Opinion
Case No. C-00-4119.
March 6, 2001.
James L. Brooks, Kansas City, Kansas, pro se, for Plaintiff.
Lawrence D. Kudej, Assistant United States Attorney, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for Defendants Mark W. Bennett and Paul A. Zoss.
Martha Fagg, Assistant United States Attorney, Sioux City, Iowa, for Defendant United States of America.
Jeffrey Farrell and Cristina Kuhn, Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the Attorney General of the State of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa, for Defendant Thomas J. Miller.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Introduction
In the fall of 1999, Chief Judge Mark W. Bennett ("Bennett") of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, and United States Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss ("Zoss") made several rulings in a civil rights case captioned Brooks v. Kunert, et al., Civ. No. C99-3069 MWB (hereinafter "Kunert"), ultimately dismissing that lawsuit. Iowa Attorney General Thomas J. Miller's ("Miller") office represented five of the eight defendants in Kunert — the State itself, an Iowa state trooper, and three Iowa state court judges. After Kunert was dismissed, Plaintiff James L. Brooks ("Brooks") contacted the United States Attorneys' Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an effort to begin a criminal prosecution of the Kunert defendants. Those efforts were unsuccessful.
On October 18, 2000, Brooks filed this action against Bennett, Zoss, Miller, and the United States. Brooks alleges that Bennett and Zoss, by their rulings, have aided and abetted the Kunert defendants' conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights. Brooks further claims that Bennett and Zoss deprived him of due process of law by interfering with the Clerk of Court's entry of default and by deciding the State defendants' motion to dismiss before an answer had been filed. Brooks alleges that Miller engaged in unethical conduct during the Kunert case and violated Brooks' due process rights by filing a motion to dismiss before filing an answer to the complaint. Brooks claims that the United States violated his due process rights by endorsing and condoning practices that are contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Brooks alleges that the United States Attorney General's Office has violated his civil rights by denying his petition for a grand jury indictment because he is white. Before the Court are motions to dismiss brought by Bennett and Zoss, the United States, and Miller pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On December 22, 2000, Judge Melloy determined that it would be appropriate to recuse and have the case assigned to a judge from another district (Doc. No. 14). On January 5, 2001, Chief Judge Roger Wollman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered an order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(b) designating the undersigned to hold court in the Northern District of Iowa in this action (Doc. No. 18).
Background
I. Factual Background A. The Iowa State Court Proceedings
The facts regarding the underlying Iowa State Court proceedings are taken from the district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order in Brooks v. Kunert, Civ. No. C99-3069 MWB, aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. Iowa Atty. General, et al., No. 99-4317, slip op. at 2 (8th Cir. Dec. 20, 2000). (See Gov't App. Ex. E.)
The chain of events that has led to the motions presently before the Court began on August 1, 1998, when Iowa State Trooper Randy Kunert stopped Brook's vehicle and issued Brooks two traffic citations. On August 26, 1998, Brooks entered his initial appearance before Iowa Judicial Magistrate Craig G. Ensign. When Brooks did not post the bail imposed by Magistrate Ensign, he was incarcerated in the Worth County Jail pending either a trial date or posting the bond.
On August 27, 1998, Brooks filed an interlocutory appeal, which tolled the trial date until the appeal was decided. Iowa Supreme Court Justice Louis A. Lavorato denied the appeal. However, Justice Lavorato directed the trial court to review the question of bond and to set the matter down for trial at the earliest possible date. On October 7, 1998, Magistrate Ensign held a bond review hearing and lowered the total amount of the bond to $273.00. Brooks still did not pay the bond and, as a result, remained in the Worth County Jail until his trial date of October 14, 1998.
At the October 14 trial, the jury found Brooks guilty of both traffic citations. After the trial, Brooks was released from custody. Brooks then appealed his conviction. On April 16, 1999, Iowa District Court Judge Jon Scoles approved a reimbursement lien filed by the Worth County Sheriff for Plaintiff's room and board fees.
B. Brooks Files Suit in Federal District Court
On July 26, 1999, while his appeal of the traffic convictions was pending, Brooks filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986, and state common law claims against Trooper Kunert, Magistrate Ensign, Judge Scoles, Justice Lavorato, the State of Iowa, Worth County Sheriff Dave Gentz, Worth County Attorney Douglas Krull, and Dick's Place Body and Tow. Brooks alleges that all of the Kunert defendants were served by mail, and were served by July 29, 1999. (Compl. at 6.)
