Opinion
No. A114337.
July 11, 2007. [CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION ]
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Alameda County, No. RG04188567, Winifred Smith, Judge.
O'Reilly Danko, Terry O'Reilly, Gary L. Simms and Stephen J. Purtill for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dykema Gossett and K. Lynn Finateri for Defendant and Respondent Rolls Royce Corporation.
Nixon Peabody, Paul E. Stinson and Raymond Mariani for Defendant and Respondent Dallas Airmotive, Inc.
Coddington, Hicks Danforth and Richard G. Grotch for Defendant and Respondent Rocky Mountain Holdings.
OPINION
This lawsuit involves a helicopter crash in Idaho. Plaintiffs appeal from a trial court order staying the action in favor of litigation in Idaho on the ground of forum non conveniens. In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude that the motion to stay the action was timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30, even though it was brought a year after most defendants answered the complaint. We affirm the trial court order staying the action.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff John Britton was piloting a helicopter in August 2003 during a firefighting operation near Webb, Idaho. The helicopter engine failed shortly after filling a firefighting bucket, resulting in a "hard landing" which seriously injured Britton and substantially damaged the helicopter.
Plaintiff's are the pilot Britton; his wife Lorinda Britton; Silverhawk Aviation LLC, owner of the helicopter; and David Currie, president of Silverhawk. In December 2004, plaintiffs brought suit in Alameda County Superior Court against Rolls Royce Engine Services Oakland, Inc. (Rolls Royce Oakland), which serviced the engine in 1993; Dallas Airmotive, Inc. (Dallas), which serviced the engine in 1998; and Rolls Royce Corporation (Rolls Royce), which, through a predecessor company, manufactured the engine. The insurer of the helicopter, XL Specialty Insurance Company, intervened as a plaintiff.
In January 2005, defendant Rolls Royce Oakland moved under sections 418.10 and 410.30 to stay or dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. Defendants Dallas and Rolls Royce filed a joinder to the motion. The trial court concluded that Rolls Royce Oakland had not met its burden because it had "submitted little, if any, evidence that Idaho is a suitable place for trial, no evidence showing who will be the most significant witnesses in this action, where they are located, or that Idaho is a more convenient forum for obtaining their testimony. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, [Rolls Royce Oakland] has essentially eschewed all discussion of the public interest factors." The motion was denied without prejudice. At the hearing on the motion, defendants indicated their intent to renew the motion under section 410.30.
Dallas then removed the suit to federal court, and Dallas, Rolls Royce Oakland, and Rolls Royce answered the complaint in March 2005. In June 2005, the federal court remanded the action back to the Alameda County Superior Court. ( Britton v. Rolls Royce Engine Services (N.D.Cal. 2005) 2005 U.S.Dist. Lexis 13259.)
Plaintiffs named Rocky Mountain Holdings, LLC (Rocky Mountain), as an additional defendant; Rocky Mountain answered in December 2005.
In February 2006, the trial court granted an unopposed motion for summary judgment filed by Rolls Royce Oakland. The court held that "[t]here is no triable issue of material fact that [Rolls Royce Oakland] had any connection with the engine components that failed at the time of the subject incident because the cause of engine failure did not implicate any engine component connected with [Rolls Royce Oakland]."
In late February 2006, defendant Dallas renewed the motion to stay or dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens and Rolls Royce and Rocky Mountain filed joinders. Another judge of the superior court stayed the action "pending initiation and conclusion of litigation in the Idaho court."
DISCUSSION
I. Timeliness of the Renewed Forum Non Conveniens Motion
Plaintiff's contend that the renewed forum non conveniens motion was untimely under section 418.10. We disagree.
Statutory construction is a question of law we decide de novo. ( People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 11 P.3d 956].) Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the underlying legislative intent. (§ 1859.) We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual, ordinary meanings and giving each word and phrase significance. ( Curie v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 16 P3d 166].) "The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. [Citation.] . . . An interpretation that renders related provisions nugatory must be avoided [citation]; each sentence must be read not in isolation but in the light of the statutory scheme [citation]; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed." ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) "If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs." ( Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 911 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 24 P.3d 1191].)
The first of the two relevant statutes, section 418.10, subdivision (a) provides that "[a] defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion . . . (2) To stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum." Section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3) further provides that "[f]ailure to make a motion under this section at the time of filing a demurrer or motion to strike constitutes a waiver of the issues of lack of personal jurisdiction, inadequacy of process, inadequacy of service of process, inconvenient forum, and delay in prosecution." The second of the two statutes, section 410.30 provides, "(a) When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just, [¶] (b) The provisions of Section 418.10 do not apply to a motion to stay or dismiss the action by a defendant who has made a general appearance."
