Opinion
3:23-CV-866-TLS-AZ
12-20-2024
JARELL J. BREWER, Plaintiff, v. LEWIS, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, JUDGE
Jarell J. Brewer, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 72. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Brewer alleges that, on July 2, 2023, Sgt. Hudson sprayed him with mace following an incident between them regarding access to a working phone. He admits he verbally threatened Sgt. Hudson but indicates that he was locked in his cell and posed no immediate threat to Sgt. Hudson.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment-including the application of excessive force-against prisoners convicted of crimes. McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2019). The “core requirement” of an excessive force claim is that the defendant “used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Deference is given to prison officials when the use of force involves security measures taken to quell a disturbance because “significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff” can be involved. McCottrell, 933 F.3d at 663 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)). Prisons are dangerous places, and security officials are tasked with the difficult job of preserving order and discipline among inmates. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 476 (7th Cir. 2009). To compel compliance-especially in situations in which officers or other inmates are faced with threats, disruption, or aggression-the use of summary physical force is often warranted. Id. at 477 (citing Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1993)). Several factors guide the inquiry of whether an officer's use of force was legitimate or malicious, including the need for an application of force, the threat posed to the safety of staff and inmates, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Hendrickson, 589 F.3d at 890 . While further factual development may demonstrate the force used was reasonable, giving Brewer the benefit of all favorable inferences, the Court will allow him to proceed on an excessive force claim against Sgt. Hudson.
Brewer further alleges with respect to the July 2, 2023, incident that Sgt. Hudson left the area while Brewer was talking to other officers, went to his cell, broke his TV and tablet, and threw away $40 in personal hygiene products. Brewer indicates he cannot state a tort claim because he does not have the broken TV or tablet. This Court's previous order [ECF No. 9] explained that the Fourteenth Amendment provides that state officials shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” But, a state tort claims act that provides a method by which a person can seek reimbursement for the negligent loss or intentional depravation of property meets the requirements of the due process clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“For intentional, as and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy.”). Indiana's tort claims act (Ind. Code § 34-13-3-1 et seq.) and other laws provide for state judicial review of property losses caused by government employees, and they provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy to redress state officials' accidental or intentional deprivation of a person's property. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more process was due.”). The Indiana Tort Claims Act offered Brewer a process for resolving his dispute that satisfied the Due Process Clause. That the process did not resolve (or would not have resolved) Brewer's dispute in his favor does not render it unavailable. Brewer had an adequate state law remedy, and he cannot proceed on a due process claim for his loss of property here.
Next, Brewer alleges that he was denied meals by Lt. Lewis on July 8, 2023, Lt. Wolford on July 9, 2023, and Sgt. Stone on July 14, 2023. ECF No. 72 at 2-3. He does not indicate which meals he was denied on those days. Later in his amended complaint, Brewer invites the court to look back at his earlier complaint where he made similar allegations and states “[i]f I said on the date of (example) 8-1-23 and 8-6-23 I was refuse[d] lunch and dinner by Sgt. Lewis, that's 2 meals I missed!” Id. The court has explained to Brewer that the amended complaint must be complete in and of itself. ECF No. 42; ECF No. 51. “[W]hen a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the new complaint supersedes all previous complaints and controls the case from that point forward . . . [b]ecause a plaintiff's new complaint wipes away prior pleadings.” Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). This court will not cross-reference Brewer's earlier complaint to locate facts that Brewer did not include in his amended complaint. However, to the extent Brewer is alleging that Sgt. Lewis denied him lunch and dinner on August 1, 2023, and August 6, 2023, those allegations will be considered by the court.
In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong asks whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” so that “a prison official's [act results] in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Id. (cleaned up). The subjective prong asks whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent. Id. “[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Objectively, “[t]here is, of course a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992). Inmates are entitled to adequate food. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009). There are, however, many reasons why people, inmates and free citizens alike, will occasionally miss meals. In Morris v. Kingston, 368 Fed.Appx. 686 (7th Cir. 2010), the Seventh Circuit considered a case where an inmate involuntarily missed 17 meals over 23 days. The court explained:
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must show that he has been severely harmed and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006). This requires that prison officials knew about a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and refused to act to prevent that harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008). Mere negligence-even gross negligence-does not violate the Constitution. Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008).Id. at 688-89. The court concluded that the plaintiff in that case had not “establish[ed] a constitutional violation because he has not shown that missing his meals or medicine caused serious harm or lasting detriment.” Id. at 689 (citing Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 547 (7th does not indicate how many meals in total were missed. Even if he missed two meals on each of the days listed in the amended complaint, that is ten missed meals over approximately a month, and he has not indicated how he was harmed by the missed meals. It cannot be plausibly inferred from the allegations in Brewer's amended complaint that being provided less than three meals a day for a handful of days deprived him of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.
On August 1, 2023, O.F.C. Peaks beat up Brewer while he was in handcuffs, while Lt. Wolford watched. “[O]fficers who have a realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow officer from violating a plaintiff's rights through the use of excessive force but fail to do so” may be held liable. Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)). Giving Brewer the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage of the case, he may proceed against Sgt. Wolford. O.F.C. Peaks, however, is not listed as a defendant in the Amended Complaint.
For these reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS Jarell J. Brewer leave to proceed against Sgt. Hudson in her individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for using excessive force against him on July 2, 2023, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(2) GRANTS Jarell J. Brewer leave to proceed against Sgt. Wolford in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for failing to intervene in Sgt. Peaks' use of excessive force on August 1, 2023, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(3) DISMISSES all other claims;
(4) DISMISSES Sgt. Lewis and Sgt. Stone;
(5) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to locate and serve process on) Sgt. Hudson at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a copy of this order and the amended complaint;
(6) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name, date of birth, and last known home address of Sgt. Hudson, if she does not waive service if it has such information; and
(7) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Sgt. Hudson and Sgt. Wolford to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED.