Opinion
Civ. No. 02-1002 ADM/JGL, Civ. No. 02-1059 ADM/JGL Civ. No. 02-1192 ADM/JGL
July 12, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
These three related cases are before the undersigned United States District Judge pursuant to Plaintiff Eric Britten's ("Plaintiff") Objections to the Reports and Recommendations ("RRs") of Magistrate Judge Jonathan Lebedoff. All three RRs recommended that Plaintiff's Applications to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees be denied and that Plaintiff's Complaints for Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Complaints") be summarily dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the RRs are adopted.
II. BACKGROUND
The factual backgrounds for these cases are adequately set forth in the RRs and are incorporated by reference for the purposes of Plaintiff's present objections.
III. DISCUSSION
A district court must make an independent, de novo review of those portions of an RR to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2).
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Stillwater, Minnesota, filed these three separate Complaints in May, 2002. He contends in his first Complaint that Defendants, Chris Benson, City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Police Department, and Hennepin County ("Defendants"), seized and confiscated his personal property. In his second Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants, City of Brooklyn Center, Brooklyn Center Police, and Hennepin County, took his money during an arrest and subsequently donated it to the City of Brooklyn Center. Finally, in his third Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants, Bob Kappers, John Skoglund, Minneapolis Police 2nd Precinct, City of Minneapolis and Hennepin County, seized his motor vehicles during a police "raid" and later sold the vehicles at an auction. He alleges that all Defendants in these cases violated his federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by taking his personal property without affording him due process of law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court is required to screen all complaints filed by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employer of a governmental entity. The court may dismiss the case if satisfied that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim when the court concludes that "no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
In all three cases, Plaintiff objects to Judge Lebedoff's conclusion that his Complaint fails to state an actionable claim. Plaintiff first argues that he has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the less stringent dismissal standard which courts must apply to pro se complaints. Plaintiff also asserts Minnesota law does not provide a post-deprivation remedy for the alleged loss of his property that satisfies due process protections. Finally, Plaintiff contends that he should be permitted to join a state law respondeat superior claim to his federal civil rights claim.
To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right and demonstrate that the alleged deprivation occurred by a person acting under state authority. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). His Complaint must contain facts that, if proven true, state a claim as a matter of law. See Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts treat pro se complaints liberally; however, specific facts still must be alleged. See Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 1981).
In each Complaint, Plaintiff states that Defendants took his personal property during arrests in 1996. He claims that he later requested that the items be returned and Defendants informed him that the property had been forfeited. Plaintiff's Complaints do not contain factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983. The Complaints do not include factual allegations describing any specific wrongful conduct by any Defendant or Defendants. The Complaints do not contain specific facts showing that any of the named Defendants was personally liable for improperly seizing and confiscating Plaintiff's property. In his Complaint against Defendants, Benson, et al., Plaintiff alleges only that Chris Benson "informed" him that his money had been forfeited. In his complaint against Defendants, City of Brooklyn Center, et al., Plaintiff claims only that the "police chief" told him that his money had been donated to the City of Brooklyn Center. Finally, with regard to his Complaint against Defendants, Kappers, et al., Plaintiff states only that Defendants Kappers and Skoglund "headed the narcotics division" of the Police Department and were present during his arrest. There are no allegations that any of these named Defendants was personally responsible for causing Plaintiff's personal property to be seized and confiscated. Nor does Plaintiff allege any particular wrongful conduct by Defendants.
In all three cases, Plaintiff also objects to Judge Lebedoff's conclusion that Plaintiff had an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the alleged loss of his personal property. Plaintiff asserts that a post-deprivation remedy under Minn. Stat. § 466.02 does not satisfy due process when Defendants were able to provide a pre-deprivation hearing. The Supreme Court has held that an unauthorized intentional or negligent deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available. See Hudson v. Palmer, 494 U.S. 517 [ 468 U.S. 517], 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In Hubenthal v. Winona County, 751 F.2d 243 (1984), the Eighth Circuit dismissed a § 1983 claim finding that Minn. Stat. § 466.02 provided plaintiff with an adequate post-deprivation remedy for his alleged loss of property rights. Section 466.02 provides that "every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (2000). Plaintiff has the same adequate post-deprivation remedy under Minnesota law as did Hubenthal. Because Plaintiff had a right to obtain relief under § 466.02 for the alleged confiscation of his property, Plaintiff cannot now claim a violation of due process in his federal civil rights action against Defendants.