The initial motion was filed within me time allowed under section 418.10, subdivision (a). The renewed motion was filed almost a year after most defendants answered. In granting the renewed motion, the trial court relied on its authority under section 410.30 to consider the convenience of the forum on its own motion. The plain language of section 410.30 authorized the trial court to consider whether to stay the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. ( Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 749-750 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 556, 819 P.2d 14] ( Stangvik).)
The trial court specified that it was considering the issue on its own merits in response to plaintiffs' contention that the renewed motion was not a proper motion for reconsideration under section 1008.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court lacked authority to raise the forum non conveniens issue, even on its own motion, because the issue was waived by defendants. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that under section 418.10, subdivision (a), defendants could only move to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens before expiration of their time to file a responsive pleading and that the issue was waived under section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3). Plaintiffs' argument is unavailing. Section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3), the only provision expressly providing for waiver, does not provide for waiver where a defendant fails to file a motion on forum non conveniens grounds before filing an answer. Rather, it provides for waiver only where a defendant fails to move on forum non conveniens grounds "at the time of filing a demurrer or motion to strike." (§ 418.10, subd. (e)(3).) On its face, the provision is inapplicable because defendants never filed a demurrer or motion to strike.
Neither did defendants waive the issue under section 418.10, subdivision (a). First, defendants Dallas and Rolls Royce did file a forum non conveniens motion within the time specified in subdivision (a). Plaintiffs do not explain why the trial court was powerless to reconsider the issue, which was properly raised at the outset of the litigation. Second, the narrow scope and express nature of the section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3) waiver provision suggest that a defendant does not waive the forum non conveniens issue by failing to file a forum non conveniens motion under subdivision (a). It would be unreasonable to conclude that, on the one hand, the Legislature expressly provided for waiver in the narrow circumstances specified in subdivision (e)(3) but, on the other hand, implicitly provided for waiver anytime a motion is not filed within the time for filing a responsive pleading, as authorized by section 418.10, subdivision (a).
Further, plaintiffs' interpretation of section 418.10, subdivision (a) is contrary to section 410.30, subdivision (b), which provides that "[t]he provisions of Section 418.10 do not apply to a motion to stay or dismiss the action by a defendant who has made a general appearance." Under subdivision (b), a defendant who has generally appeared may make a forum non conveniens motion at any time, not only on or before the last day to plead. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, § 369, p. 967; see also Review of Selected 1972 California Legislation, 4 Pacific L.J. (1973) pp. 305-306.)
Plaintiffs contend that this interpretation of section 410.30, subdivision (b) nullifies the waiver language in section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3). But we do not read section 410.30, subdivision (b) to mean that a defendant who has waived the forum non conveniens issue under section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3) may later bring a motion under section 410.30, subdivision (a). If the issue has been waived under the express language of section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3), then the defendant may not raise it at any point in the litigation. Section 410.30, subdivision (b) does not purport to allow a party to raise issues waived at the outset of the litigation, and its general language does not contradict the subsequently enacted and specific waiver provision in section 418.10. (Stats. 1972, ch. 601, § 1, p. 1064, enacting § 410.30, subd. (b); Stats. 2002, ch. 69, § 1, enacting § 418.10, subd. (e)(3).) "`It is a settled rule of statutory construction that a special statute dealing expressly with a particular subject controls and takes priority over a general statute.'" ( Branciforte Heights, LLC v. City of Santa Cruz (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 914, 924 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 96], citing Lacy v. Richmond Unified Sch. Dist. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 469, 472 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 1, 530 P.2d 1377].)
Our independent review of the legislative histories of section 410.30, subdivision (b) and section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3) provided no clear guidance on the issues before us. (See J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1578-1579 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 206].)
Plaintiffs argue that subdivision (b) of section 410.30 can be interpreted to mean that a forum non conveniens motion can no longer be made after a general appearance, and that section 418.10 provides the sole statutory procedure for the motion. But that interpretation disregards the fact that subdivision (a) of section 410.30 expressly authorizes forum non conveniens motions. ( Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 749-750.) If forum non conveniens motions may only be brought under section 418.10, then the separate authorization of such motions in section 410.30 is superfluous. Plaintiffs' construction renders section 410.30 "`redundant and a nullity, thereby violating one of the most elementary principles of statutory construction.'" ( White v. Davis (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 197, 216 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 691], quoting Cal Pacific Collections, Inc. v. Powers (1969) 70 Cal.2d 135, 139 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 289, 449 P.2d 225].)
Accordingly, we construe the provisions of sections 418.10 and 410.30, both relating to forum non conveniens motions, in harmony. Read together, they provide that where a defendant has not appeared, section 418.10 applies and specifies the procedure for bringing a forum non conveniens motion. Section 410.30 applies after a defendant has appeared. So understood, section 418.10 provides special procedures for preanswer forum non conveniens motions, but such motions are not precluded after a defendant has appeared. This is a reasonable rule because it may be necessary to conduct discovery to develop the factual underpinnings of a forum non conveniens motion. (See, e.g., Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1460-1462 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 301].) Further, to retain a case for the entire duration of the litigation because the lack of connection to California was unclear at the outset would impair the state's interest in avoiding burdening courts and potential jurors with litigation in which the local community has little concern. ( Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.)