A court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may consider material other than the complaint itself if the plaintiff's claims are based upon that material. See Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 n. 9 (8th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, the Court may consider documents that are of public record on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Brooks' Complaint in this action is in large part based upon documents filed and orders entered in Kunert. Defendants Bennett and Zoss have provided the Court with copies of a number of documents from the Kunert file. The Court finds that these documents are within the ambit of what may be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
The State of Iowa, Kunert, Ensign, Scoles, and Lavorato (collectively, "the State defendants") filed a request for a ten-day extension of time within which to answer the complaint. (Gov't App. Ex. B.) The clerk of court granted the State defendants' request on August 16, 1999, stating that any answer or other pleading "would be due on September 6, 1999." (See Gov't App. Ex. C.) On August 31, 1999, in lieu of answering the complaint, the State defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Gov't App. Ex. B.) Together with the motion to dismiss, a motion to transfer venue was filed. (Compl. at 8.) On September 2, 1999, United States District Court Judge G.T. Vanbedder entered an order transferring Kunert to the Northern District of Iowa. (Id.)
C. The Kunert Case Comes to Iowa
After the case was transferred to Iowa, Brooks filed a response to the State defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Compl. at 8.) On September 22, 1999, Brooks also filed a "Demand for Clerk's Entry of Default" together with a request for a hearing on the entry of judgment by default. (Gov't App. Exs. B, C.) On October 6, 1999, Magistrate Judge Zoss issued an order denying Brooks' request that a default be entered as to the State defendants because they had timely filed a motion to dismiss. (Id., Ex. B.) Magistrate Judge Zoss further ruled that the entry of default was not warranted as against the remaining defendants because Brooks had not complied with Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in that he had not submitted proof that he had served the remaining defendants with his request for the entry of default. (Id.) On October 26, 1999, Judge Bennett entered an order overruling Brook's objections to Magistrate Judge Zoss's Order. (Gov't App. Ex. C.) Brooks filed a motion to reconsider, which Judge Bennett denied on November 3, 1999. (Id., Ex. D.)
On November 4, 1999, Judge Bennett entered an order dismissing with prejudice all of the claims against the State of Iowa, and against Ensign, Scoles and Lavorato in both their official and individual capacities. (Gov't App. Ex. E at 11.) Judge Bennett also dismissed with prejudice the claims against Trooper Kunert in his official capacity. (Id.) Judge Bennett dismissed without prejudice, however, the claims against Kunert in his individual capacity, granting Brooks leave to re-file if his state court appeal was decided in his favor. (Id.)
On November 15, 1999, Brooks filed several documents with the district court, including a copy of a Ruling on Appeal stating that Brooks appeal on the traffic citations had been sustained and the charges against him dismissed on October 20, 1999. (See Gov't App. Ex. G.) On November 17, 1999, the court entered judgment in Kunert. (Gov't App. Ex. F.) The judgment, approved as to form by Judge Bennett, included the dismissal of the claims against Sheriff Gentz, Worth County Attorney Krull, and Dick's Place Body and Tow on the grounds that Brooks had failed to effect proper service. (Id.) Brooks filed a Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on December 2, 1999. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals entered a judgment affirming the district court on December 20, 2000.
Analysis
I. Standard of Decision
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . . A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must take as true the allegations contained in the complaint. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam). A complaint
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts that a plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual allegations. "Thus, as a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief."Fusco v. Xerox Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting Jackson Sawmill Co. v. United States, 580 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir. 1978)). Viewing the complaint in this manner, the court may dismiss a case under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it is clear that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that can be proved consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
II. Bennett and Zoss' Motion to Dismiss
Brooks asserts two claims against Defendants Bennett and Zoss. The first is that, by ruling against Brooks on various matters in Kunert, Bennett and Zoss aided and abetted the Kunert defendants in their conspiracy to deprive Brooks of his constitutional rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985 and 1986. The second is that, by converting Brooks' demand for the entry of default into a motion, denying that motion, and subsequently dismissing Kunert in its entirety, Bennett and Zoss deprived Brooks of due process of law. (Compl. at 17, 18-19.) Bennett and Zoss raise several arguments as to why, as a matter of law, Brooks cannot state viable claims against them. The Court begins with absolute judicial immunity.
