Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-01021-HMH-KFM
03-21-2023
Brody Bridges, Plaintiff, v. Kayla Porter, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on March 13, 2023 (doc. 1). The case is in proper form for judicial screening. However, upon review of the plaintiff's complaint, the undersigned recommends it be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff is a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and currently housed at Kirkland Correctional Institution (“Kirkland”) (doc. 1). The plaintiff sues regarding a conviction for burglary second degree. See Oconee County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Oconee/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A3710100040) (last visited March 21, 2023). The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration in his criminal case on February 16, 2023. Id.
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant Kayla Porter, his attorney in state court, provided ineffective assistance of counsel, should have requested a mental evaluation of him, and violated his due process rights (doc. 1 at 4). He contends that the defendant violated his rights because he did not understand the court proceeding (id.). He also contends that the defendant failed to communicate or visit the plaintiff while a pretrial detainee, coerced him into pleading guilty, and forgot the plea agreement (id. at 5-6). The plaintiff further contends that the victim's advocate in the case had a conflict of interest and used inappropriate pictures (id. at 6).
The plaintiff alleges that he now suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder because he did not understand what happened when he pleaded guilty and was sentenced (id.). For relief, the plaintiff seeks to have the defendant suspended from the practice of law and money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendant. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Younger Abstention
To the extent the plaintiff's allegations can be construed as asserting that his conviction and/or sentence are invalid because he did not understand the court proceedings when he pleaded guilty, the plaintiff is requesting that this court interfere with or enjoin pending state criminal prosecution against him (see generally doc. 1). As noted above, although the plaintiff has pleaded guilty and been sentenced, on February 16, 2023, he filed a motion for reconsideration, meaning that his conviction is not yet final. See Oconee County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A3710100040) (last visited March 21, 2023). Because a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this court should abstain from interfering with them. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881,903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Here, the first criterion is met, as the plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings based on his pending motion for reconsideration. As for the second criterion, the Supreme Court has stated that the “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Here, the plaintiff still has the opportunity to argue his claims in the Oconee County General Sessions Court, the South Carolina appellate courts, and by filing a postconviction relief action. As such, the plaintiff has failed to make a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm.”). Therefore, to the extent the plaintiff seeks an order from this court finding his guilty plea invalid because he did not understand the court proceedings, this court should abstain from hearing this action.
The plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief
As noted above, to the extent the plaintiff seeks relief based upon his Oconee County General Sessions Court proceedings, the court should abstain under Younger. However, in addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff's complaint is also subject to summary dismissal as outlined below.
Kayla Porter, Esquire
Ms. Porter is subject to summary dismissal because she does not act under color of state law. It is well-settled that “[a]nyone whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the state' can be sued as a state actor under § 1983.” Filarsky, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012). To determine whether state action is present, no single factor is determinative and the “totality of the circumstances” must be evaluated. See Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 341-43 (4th Cir. 2000). However, purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001).
The law is well-established that appointed defense counsel, such as Ms. Porter, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 claims because the public defender acts not on behalf of the state; rather, the public defender “is the State's adversary.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 n.13 (1981); see Mahaffey v. Sumter Cnty. Pub. Defender's Corp., C/A No. 3:06-3557-SB, 2007 WL 3001675, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2007) (“[T]he Sumter County Public Defender's Corp. did not act under color of state law and is entitled to summary dismissal.”); see also Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no state action under § 1983, even where the plaintiff's attorney was court-appointed). While “public defenders are not immune from § 1983 liability when they conspire with state officials to deprive their client of federal rights” (Figueroa v. Clark, 810 F.Supp. 613, 616 (E.D. Pa. 1992); see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984)), the plaintiff's complaint - alleging that Ms. Porter was not prepared, did not visit him in the detention center, and did not obtain a mental evaluation of him - does not plausibly allege any conspiracy between Ms. Porter and the state. As referenced above, the employment relationship between a public defender and the state is insufficient to establish that a public defender acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. Accordingly, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief against Ms. Porter and she is subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).