Bridges v. Gilbert

1,000+ Citing cases

  1. Watkins v. Kasper

    599 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2010)   Cited 400 times
    Expanding the holding of Bridges to include prisoners who are employed by the prison

    To prevail on his § 1983 claim of First Amendment retaliation, Watkins had to prove that "(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future"; and (3) a causal connection between the two. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). At issue in this case is the first requirement, that Watkins engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment.

  2. Clark v. DeWitt

    13-CV-3012 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2015)   Cited 2 times
    Explaining that the statement in Bridges is "premised upon the fact that no actionable injury was inflicted as a result of the disciplinary charge alone."

    A rational jury could also find for Defendant, but that only underscores that a jury is needed. Defendant also quotes Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 555 (7th Cir. 2009), in which the Seventh Circuit stated, "a single retaliatory disciplinary charge that is later dismissed is insufficient to serve as the basis of a § 1983 action." That statement was premised upon the fact that no actionable injury was inflicted as a result of the disciplinary charge alone.

  3. Ibarra v. City of Chicago

    816 F. Supp. 2d 541 (N.D. Ill. 2011)   Cited 59 times
    Addressing the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim alleging that he was arrested for engaging in the protected speech of reporting criminal activity (citing Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2010) (considering a claim of First Amendment retaliation by a firefighter who participated in pro-union speech and whose employment was subsequently terminated); Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2010) (addressing a claim of First Amendment retaliation by a prisoner who complained about prison conditions and allegedly suffered a series of illegitimate disciplinary actions as a result); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (considering a First Amendment retaliation claim alleging that the plaintiff, a prisoner, filed an affidavit in a lawsuit by another inmate's mother regarding a prison incident and that the prison subsequently retaliated by delaying the plaintiff's incoming and outgoing mail, harassing him in various ways, imposing unjustified disciplinary charges on him, and improperly dismissing his grievances))

    To establish a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in activity that was constitutionally protected; (2) but for the protected speech, the defendants would not have taken the same action; and (3) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter First Amendment activity in the future. Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir.2010); Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir.2010); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir.2009). A. Constitutionally Protected Activity

  4. Kuslits v. Kloth

    15-cv-413-bbc (W.D. Wis. Nov. 16, 2016)

    To prevail on his claim of First Amendment retaliation, plaintiff must prove that (1) his speech or activity in question was protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation or injury that likely would deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) there was a causal connection between the two. Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2010); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). To defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must present enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find in his favor on each of these three elements.

  5. McKinnie v. Heisz

    09-cv-188-bbc (W.D. Wis. May. 7, 2009)

    "An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right violates the Constitution."DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). Petitioner must plead three elements in order to state a claim for retaliation: he must (1) identify a constitutionally protected activity in which he was engaged; (2) identify one or more retaliatory actions taken by each respondent that would deter a person of "ordinary firmness" from engaging in the protected activity in the future; and (3) allege sufficient facts that would make it plausible to infer that petitioner's protected activity was one of the reasons respondents took the action they did against him. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 555-56 (7th Cir. 2009); Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005). Petitioner's claims for retaliation are as follows: respondents Heisz and Wolfgram retaliated against him because he reported their misconduct to their superiors; respondent Ashworth retaliated against him because he cooperated in a criminal prosecution of Evans and Essex; and respondents Heisz, Wolfgram, Ashworth, Morris, Nickel, Winslow-Stanley and Grams retaliated against him because he intended to seek legal assistance against them or others.

  6. Taylor v. Quarles

    Case No. 17 C 6094 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 24, 2020)

    To adequately plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was 'at least a motivating factor' in the Defendants' decision to take the retaliatory action." Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)). At this stage in the proceedings, Plaintiff's allegations suffice under this standard.

  7. Wysocki v. Crump

    838 F. Supp. 2d 763 (C.D. Ill. 2011)   Cited 4 times
    Granting qualified immunity where law was not clearly established such that a reasonable school principal would have known that a parent's communication with a school principal about a private matter would be entitled to First Amendment protection

    A claim of First Amendment retaliation under § 1983 involves a three-step inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff engaged in an activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) whether the plaintiff suffered an adverse act that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) whether the protected speech was “a causal connection between the two.” Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir.2010) (citing Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir.2009)); see also Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 977–80 (7th Cir.2011) (clarifying the causation issue in First Amendment cases). In the public employee context, whether an employee has a First Amendment right depends on: (1) whether the plaintiff spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and (2) if so, whether the “relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.”

  8. Whitfield v. Spiller

    76 F.4th 698 (7th Cir. 2023)   Cited 56 times
    Recognizing that "[a]t times, it is necessary to determine what exactly motivated a defendant," if that evidence sheds light on causation

    Having proffered evidence of Spiller's personal involvement, Whitfield's next hurdle is to establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. This requires a plaintiff to show that "(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was 'at least a motivating factor' in the Defendants' decision to take the retaliatory action." Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)).

  9. Johnsonn v. Dye

    3:19-cv-00444-GCS (S.D. Ill. Sep. 29, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    A successful claim for First Amendment retaliation requires that a plaintiff show, “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment Activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor' in the Defendants' decision to take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)). “Once the Plaintiff proves that an improper purpose was a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the defendant . . . to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same actions would have occurred in the absence of the protected conduct.” Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 943 (7th Cir. 2004); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996).

  10. Howard v. Radtke

    21-cv-643-pp (E.D. Wis. Jul. 19, 2023)

    To plead a retaliation claim, the plaintiff needs to allege that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the defendants' decision to take the retaliatory action.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)).