Opinion
Case No. 2:17-cv-665-BHH-MGB
03-24-2017
Michael A. Breyan, #332098, Plaintiff, v. Mental Health, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Michael A. Breyan has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining that "Mental Health" did not give him medication he wanted. (DE# 1). Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Lieber Correctional Institution located in Ridgeville, South Carolina. He is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the complaint and to submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. Upon careful review, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Complaint be summarily dismissed without prejudice , and without issuance and service of process, for the following reasons:
I. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, the Magistrate Judge has carefully reviewed this pro se prisoner complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and in light of the following precedents: Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows the court to dismiss the case upon finding that the action is "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte "at any time." Neitzke, 490 U.S. 319. The PLRA also provides for the screening of complaints "in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
With respect to a failure to state a claim, "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Unless otherwise specified, a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is presumed to be both a judgment on the merits and to be rendered with prejudice." McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2009).
This Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) (per curiam). The liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
II. The Complaint's Allegations
Plaintiff's Complaint is rather difficult to follow, as his allegations are sparse and fragmented. For example, Plaintiff indicates (verbatim): "Evil intent U.S.C.A. 1st, 8th, 14th Requesting mental health treatment and not getting it. Telling me I'm not mental health." (DE# 1 at 4, ¶ IIB). The pre-printed prisoner complaint form asks: "If the events giving rise to your claim arise outside an institution, describe where and when they arose." In response, Plaintiff indicated "all over S.C.D.C." (Id. at 5 ¶ IV(A) "Statement of the Claim"). For the date and time of events underlying his claim, Plaintiff indicates "3/12/2014." (Id. at 5, ¶ IV(C)). Records reflect that on that date, the Plaintiff was initially processed at Kirkland Correctional Institution and admitted to Perry Correctional Institution.
See http://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/inmateDetails. Online state inmate records check, site checked March 21, 2017.
However, in response to the question on the pre-printed complaint form asking the Plaintiff to name the correctional facility where he was confined at the time of the events giving rise to his claim, Plaintiff indicated "Kirkland, McCormick, Lee County, Perrey (sic), and Libra (sic)." (Id. at 8, ¶ VII). Plaintiff generally alleges that he wrote several requests for medication, but "my doctor wouldn't give me my meds. Say I'm not mental health." (Id.). Plaintiff's Complaint names as defendant a prison department ("Mental Health"). The Complaint does not identify any individual defendants, does not identify a specific location where the alleged events occurred, and does not identify or provide any copies of any grievances or other requests.
Plaintiff does not appear to have exhausted his available administrative remedies prior to bringing this suit. (DE# 1 at 8, indicating only that he complained to several unidentified persons). Inmates suing under § 1983 must exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) ("There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court."). An inmate must avail himself of every level of available administrative review in the prison grievance system. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). However, in light of Custis v. Warden, -- F.3d - (4th Cir. March 23, 2017), the apparent lack of exhaustion in the present case will not be considered on initial review.
For relief, the Plaintiff demands (verbatim): "Release from prison and Reperminded (sic) regulation cleared took off S.D. Sent to yard. Compensation." (DE# 1, ¶ VI "Relief").
III. Discussion
A. Failure to Name a Defendant Amenable to Suit Under § 1983
A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts in support of two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570).
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to name or identify any individual defendant amendable to suit. (DE# 1, ¶ IV "Statement of Claim"). Plaintiff attempts to sue "Mental Health" based on alleged events on one day -- March 12, 2014 -- although he lists numerous state prisons. (Id.). Plaintiff generally refers to "Mental Health" but does not identify any individual defendant. A plaintiff must identify the person or persons who purportedly violated his rights. The collective term ("Mental Health") does not name a proper party amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Brownlee v. Williams, Case No. 2:07-cv-78-DCN-RSC, 2007 WL 904800, *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2007) (summarily dismissing complaint against "Medical Dept. Staff Nurses" for failure to state a claim); Ferguson v. Morgan, 1991 WL 115759, *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1991) (holding that the collective term "Medical Staff" did not name a person for purposes of § 1983). Plaintiff's general allegation that unspecified defendants and/or an entire "department" violated his rights is conclusory and does not adequately state a § 1983 claim.
An online search of the South Carolina Inmate Search website reflects that after being admitted to prison on 3/12/2014, Plaintiff was transferred the following year to Lee Correctional Institution on 3/18/2015; to Broad River Correctional Institution on 12/18/2015; to Kershaw Correctional Institution on 2/25/2016; to Perry Correctional Institution on 3/9/2016, and then to Lieber Correctional Institution on 7/14/2016, where he is currently incarcerated. See http://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/inmateDetails. Site checked March 21, 2017.
