Opinion
C/A No. 4:19-2050-RBH-TER
10-18-2019
Clara Lewis Brockington, Plaintiff, v. Salem United Methodist Church, The United Methodist Church South Carolina Conference, Council of Bishops, Rev. Bryan Mungo, Pastor Bishop L. Jonathan Holson, Rev. Terry Fleming, Kenneth Carter, Jr., Cynthia Fierro Harvey, Council of Bishops, Bruce R. Ough, Council of Bishops, Dorethia Bailey, Janice Alexander Howard, Maxine McClaine, Defendants.
Report and Recommendation
This is a civil action filed by a pro se litigant, proceeding in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se complaint filed in this case. This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Id. ; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for her, or conjure up questions never squarely presented to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.1990) (The "special judicial solicitude" with which a [court] should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.).
DISCUSSION
Cognizant of Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2015) and its progeny, the court informed Plaintiff regarding the deficiencies in her original Complaint and Plaintiff was given notice and opportunity to amend her Complaint. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff availed herself of such opportunity and filed an Amended Complaint; however, the deficiencies persist and this action is subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff sues Salem United Methodist Church and several persons affiliated with the church and leadership hierarchy of the Methodist Church generally. Plaintiff alleges she has been a long-standing member of Salem United Methodist Church. (ECF No. 23 at 13). Plaintiff alleges in 2018, Plaintiff completed her portion of the application for Golden Cross Medical Assistance, which needed her pastor's recommendation. (ECF No. 23 at 13). Plaintiff's pastor refused to provide a recommendation and Plaintiff alleges the pastor retaliated when the Bishop was notified. (ECF No. 23 at 13)(it is unclear if the "retaliation" alleged is related to the application or to Plaintiff's membership in the church). Plaintiff alleges "a form of slander, libel, and defamation of character" was performed against her. (ECF No. 23 at 13). "I have been discriminated against by Defendants due to my age, color, gender, disability, etc." (ECF No. 23 at 13). Plaintiff alleges statements, letters, and meetings by church members and hierarchy have harmed her reputation and attacked her Christian faith. (ECF No. 23 at 14). Plaintiff alleges as damages she is suffering from "slander, libel, defamation of character, retaliation, mental anguish, harassment, stress, depression, emotional imbalance, anxiety, fear, embarrassment, loss of place to worship, loss of leadership, punitive damages, etc." (ECF No. 23 at 14). Plaintiff alleges she is embarrassed to leave her home and has nightmares. (ECF No. 23 at 15). Plaintiff alleges there are numerous witnesses that will testify as to baptism policies. (ECF No. 23 at 15). It appears Plaintiff is contesting her termination in church membership from the Methodist Church due to immersion baptism in a Baptist church. (ECF No. 23 at 15). Plaintiff further contests her pastor's qualifications. (ECF No. 23 at 15). "Due to the negligence of all of these defendants for hiring a first time, uneducated, disqualified [pastor], inexperienced to a large congregation and fearing knowledge of long time members with Christian skills and numerous degrees, I am requesting that this case remain in federal court to rule on the substantial evidence in the case that comes under federal court subject matter jurisdiction." (ECF No. 23 at 16). Plaintiff requests monetary damages and that all defendants resign immediately from all United Methodist Church affiliations. (ECF No. 23 at 17). "Defendants have violated my constitutional rights on numerous occasions according to my state of being." (ECF No. 23 at 17).
Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, "constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Because federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir.1999), citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337, 327 (1895). Federal courts have an "independent obligation" to investigate the limits of its subject-matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). As such, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, "and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears." Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
District courts exercise two types of subject matter jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The diversity statute requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978). This Court has no diversity jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiff has a South Carolina address and a defendant also has a South Carolina addresses. Thus, no subject matter jurisdiction exists based upon diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. Plaintiff is may be able to pursue any state law tort claims alleged against defendants in state court, but such claims cannot form the basis for subject matter jurisdiction in this court based on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
A plaintiff must allege in her pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182 (1936). To this end, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction." If, however, the complaint does not contain "an affirmative pleading of a jurisdictional basis, the federal court may find that it has jurisdiction if the facts supporting jurisdiction have been clearly pleaded." Pinkley, Inc., 191 F.3d at 399 (citing 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 8.03[3] (3d ed.1997). Plaintiff has not pleaded what jurisdictional basis supports her filing in federal court. Plaintiff does not cite what federal cause of action she is pursuing or what constitutional amendment has been violated. Plaintiff does not name any state actors or pleaded that Defendants are state actors. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege any claim under § 1983, no viable federal claim is stated against any of the defendants as they are non-state actors. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The only other possible basis for subject matter jurisdiction that the court can liberally construe from Plaintiff's allegations is a § 1981 action. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.1990) (The "special judicial solicitude" with which a [court] should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.). To the extent Plaintiff intended to state such a § 1981 claim to support federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege basic facts that could support such a claim, and thus jurisdiction. "The two major elements of a successful § 1981 claim follow from the statute's language. First, the plaintiff must possess some contractual right that the defendant blocked or impaired.... Second, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that racial discrimination drove the decision to interfere with these contractual rights." Williams v. Richland Cnty. Children Servs., No. 11-4205, 489 Fed. Appx. 848, 851 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006)). Plaintiff has not alleged what contractual right Plaintiff has to support a prima facie § 1981 claim. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations that the defendants discriminated against her based on her "age, color, gender, disability, etc." are also insufficient to establish the necessary discriminatory animus under § 1981. See Morales v. City of New York, 752 F.3d. 234, 238 (2d Cir. 2014) (dismissing a Section 1981 claim where plaintiff failed to allege examples of purposeful discrimination).
Even if Plaintiff attempts to allege such protected class with specificity on objections, Plaintiff still has not alleged a contractual right to support a prima facie § 1981 claim. Moreover, objections containing new factual allegations are not proper. See generally Cleveland v. Duvall, No. 8:14-cv-04305-RBH, 2015 WL 6549287, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2015) (explaining "new factual allegations are not properly considered in the context of an objection to an R & R"), aff'd, 647 Fed. Appx, 156 (4th Cir. 2016).
As request for relief, Plaintiff requests monetary damages and that defendants "resign effective immediately from all [their] United Methodist affiliations." (ECF No. ? at 17). Civil courts are restricted when they consider issues pertaining to religious organizations or doctrines. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (citations omitted). "Generally, courts may not interpret church laws, policies or practices in a manner that will limit the churches [sic] ability to fully practice its religion or be guided by its religious principles." JC2 v. Grammond, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1168 (D. Or. 2002) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)); see also Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (per curiam). The First Amendment allows civil courts to adjudicate disputes within religious organizations, so long as resolution refrains from determining matters of ecclesiastical doctrine or polity. Jones, 443 U.S. at 610; see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Canada v. Milivoievich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976); Pearson v. Church of God, 478 S.E.2d 849, 851 (S.C. 1996) ("where resolution of the [religious] disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity ...") (quoting Milivoievich, 426 U.S. at 709). Plaintiff, in part, also contests baptism policies and the education/qualifications of her pastor. Such matters would involve determining matters of ecclesiastical doctrine or polity or be so intertwined with other issues as to be considered ecclesiastical, and this court is prohibited from interpreting such matters of ecclesiastical doctrine.
Ecclesiastical entanglement has long been treated as a jurisdictional question. Gregorio v. Hoover, 238 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2017).
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
See Platts v. O'Brien, 691 Fed. Appx. 774 (4th Cir. June 22, 2017) (citing S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) ("A dismissal for ... [a] defect in subject matter jurisdiction[ ] must be one without prejudice, because a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.")..
s/Thomas E. Rogers, III
Thomas E. Rogers, III
United States Magistrate Judge October 18, 2019
Florence, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).