For example, filing of a motion under section 418.10 extends the defendant's time to plead until 15 days after notice of entry of an order denying the motion, and a defendant may petition for a writ of mandate if the trial court denies the motion. (§ 418.10, subds. (b) (c).)
In support of their construction, at oral argument plaintiffs pointed out that the Judicial Council comment to section 410.30 states, "The procedure for making a motion to stay or dismiss an action under this section is stated in Section 418.10." (Judicial Council of Cal., Ann. Rep. (1969) appen. Ill, p. 96.) We agree that section 418.10 specifies the procedure for bringing a forum non conveniens motion where the defendant has not appeared. The Judicial Council comment does not state that the issue may not be raised or renewed after the defendant appears. The plain language of sections 410.30 and 418.10 does not support such a conclusion. Notably, the Judicial Council comment predates the enactment of section 410.30, subdivision (b), which provides that section 418.10 is inapplicable to a motion by a defendant who has generally appeared. (Stats. 1972, ch. 601, § 1, p. 1064, enacting § 410.30, subd. (b).) The comment also predates the enactment of section 418.10, subdivision (e)(3), which provides for waiver only where a defendant fails to move on forum non conveniens grounds at the time of filing a demurrer or motion to strike. (See Stats. 2002, ch. 69, § 1, enacting § 418.10, subd. (e)(3).)
Some courts have assumed the propriety of forum non conveniens motions filed after a defendant has appeared, without considering the statutory construction issues addressed herein. (See, e.g., Morris v. AGFA Corp., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1460-1461; Roulier v. Cannondale (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1184-1185 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 877].)
Here, the trial court had authority to consider the forum non conveniens motion in March 2006. We hasten to add that our interpretation of sections 418.10 and 410.30 does not mean that defendants can unreasonably delay bringing forum non conveniens motions with impunity; any delay would be relevant to whether the motion should be granted. (See Roulier v. Cannondale, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1191; Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co. (3d Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 604, 614.)
II. Abuse of Discretion It is well established that "[f]orum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine invoking the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere. [Citations.] . . . ¶ In determining whether to grant a motion based on forum non conveniens, a court must first determine whether the alternate forum is a `suitable' place for trial. If it is, the next step is to consider the private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining the action for trial in California. The private interest factors are those that make trial and the enforceability of the ensuing judgment expeditious and relatively inexpensive, such as the ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses. The public interest factors include avoidance of overburdening local courts with congested calendars, protecting the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and weighing the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation." ( Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.) The trial court concluded that Idaho was a suitable forum and that defendant Dallas had "offered substantial and persuasive evidence that the private factors of access to witnesses not otherwise subject to having their appearance at trial in California compelled, and to other evidence, favor an Idaho forum. [Citation to record.] Further, the public factors favor an Idaho forum, as the accident did not occur here, no party resides here, and there is no other significant connection with the California forum. . . . The balance of the public and private interest thus heavily favors an Idaho forum over a California forum." The grant or denial of the motion is within the trial court's discretion. ( Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.) Plaintiffs contend that the forum non conveniens motion should have been denied because defendants waited a year after denial of the first motion before filing the renewed motion. However, the first motion was denied with the expectation that defendants would develop the facts and bring a renewed motion. The renewed motion was filed soon after a major change in circumstances, dismissal of the case against the only California defendant, Rolls Royce Oakland. At the hearing on the initial motion, the judge focused on the presence of the California defendant. It was appropriate for the trial court to consider the forum non conveniens issue in March 2006. Plaintiffs further contend that defendants failed to meet their burden of presenting evidence that California is a "seriously inconvenient" forum. ( Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 604, 610-611, italics omitted ( Ford Motor Co.).) Plaintiffs do not dispute that Idaho is a suitable place for trial. At the outset, we note that defendants were not required to make "`an extensive evidentiary showing.'" ( Morris v. AGFA Corp., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1462.) "`The principal evidentiary showing Stangvik requires is that trial may be had in the alternative forum and that some form of relief may be granted. . . . Examination of the private and public interests at stake involve more general considerations.'" ( Morris, at p. 1462.) "[T]he evidence before the court, which may include affidavits of the parties, discovery responses, and the undisputed general knowledge of the nature of the action, need only be sufficient to give the court the ability to soundly exercise its discretion regarding the applicability of the general considerations of the Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d 744 factors to the question of forum non conveniens." ( Morris, at p. 1462.) The trial court had before it evidence that the accident occurred in Idaho; that all the plaintiffs reside in Idaho; that the helicopter operator was based in Idaho at the time of the accident; that one of the witnesses is an Idaho state employee; that plaintiff Britton received all his helicopter flight training in Idaho; that the mechanic who installed the helicopter engine resides in Idaho; that the accident occurred while the helicopter was operating pursuant to an Idaho State Government contract for fire suppression; and that the helicopter airframe is located in Idaho. The trial court also had evidence before it that defendant Dallas is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Texas; that