Judges are immune from liability for their judicial acts, "`even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.'" Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1872)). A judge is immune from suit if, at the time the judge took the challenged action, he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before the court.Id. "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather he will be subject to liability only when he acted in the `clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" Id. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley, 13 Wall. at 351). Furthermore, a judge has immunity with respect to acts which are "judicial." Whether an act is "judicial," involves a two-part inquiry: (1) was the act is a function normally performed by a judge, and (2) was the judge interacting with the complaining party in a judicial capacity.Stump, 435 U.S. at 360; see also Liles v. Reagan, 804 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1986).
In Kunert, Brooks brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986. Those claims fall within the district court's federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Furthermore, the district court would have had supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims Brooks' asserted against the Kunert defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Thus, Bennett and Zoss clearly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Kunert case. Furthermore, the actions of Bennet and Zoss were "judicial." Deciding whether a party has "failed to plead or otherwise defend," holding a hearing on a motion to dismiss, and ruling on a motion to dismiss are all acts normally performed by a judge. Moreover, Brooks was plainly interacting with Bennett and Zoss in their role as judges with respect to these actions.
Section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
Section 1367(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal Statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
"A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts, even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." Stump, 435 U.S. at 359. There is no set of facts consistent with the facts alleged in the Complaint under which Brooks can show that Bennett and Zoss lacked subject matter jurisdiction over theKunert case. Furthermore, Brooks cannot establish by any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the Complaint that Bennett and Zoss' actions were anything other than "judicial acts." Absolute judicial immunity applies to Bennett and Zoss, and is an insuperable bar to relief. The Court will therefore dismiss the causes of action alleged against them.
III. The United States' Motion to Dismiss
The claims Brooks asserts against the United States are two-fold. First, he alleges that the judicial branch's policies are to condone and endorse practices contrary to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to defaults and the powers of the clerk of court. Essentially, Brooks argues that, by permitting a defendant to bring a Rule 12 motion prior to answering, the courts are depriving litigants of their right to obtain an entry of default. Brooks claims that, by maintaining these policies, the United States has violated his right to due process "named in the Fifth Amendment and protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986." (Compl. at 20.) Second, Brooks complains that the United States Attorneys' Office has refused to launch a criminal prosecution based on what occurred in Iowa on the grounds that he is not a minority, but rather is a white male. Accordingly, the United States Attorneys' Office has deprived him of his civil rights. Neither of these claims is viable, however, due to the United States' sovereign immunity, which deprives this Court of jurisdiction.
Every federal court has the inherent power to determine, as a preliminary matter, its own subject matter jurisdiction. Gaines v. Nelson (In re Gaines), 932 F.2d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 290-92 (1947)). Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Indeed, "[i]t is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent, and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
Neither § 1983, nor § 1985, nor § 1986 contains a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States. See Davis v. United States, 439 F.2d 1118, 1119 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding no waiver of sovereign immunity in § 1983); see also Affiliated Prof'l Home Health Care Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1999) ("suits against the United States brought under the civil rights statutes are barred by sovereign immunity."); Unimex, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Housing Urban Dev., 594 F.2d 1060, 1061-62 (5th Cir. 1979) (§§ 1985 and 1986); Perrott v. United States, No. 96 C 4347, 2001 WL 40799 at *2 (N.D.Ill., Jan 17, 2001) (§ 1985). Sovereign immunity shields both the United States and its agencies from suit. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Hence, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear a claim against the United States or the Office of the United States Attorney General brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, or 1986.
While a "Bivens" action exists to provide a cause of action for the deprivation of rights under the Constitution, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), such an action may only be brought against individual federal officers. Neither the United States nor an office or department of the United States government is a proper Bivens defendant because of sovereign immunity.Phelps v. U.S. Fed. Gov't, 15 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1114 (1994); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983). Thus, Brooks can prove no set of facts consistent with those plead in his Complaint that would entitle him to relief against the United States or the Office of the Attorney General.
IV. Attorney General Miller's Motion to Dismiss
Brooks has brought three causes of action against Miller in both his official and his individual capacities. In the first cause of action, Brooks contends that Miller deprived him of due process and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when two of his Assistant Attorneys General filed a motion to dismiss in Kunert prior to filing an answer to the complaint. (Compl. at 17.) In the second cause of action, Brooks contends that Miller violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985 and 1986 by contributing to the Kunert defendants' alleged conspiracy to violate Brooks' civil rights (or aiding and abetting that conspiracy) by filing the motion to dismiss. In the third cause of action, Brooks claims that Miller has violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1986 by operating under several conflicts of interest during Kunert, including (1) acting as the State of Iowa's attorney of record while the State was accused of failing to adhere to the state rules of court practice; (2) appearing on behalf of the individual state officials in both their individual and official capacities; (3) engaging in an "abuse of process" by filing a motion to dismiss before answering; and (4) showing deliberate indifference to the wrongs committed by the Kunert defendants in their conspiracy.