For purposes of § 1983, it is well-settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Collective descriptive terms are not "persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Wells v. SCDF Employees, Case No. 2:10-cv-3011-CMC-BHH, 2011 WL 2472512 (D.S.C. May 19, 2011) (explaining that "use of the term 'medical staff or the equivalent as a name for alleged defendants, without the naming of specific staff members, is not adequate to state a claim against a 'person' as required in a § 1983 action"), adopted by 2011 WL 2463066 (D.S.C. June 21, 2011); Drummond v. Spartanburg Cty., Case No. 5:15-cv-04285-MGL-KDW, 2016 WL 1621969 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2016), adopted by 2016 WL 1596725 (D.S.C. Apr. 21, 2016) (same, dismissing case); Barnes v. Baskerville Corr. Center Med. Staff, Case No. 3:07-cv-195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D.Va. June 25, 2008) (same, summarily dismissing for failure to state a claim). The Complaint does not identify any mental health providers as defendants. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to name a proper defendant in this action, and is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
Although courts liberally construe pro se pleadings, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements against unspecified parties to state a plausible claim. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 ("A plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."). A plaintiff must affirmatively state facts indicating that a defendant acted personally in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (emphasizing that a plaintiff must plead that each "defendant, through the official's own actions, has violated the Constitution"); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (in § 1983 actions, "liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations"), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1045 (2002); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (same). When a complaint contains no personal allegations against a defendant, that defendant is properly dismissed. See, e.g., Reaves v. Richardson, Case No. 4:09-820-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 2119318, *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2011), adopted by 2011 WL 2112100 (D.S.C., May 27, 2011); Faltas v. South Carolina, Case No. 3:11-3077-TLW-SVH, 2012 WL 988105, *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 988083 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012), aff'd by 489 F.App'x 720 (4th Cir. Nov. 26, 2012).
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to identify the medical providers he actually wishes to sue and fails to allege any specific acts by any specific medical providers. Although deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is generally a cognizable type of claim, the present Complaint fails to allege facts that state a plausible claim for relief. The Complaint fails to provide specific facts, fails to identify any individual defendant, fails to allege personal acts by any individual defendant, and fails to adequately identify where the specific events allegedly occurred. For all these reasons, the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief.
B. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
In his Complaint, Plaintiff indicates that he is suing the Defendant "Mental Health" in its "individual capacity" and wants "compensation." (DE# 1 at 2, ¶ I.B). However, a department of a state agency is not an individual, and by definition, cannot be sued in any "individual capacity." In any event, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages from a department of a state agency (i.e., the South Carolina Department of Corrections), state agencies are immune from such relief under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Sovereign immunity protects the State itself, as well as its agencies, divisions, departments, officials, and other "arms of the State." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) (explaining that a suit against a state official in his official capacity is "no different from a suit against the State itself"); Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996); Jones v. SCDC, Case No. 5:12-cv-03554-RBH-KDW, 2013 WL 3880175, *4 (D.S.C. July 26, 2013) (summarily dismissing because "SCDC is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment"); Ransom v. Lawrence, Case No. 6:12-3141-JFA-KFM, 2013 WL 4523588, *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2013) ("Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983").
C. Requested Relief is Unavailable or Inappropriate
Additionally, Plaintiff asks for relief that is unavailable or inappropriate in a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint's "Request for Relief," Plaintiff asks to be released from prison. (DE# 1, ¶ VI "Relief"). Release from prison is not available as relief in a § 1983 action. The United States Supreme Court has explained that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); see also O'Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 2005) (observing that the traditional function of the writ of habeas corpus is to obtain release from illegal custody); Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806, 823 (D.S.C. 2008) (holding that release from prison is not available as a remedy in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
It is unclear what Plaintiff means when he indicates he wants "Reperminded (sic) regulation cleared took off S.D. Sent to yard." To the extent this language could be construed as a request to transfer to another facility or to challenge his security classification (in order to be assigned to a different "yard"), it is well-settled that an inmate has no constitutional right to be housed in a particular prison, at any particular custody level, or in a particular portion or unit of a prison. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-248 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-28 (1976); Montanye v. Haynes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1974). "South Carolina law confers no protected liberty interest upon inmates of SCDC from being classified, or being placed in administrative segregation, in a particular prison, or in a particular section of a prison." Jones v. SCDC, Case No. 5:12-cv-03554-RBH-KDW, 2013 WL 3880175, *3 (D.S.C. July 26, 2013) (citing Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 43-44 (D.S.C. 1992) and Meachum, 427 U.S. at 215). "Prisoners have no right under the Constitution to be held in either protective or minimum custody." Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); O'Bar v. Pinion, 953 F.2d 74, 83 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[A]dministrative segregation and reclassification ... are ... discretionary administrative acts in which an inmate obtains no liberty interest..."). The present Plaintiff appears to be requesting relief that is unavailable or inappropriate in this civil action under §1983. For all the reasons discussed above, this case is subject to summary dismissal.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Plaintiff's Complaint (DE# 1) be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE March 24, 2017
Charleston, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the Important Notice on following page:
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).