Opinion
2:24-cv-00565-BHH-MGB
03-20-2024
Michael Anthony Breyan, Plaintiff, v. Governor Henry McMaster, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Michael Anthony Breyan (“Plaintiff”) is currently confined at the Columbia Regional Care Center in Columbia, South Carolina. On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this civil action against the Governor of South Carolina, Henry McMaster (“Defendant McMaster”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff appears to bring this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, referencing the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 6.) The Complaint is entirely based on the claim that the former Vice President of the United States, Mike Pence, flew to Greenville, South Carolina in December 2020 and ordered Defendant McMaster “to pay [Plaintiff] $20 million trillzillion 550 billion katrillion.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) According to the Complaint, Plaintiff “was awarded [this] money” as part of “a civil case” involving “Kirkland R&E Center.” (Id.) The Complaint contends that while a “news channel” recorded former Vice President Pence's purported directive to Defendant McMaster (id. at 8), Plaintiff has yet to receive any money and should therefore “be paid.” (Id. at 9.) This is the extent of the Complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or “baseless” factual contentions, such as “fantastic or delusional” scenarios, may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327-28 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Plaintiff appears to bring this Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 1 at 6), which “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). However, the delusional and frivolous nature of Plaintiff's allegations undermines any sort of colorable constitutional violation, such that the undersigned is constrained to recommend summary dismissal of this case.
When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “gives courts the authority to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations” and dismiss the case “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (internal quotation marks and citations and omitted); see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a Pro se plaintiff “must meet certain minimum standards of rationality” in filing a complaint). Examples of such claims are those “describing fantastic or delusional scenarios or claims which are otherwise manifestly fanciful or so wholly irrational as to lack any basis in fact.” See Kraim v. Virginia, No. 3:21-cv-326, 2021 WL 3612305, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. July 26, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), adopted, 2021 WL 3610509 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 13, 2021).
Here, the Complaint's nonsensical demand for billions of dollars, in and of itself, is plainly irrational. See, e.g., Smith v. Jehovah's Witnesses, No. 1:22-cv-123-LMB-TCB, 2022 WL 500601, at *2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2022) (dismissing complaint as frivolous in part because plaintiff sought a “delusional amount of damages”), aff'd, No. 22-1158, 2022 WL 2915453 (4th Cir. July 25, 2022); Aderinto v. Clinton, No. 3:08-cv-1670-JFA-BM, 2008 WL 2415863, at *3-4 (D.S.C. June 11, 2008) (dismissing complaint as frivolous where plaintiff alleged that certain politicians owed him $14 billion in “restitution”). Equally fanciful are Plaintiff's allegations that the former Vice President of the United States personally, and publicly, directed the Governor of South Carolina to pay Plaintiff billions of dollars in relation to a purported lawsuit. The undersigned therefore finds that the instant action should be summarily dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 53637 (1974) (dismissing claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”); Fox v. U.S. State Dep't, No. 2:16-cv-185-RMG, 2016 WL 1046971, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 10, 2016) (dismissing case for frivolousness and failure to state a claim where complaint's allegations were “largely incoherent and [could] be described as the ‘the ramblings of a troubled mind'”) (internal citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 668 Fed.Appx. 442 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (noting that, in considering a complaint under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the reviewing court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense”).
Notwithstanding the above, it is also worth noting that the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against the State, as well as its agencies, divisions, departments, officials, and other “arms of the State.” See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (explaining that “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself”). Defendant McMaster is clearly considered an arm of the State of South Carolina for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Smith v. McMaster, No. 8:17-cv-2549-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 9286981, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2017) (finding Henry McMaster, as Governor of South Carolina, immune from § 1983 damages claim under the Eleventh Amendment). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant McMaster are also precluded under the Eleventh Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff's allegations are “so detached from reality that there is no conceivable way for [him] to cure the [C]omplaint's deficiencies through amendment.” Kraim v. Virginia, No. 3:21-cv-326, 2021 WL 3612305, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. July 26, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 3610509 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 13, 2021); see also Boyd v. United States Cent. Intel. Agency, No. 7:21-cv-1133-BHH-JDA, 2021 WL 2482415, at *5 (D.S.C. May 26, 2021) (finding that it would be futile to allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint “given the preposterous and frivolous nature” of the allegations), adopted, 2021 WL 2477170 (D.S.C. June 17, 2021).
Consequently, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this action be summarily dismissed without further leave to amend. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 796 (4th Cir. 2022).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).