Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp.

9 Citing cases

  1. Bhan v. Battle Creek Health Sys.

    No. 13-1682 (6th Cir. Sep. 8, 2014)   Cited 14 times

    Recently, this Circuit has determined, albeit in non-binding opinions, that Medical Staff Bylaws do not create a contractual relationship under Michigan law even when the bylaws are silent as to whether they create a contractual relationship. Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., No. 12-2616, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23144, at *7 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2013); Grain v. Trinity Health, 431 F. App'x 434, 450 (6th Cir. 2011). Prior to this Circuit's recent decisions, the Eastern District of Michigan noted the split of authority as to whether medical staff bylaws constitute a contract and decided to follow the line of cases that held such bylaws created a contract.

  2. Pop Daddy Popcorn, LLC v. Unified Flex Packaging Techs.

    No. 23-12994 (E.D. Mich. Jul. 25, 2024)

    ., 904 F.Supp.2d 699, 723-25 (E.D. Mich. 2012), aff'd, 545 Fed.Appx. 484 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Batshon v. Mar-Que Gen. Contractors, Inc., 463 Mich. 646, 650 n. 4 (2001)).

  3. Jackson v. Walmart, Inc.

    1:23-cv-01110 (N.D. Ohio May. 16, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    But since a contract requires offer, acceptance, and consideration, see Kirkland, 34 Fed.Appx. at 178, Jackson did not form a contract with Walmart as to these unpaid-for items. Since there was no contract as to these items, there was no existing contractual relationship for Walmart to impair. See Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., 545 Fed.Appx. 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiff “must first show the existence of a contract between her and [the defendant]” to proceed with a Section 1981 claim).

  4. Lane v. S.A. Comunale Co.

    5:21CV1085 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2023)

    See, e.g., Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., 904 F.Supp.2d 699, 714 (E.D. Mich. 2012), (“It is well-settled . . . that to make out a claim for relief under Title VII, it must be shown that there existed an employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.”) aff'd, 545 Fed.Appx. 484 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition (ECF No. 33) also does not mention or respond to Defendants' arguments and evidence refuting Plaintiff's claim against EMCOR Group, Inc.

  5. Wells v. Farmington Pub. Schs.

    21-cv-11265 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 2022)   Cited 2 times

    Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the defendant's action. Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., 904 F.Supp.2d 699, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2012), aff'd, 545 Fed.Appx. 484 (6th Cir. 2013). 25

  6. McBroom v. HR Dir. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Elections

    Case No. 2:12-CV-01074 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2014)

    It is well settled that only employees, and not "independent contractors," are protected by Title VII.Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., No. 12-2616, 2013 WL 6038227, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2013); Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2004). Section 2000e(f), Title 42, United States Code, helpfully defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer."

  7. Taylor v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

    Civil No. 13-24-GFVT (E.D. Ky. Jan. 8, 2014)   Cited 13 times
    Alleging racial discrimination where Chase placed a hold on a check the plaintiff attempted to cash

    Section 1981 "protects the equal right of all persons ... to make and enforce contracts without respect to race." Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., 2013 WL 6038227 at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2013) (quoting Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474, 126 S.Ct. 1246, 163 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2006)). The text of the statute sets forth two major elements of a Section 1981 claim: "[f]irst, the plaintiff must possess some contractual right that the defendant blocked or impaired," and "[s]econd, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that racial discrimination drove the decision to interfere with these contractual rights."

  8. Villare v. Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc.

    C.A. No.: 08C-10-189 JRJ (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2014)   Cited 4 times

    The Mason court did not find the bylaws at issue to be such a contract.See, e.g., Kaufman v. Columbia Mem'l Hosp., --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2014 WL 652886, at *14 (N.D. N.Y. Feb. 19, 2014) (finding no contract in most circumstances) (discussing Mason v. Cent. Suffolk Hosp., 819 N.E.2d 1029 (N.Y. 2004)); Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., 2013 WL 6038227, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2013); Medical Staff of Avera Marshall Reg'l Med. Ctr., 836 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (the court analyzed the issue under Minnesota's contract formation law and found the parties had a preexisting duty, therefore, the bylaws did not create a contract) (also finding that under the bylaws' plain language, the hospital could unilaterally amend the bylaws, which emphasized the hospital's ultimate control); Granger v. Christus Health Cent. Louisiana, 2013 WL 3287128, at *1 (La. Aug. 30, 2013) (finding bylaws create a contract if Louisiana's contract requirements are fulfilled: capacity, consent, a lawful cause, and a valid object); Hildyard v. Citizens Med. Cent., 286 P.3d 239 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (finding no contract, the court stated "Kansas law requires an intent to be bound and a meeting of the minds on all essential terms of a contract); Kessel v. Monongalia Cnty. Gen. Hosp., 600 S.e.2d 321 (W.Va. 2004) (holding bylaws are not a contract between hospital and staff physician); Houston