In Brock v. State, a case relied upon by the State, the court held evidence of prior offenses by the defendant against the victim was admissible as circumstantial evidence of motive for murdering her. Brock v. State, 275 S.W.3d 586, 589-90 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd). There, two of the incidents occurred within two months of the victim's murder, both of which arose from her final separation from him.
Here, the extraneous offense evidence pertaining to Deanna and Dudley's relationship had probative value and the State had the need for the evidence because it tended to establish Dudley's motive for committing the offense and tended to disprove the defense's theory that their relationship had been ordinary and just like any other. See, e.g., Brock v. State, 275 S.W.3d 586, 588-90 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd) (evidence of prior bad acts committed several years before the charged offense were nonetheless probative evidence of defendant's motive to murder victim). The State also had need for the evidence because the case was founded on circumstantial evidence, without direct evidence linking Dudley to Deanna's murder, and such evidence of Dudley's motive to commit the offense was necessary to establish his guilt.
To the extent appellant argues the evidence was too remote to consider, neither article 38.36 nor rule 404(b) limits the time period for which such evidence may be admissible. See, e.g., Brock v. State, 275 S.W.3d 586, 590 n.3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd). Evidence, while relevant and otherwise admissible under rule 404(b) and article 38.36, may still be excluded under rule 403 if the appellant demonstrates the damaging nature of the evidence outweighs its probative value.
See Fernandez, 597 S.W.3d at 566; see also Chavez v. State, 399 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (stating that evidence about relationship between defendant and victim "was a material issue for consideration by the jury because it helped illustrate the nature of their relationship and possibly explained" victim's fear of defendant, failure to defend himself, and decision to leave with defendant after assault); Brock v. State, 275 S.W.3d 586, 589, 590 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd) (reviewing trial court's decision to admit evidence showing tumultuous relationship between defendant and victim and concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that "the challenged evidence had probative force to explain the relationship between appellant and his wife, and how that relationship motivated her murder"). The evidence also helped to establish Elkins's intent when grabbing Mother in this case and to rebut his defensive theory that the bruising was caused by a combination of Mother's medicine and minor contact with her skin.
Those extraneous bad acts tend to show a motive by Washington to hurt or to punish Latonya because of her affair, which reasonably supports a motive also to commit the offense charged. See Brock v. State, 275 S.W.3d 586, 589-90 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd); Page v. State, 819 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd). The first factor favors admission.
See id. at 580 (presuming jury disregarded testimony about extraneous offense when trial court gave prompt instruction to do so); Brock v. State, 275 S.W.3d 586, 591-92 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd) (holding jury presumed to have followed trial court's instruction to disregard deputy sheriff's testimony that defendant confessed).
("The trial court could have concluded that the evidence was admissible to refute appellant's defensive theory that Patty fabricated the assault or that no assault actually occurred."); Brock v. State, 275 S.W.3d 586, 589-90 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd) (reviewing the trial court's decision to admit evidence regarding a tumultuous relationship between the appellant and complainant and concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that "the challenged evidence had probative force to explain the relationship between appellant and his wife, and how that relationship motivated her murder").
In light of the testimony above, the evidence regarding a prior incident of abuse similarly motivated by jealousy and involving use of a deadly weapon was probative because it contextualized the nature of the relationship between Brickley and C.M. and helped explain some of her conduct during the incident and her hesitancy in reporting the offense. SeeFernandez v. State , 597 S.W.3d 546, 566 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet. ref'd) ; see alsoChavez v. State , 399 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (stating that evidence about relationship between defendant and victim "was a material issue for consideration by the jury because it helped illustrate the nature of their relationship and possibly explained" victim's fear of defendant, failure to defend himself, and decision to leave with defendant after assault); Brock v. State , 275 S.W.3d 586, 589, 590 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd) (reviewing trial court's decision to admit evidence showing tumultuous relationship between defendant and victim and concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that "the challenged evidence had probative force to explain the relationship between appellant and his wife, and how that relationship motivated her murder"). Although C.M. explained that she did not know precisely when the prior incident occurred and estimated that it occurred between seven months and two years before the incident in question, seeGaytan v. State , 331 S.W.3d 218, 226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref'd) (explaining that remoteness reduces probative value of extraneous offense "because, logically, the passage of time allows things and people to change"), courts have found that similar lapses in time did not deplete the probative value of the evidence, see, e.g.,Robinson v. State , 701 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (concluding that four-to-six-month lapse in time was suffic
See, e.g., Matthews v. State, No. 07-01-0147-CR, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6070, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 20, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (involving evidence of a seven-year-old assault and holding that it was not too remote for purposes of admission under article 38.36). So too has this court held that article 38.36 does not limit the time period for which such acts may be admissible. Brock v. State, 275 S.W.3d 586, 590 n.3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd). Thus, the evidence in question was not inadmissible simply because it occurred as early as 2015.
A trial court addressing a rule 403 objection must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2) the proponent's need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or repeat evidence already admitted. Brock v. State, 275 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd) (citing Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 880).