Opinion
No. 108,199.
2013-02-8
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. Mike YANG, Appellant.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; Jan A. Way, Judge. Mike Yang, appellant pro se. Mark A. Samsel, Matthew L. Hefner, and Frederick K. Starrett, of Lathrop & Gage LLP, of Overland Park, for appellee.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; Jan A. Way, Judge.
Mike Yang, appellant pro se. Mark A. Samsel, Matthew L. Hefner, and Frederick K. Starrett, of Lathrop & Gage LLP, of Overland Park, for appellee.
Before ATCHESON, P.J., BUSER and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Mike Yang appeals from a judgment entered against him in a Chapter 61 action that Plaintiff University of Kansas Hospital Authority brought in Wyandotte County District Court to collect for services provided to him at the KU Medical Center. As much as anything, the case illustrates the difficulty a person without legal training may encounter in trying to represent himself or herself in a civil suit, even under the comparatively streamlined procedures used in Chapter 61. We find no error in the district court decision granting summary judgment to the Hospital Authority and, therefore, affirm.
Yang apparently has received ongoing care at the KU Medical Center for an extended period of time. This suit concerns bills for services on five separate days totaling $3,505. Yang attempted to deal with pretrial discovery, including requests for admission, and then to respond to the Hospital Authority's motion for summary judgment on his own.
The standards governing summary judgment are well settled and often recited. A party seeking summary judgment has the obligation to show, based on appropriate evidentiary materials, that there are no disputed issues of material fact and that judgment may, therefore, be entered in its favor as a matter of law. Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 289 Kan. 891, 900, 220 P.3d 333 (2009). In short, the movant argues there is nothing for a jury or a trial judge sitting as fact-finder to decide that would make any difference. Where, as here, the party requesting summary judgment does so on an issue on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must furnish sufficient evidence in support of the motion to show its entitlement to the relief requested. See Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir.2008) (applying Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56, the federal counterpart to K.S.A. 60–256 governing summary judgment practice). The party opposing summary judgment must then point to evidence calling into question a material factual representation made in support of the motion. Shamberg, 289 Kan. at 900. If the opposing party does so, the motion should be denied so a fact-finder may resolve that dispute.
In addressing a request for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence most favorably to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference that might be drawn from the evidentiary record, 289 Kan. at 900. An appellate court applies the same standards. If a party opposing summary judgment fails to identify evidence disputing a particular factual representation made in support of summary judgment, the trial court may treat that fact as admitted for purposes of deciding the motion. Seitz v. Lawrence Bank, 36 Kan.App.2d 283, 289–90, 138 P.3d 388,rev. denied 282 Kan. 791 (2006); Supreme Court Rule 141 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 232).
Navigating through civil litigation requires a fairly detailed knowledge of procedural rules and the Kansas Code of Evidence. Absent that knowledge, the trip amounts to a journey across a minefield. Nonetheless, a nonlawyer is held to the same standards as a lawyer during the course of litigation and must bear the consequences if his or her performance falls short of what those rules require. Mangiaracina v. Gutierrez, 11 Kan.App.2d 594, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 730 P.2d 1109 (1986). In Mangiaracina, 11 Kan.App.2d at 595, this court held: “A pro se litigant in a civil case is required to follow the same rules of procedure and evidence which are binding upon a litigant who is represented by counsel.” In this case, Yang failed in several ways that were highly damaging and ultimately fatal to his case.
At the outset, Yang failed to file an answer to the Hospital Authority's petition and, rather, filed what he characterized as a counterclaim asserting various claims against the Hospital Authority. The counterclaims were dismissed, and Yang has not appealed that ruling. Having failed to answer, Yang was subject to a default judgment. But the district court allowed the case to proceed,
The Hospital Authority served requests for admission on Yang. Requests for admission essentially ask a party to admit or deny factual statements relevant to the case or to admit or deny the genuineness of pertinent documents or other evidentiary materials. There is some dispute about whether Yang made a timely response to the requests. If a party fails to provide a timely response, the requests are considered admitted and binding for purposes of the suit. Yang did attempt to respond, and those responses are in the record. The Hospital Authority essentially asked in a series of requests for admission if Yang received the medical services indicated in the attached bills, if the amount charged was reasonable, whether Yang had paid the bills, and whether he owed the Hospital Authority $3,582 for those services. In response to each request, Yang simply wrote “do not recall” and nothing more. But under K.S.A. 61–3101, the requests must be denied under oath or the party must “set forth in detail the reasons why” he or she cannot truthfully admit or deny the requests. Here, without some further explanation, Yang did not sufficiently indicate why he does not recall and what reasonable effort he otherwise made to determine the accuracy of the requests for admission. The rule is designed to prevent precisely this sort of cursory denial based on lack of memory and, instead, to require a party to make a legitimate effort to review documents or otherwise refresh a dulled memory before responding. Nothing here indicated Yang did so.
Having failed to sufficiently deny or otherwise respond to the requests, those statements were properly considered admitted for purposes of the Hospital Authority's suit. Yang never sought to supplement or elaborate on his responses or to withdraw them. The requests for admission became binding on him and essentially established the necessary factual basis for the Hospital Authority to prove its claim against him.
The Hospital Authority then filed its motion for summary judgment with a supporting memorandum and evidentiary materials asking for a judgment against Yang for $3,505. The amount sought in the motion is slightly less than what was stated in the requests for admission, but the discrepancy is legally irrelevant, since the request in the motion is for less. Those evidentiary materials included copies of the bills for the medical services and an affidavit from a representative of the Hospital Authority explaining how the bills are maintained as accurate business records of the organization and correctly reflect patient services. The affidavit also stated that the amounts charged reflected the reasonable value of those services. The paperwork also included Yang's responses to the requests for admission. The Hospital Authority's motion and supporting documentation conformed to Rule 141 and, in particular, listed the specific facts asserted and cited the evidentiary materials proving those facts.
Yang's response did not fare so well. A party opposing summary judgment must admit or controvert the specific facts in the motion. If an asserted fact is controverted, the party must point to evidentiary materials calling into question the accuracy of that fact. While Yang did say he disputed a number of the facts, he failed to supply any evidentiary materials relevant to them. The district court properly disregarded those representations because they lacked any evidentiary basis. Yang did challenge the sufficiency of the affidavit to demonstrate the reasonableness of the charges billed to him. On that score, he had a point in that the affidavit does not establish how the representative of the Hospital Authority came to the conclusion that the charges were reasonable. But the point really carried no legal weight. The requests for admission included a statement that the charges were reasonable, and that became binding on Yang because he did not properly deny it. Yang also argued in his response that the Hospital Authority waited too long to sue him over some of the bills. That is a statute of limitations defense. Under the rules, that kind of defense must be asserted in the answer filed in response to the petition. K.S.A. 61–2904(b)(2). But Yang never filed an answer and certainly did not assert a limitations defense at the start of the suit. He satisfied neither the spirit nor the letter of the law in that regard.
In his opposition to the summary judgment, Yang also argued the costs were too high and some of the care was unnecessary. And he asserted some of the services were provided by nurses or paraprofessionals rather than medical doctors so they should not have cost so much. But those are offered as Yang's unsupported opinions and do not amount to legal defenses to the bills.
In short, the Hospital Authority presented evidence that it provided the medical services to Yang, he had not paid for them, and the charges were reasonable. Yang failed to present contrary evidence. The district court, therefore, properly entered judgment for the Hospital Authority.
Affirmed.