This Court's review of counsel's performance is "highly deferential" and the presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance" serves to "eliminate ‘the distorting effects of hindsight.’ " Bright v. State , 4 S.W.3d 568, 569 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). The fact that trial counsel believed her trial strategy would succeed, even though it did not ultimately persuade the trial court, does not necessarily mean that her advice to Movant regarding the case's strengths and weaknesses rendered her performance ineffective under the Strickland performance standard.
Based on the Strickland standard, when reviewing a Rule 29.15 case, "we indulge in a strong presumption that defense counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Bright v.State, 4 S.W.3d 568, 569[1] (Mo.App. 1999). "Our 'scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,' and the strong presumption serves to eliminate the 'distorting effects of hindsight.'"