1. Claims against Miller in His Official Capacity
Miller contends that all of the causes of action, to the extent they are brought against him in his official capacity, must be dismissed on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The Court agrees. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Thus, unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by making its intention clear in the text of a federal statute (or unless a state has expressly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity), the federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide a suit for money damages brought against a state by citizens of that state or another state. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Hwys. Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987); Long v. Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, 236 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 2001); Entergy, Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2000).
"A state official is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity if immunity will protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Hopkins v. Saunders, 93 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Brooks seeks an award of compensatory damages against Miller and the other defendants in the amount of one hundred million dollars and punitive damages in the amount of three hundred million dollars. There is no evidence to indicate that the State of Iowa has waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the claims against Miller in his official capacity for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Claims Against Miller in His Individual Capacity
Miller moves to dismiss the first cause of action against him on the grounds that it is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As set forth above, Rule 12(b) states that a defendant shall assert the defenses enumerated in Rule 12(b) prior to filing a responsive pleading. Furthermore, the service of a Rule 12(b) motion alters the time within which an answer must be filed; if the court denies the motion, the responsive pleading must be filed within ten days after notice of the court's ruling. The Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the District of Kansas entered an order stating that the State defendants' time for answering the Kunert complaint was extended to September 6, 1999. The State defendants, represented by attorneys in Miller's office, filed a motion to dismiss on August 31, 1999 — before the deadline for answering imposed by the Court. Brooks had an opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss and in fact did so. These facts fail to state a claim for the deprivation of due process. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the first cause of action.
Miller moves to dismiss the second cause of action on the grounds that Brooks' conspiracy allegations do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim for a civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the plaintiff must allege four elements:
Brooks fails to specify the subsection of § 1985 under which he is proceeding. The Court concludes that the only subsection consistent with the allegations in the Complaint is 1985(3).
(1) the existence of a civil conspiracy;
(2) that the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive [him] either directly or indirectly of [his] civil rights;
(3) that a conspirator did an act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy; and
(4) damages, shown by demonstrating either injury to person or property or the deprivation of a civil right.Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1206 (8th Cir. 1999). "The `purpose' element of the conspiracy requires that the plaintiff prove a class-based `invidiously discriminatory animus.' Moreover, the plaintiff must allege with particularity and specifically demonstrate with material facts that the defendants reached an agreement." Larson by Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting City of Omaha Employees Betterment Ass'n v. City of Omaha, 883 F.2d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1989)). Brooks has not alleged with any particularity the existence of an agreement among the defendants in this case. Nor has Brooks alleged an "invidiously discriminatory animus" for the conspiracy that is class-based. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the second cause of action asserted against Miller.
Finally, the third cause of action brought against Miller in his individual capacity must be dismissed on several grounds. First, it is not a conflict of interest for the Attorney General to appear on behalf of the state officials in Kunert in both their individual and official capacities; indeed, the Attorney General is required by state law to represent state employees sued in their individual and official capacities. Iowa Code §§ 13.2(2) and (3) (2000); Iowa Code § 669.22 (1998). Furthermore, for the reasons set forth above, it is not an "abuse of process" to file a motion to dismiss before filing an answer. As for Brooks' allegations that Miller showed "deliberate indifference" to the Kunert defendants' conspiracy, they are conclusory and insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed Judge Bennett's ruling in Kunert dismissing with prejudice Brooks' claims under §§ 1985 and 1986. Brooks v. Iowa Atty. General, et al., No. 99-4317, slip op. at 2 (8th Cir. Dec. 20, 2000). In the absence of a § 1985 conspiracy by the State defendants in Kunert, Brooks cannot maintain a claim against Miller under § 1986 that is premised upon such a conspiracy. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the third cause of action against Brooks.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT
1. Defendant Chief Judge Mark W. Bennett and Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss' Motion to File Overlength Brief (Doc. No. 11) is GRANTED;
2. Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 7) is GRANTED;
3. Defendant Chief Judge Mark W. Bennett and Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED;
4. Defendant Thomas J. Miller's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED; and
5. Brooks' Complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.