defendant Rolls Royce is headquartered in Virginia and incorporated in Delaware; and that defendant Rocky Mountain is headquartered in Utah and incorporated in Delaware. As to the only California defendant, an unopposed motion for summary judgment was granted in February 2006. The evidence supports the trial court decision that California is a "seriously inconvenient forum" for this action. As noted previously, the factors that the court considers in balancing the private interest of the litigants include ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses. ( Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.) The important witnesses are in Idaho or in the principal places of business of the defendants; none are located in California. In particular, it is likely that the mechanic who installed the helicopter engine, a resident of Idaho, will be an important witness. It is also likely that witnesses regarding medical damages are located in Idaho where plaintiff received medical treatment. Due to the increased cost and difficulty of obtaining their attendance at trial, the presence of these witnesses in Idaho, and the absence of important witnesses in California, weighs in favor of granting the forum non conveniens motion. (See Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 762-763; Boaz v. Boyle Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 712-713 ( Boaz).) The fact that plaintiff in intervention XL Specialty Insurance Company shipped the engine and certain records to California is not significant because that evidence can be shipped to Idaho. (See Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 617.) The public interest factors supporting the trial court decision are even more compelling. The factors that the court considers in balancing the interests of the public in retaining the action in California include the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction, and the avoidance of burdening courts and potential jurors with litigation in which the local community has little concern. ( Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 751.) California has little relationship with the parties or the underlying events. (See Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 760-761; Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) Once Rolls Royce Oakland was dismissed from the lawsuit, all connection to California was severed, except of course for the location of plaintiffs' lawyers and evidence shipped here by plaintiff in intervention. None of the parties reside or have their principal place of business in California, the accident did not occur in California, and none of the relevant repairs or maintenance occurred in California. Accordingly, California has little interest in providing a forum for this action, aside from a generalized interest in aviation safety no greater than the interest of any other state. (See Boaz, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 712-714; cf. Stangvik, at p. 756, fn. 10 [noting that California has an interest in deciding actions against resident corporations whose conduct in California causes injury elsewhere].) On the other hand, Idaho has a substantial and particularized interest in regulating the conduct at issue. ( Ford Motor Co., at p. 614.) The crash occurred in the course of completion of a public contract in and for the state of Idaho, and both the pilot victim and helicopter owners are residents of Idaho. In considering the burden placed on local courts and taxpayers by the litigation, the question is "`[w]hether prosecution of the action will or may place a burden on the courts of this state which is unfair, inequitable or disproportionate in view of the relationship of the parties or of the cause of action to this state.'" ( Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 615-616.) Any burden on California courts and citizens is disproportionate to the state's interest. (See Boaz, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 713-714.) Trial in this state would require imposition of jury duty on California residents despite the fact that there is no significant connection between the case and the State of California. ( Morris v. AGFA Corp., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467.) Even if we assume that the nonresident plaintiffs' choice of a California forum is entitled to "great weight," it does not compel reversal. The preference accorded a plaintiff's choice of forum can be outweighed where the balance of private interests and the interest of the public is strongly in favor of another forum. ( Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 610-611.) This is such a case. The forum non conveniens doctrine "`is typically applied to litigation where all of the parties are out-of-state residents and where the cause of action arose outside the forum state.'" (See Appalachian Ins. Company v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 427, 434, quoting Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 738, 742; see also Boaz, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 713-714.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in staying the California action in favor of litigation in Idaho.
See footnote, ante, page 127.
We reject plaintiffs' unsupported contention that we should apply a different standard of review because the motion was renewed before a different judge following denial of the first motion without prejudice.
Although many of these facts were before the trial court at the time of the first forum non conveniens motion, in the renewed motion defendants presented additional facts learned through discovery. Further, the renewed motion relied on (and was filed soon after) the dismissal of Rolls Royce Oakland, the only California defendant.
Although the California Supreme Court in Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 754-755 fn. 7, questioned the rationale for deference to a nonresident plaintiff's choice of forum, the court in Ford Motor Co., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 610-611, interpreted that portion of Stangvik as dicta, concluding "it remains the case in this state that the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to great weight even though the plaintiff is a nonresident." (Accord Morris v. AGFA Corp., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1465 fn. 6; Hansen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 753, 760; but see Boaz, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 713 [declining to place substantial weight on the plaintiffs' choice where none were California residents].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court order staying the action is affirmed.Jones, P. J., and Needham, J., concurred.