it is inclined to grant the post-judgment relief and to enter an amended order resolving all matters between the parties pursuant to their stipulation. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand the matter to the district court to enter a proper order pursuant to the parties' stipulation. In light of the foregoing, we vacate our "Order of Reversal and Remand," that was filed on June 29, 2017. We admonish counsel for not informing this court of the pending or completed settlement agreement in a timely manner, and for not following the appropriate appellate procedure for a remand.
A file-stamped copy of the amended stipulation and order is attached to respondent's supplement to the motion to dismiss. --------
It is so ORDERED.
/s/_________, C.J.
Silver
/s/_________, J.
Tao
/s/_________, J.
Gibbons cc: Hon. William S. Potter, District Judge
Pintar Albiston LLP
Pecos Law Group
Eighth District Court Clerk