In all three Complaints, Plaintiff objects to Judge Lebedoff's finding that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to his federal civil rights action. He contends that supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) permits him to add to his federal civil rights claim a state law respondeat superior claim against Defendant City of Brooklyn Center and Defendant City of Minneapolis. Plaintiff's argument that federal supplemental jurisdiction permits him to join a separate state law claim against these local governments is without merit. Plaintiff does not allege a separate respondeat superior state law claim against any Defendant in his Complaints. He claims only that Defendants are responsible for violating his civil rights because they seized and confiscated his property without affording him due process. Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly held that a local government cannot be held liable for a civil rights violation solely because it employs a tortfeasor. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). It is only when execution of a government's policy or custom inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. See id. Because Plaintiff does not contend that Defendants caused him injury through the execution of governmental policy or custom, Defendants, as government employers, cannot be held liable for any civil rights violation.
Even if Plaintiff had stated an actionable claim, his § 1983 actions may be time barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 618 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1995), the Eighth Circuit noted that § 1983 claims brought in Minnesota are subject to a six year statute of limitations as defined in Minn. Stat. § 541.05. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Benson, et al., took his property in February, 1996, but he did not commence the present action until May, 2002. Similarly, although Plaintiff contends that Defendants, City of Brooklyn Center, et al., seized his money in 1996, he did not bring the present action until May, 2002.
Plaintiff's frequent filings in this Court are flying perilously near the border of frivolousness and vexatiousness. Over the past three years, Plaintiff has brought eight civil actions in this Court. Plaintiff is not immune from sanctions under Rule 11 simply because he appears as a pro se litigant. See Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that pro se litigants are not excused from complying with substantive and procedural law); Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d 1226, 1227 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1979) ("we urge the district courts to assure compliance by pro se litigants with the requirements of Rule 11"). Rule 11 requires the signatory of a pleadings to represent to the Court that pleading is not filed for an improper purpose, such as harassment, the claims are not frivolous and the factual allegations have evidentiary support. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b). If Plaintiff persists in the direction of frivolous and vexatious litigations, sanctions will soon be warranted.
See Britten v. Brooklyn Park Police Department, No. 99-0744; Britten v. Crist, No. 99-0855; Britten v. Crist, No. 99-1479; Britten v. Myers, No. 00-0507; Britten v. Crist, No. 00-0941; Britten v. Benson, No. 02-1002; Britten v. Brooklyn Center, No. 02-1059; Britten v. Kappers, No. 02-1192.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bases on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(A) In Britten v. Benson, et al., No. 02-1002 ADM/JGL:
(1) Plaintiff's Objections [Doc. No. 7] are DENIED,
(2) The RR [Doc. No. 4] is ADOPTED,
(3) Plantiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees [Doc. No. 2] is DENIED, and Plaintiff is required to pay the $150 filing fee in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), and
(4) Plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. No. 1] is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
(B) In Britten v. City of Brooklyn Center, et al., No. 02-1059 ADM/JGL:
(1) Plaintiff's Objections [Doc. No. 8] are DENIED,
(2) The RR [Doc. No. 4] is ADOPTED,
(3) Plantiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees [Doc. No. 2] is DENIED, and Plaintiff is required to pay the $150 filing fee in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), and
(4) Plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. No. 1] is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
(C) In Britten v. Kappers, et al., No. 02-1192:
(1) Plaintiff's Objections [Doc. No. 5] are DENIED,
(2) The RR [Doc. No. 4] is ADOPTED,
(3) Plantiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees [Doc. No. 2] is DENIED, and Plaintiff is required to pay the $150 filing fee in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), and
(4) Plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. No. 1] is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.