Opinion
NO. 2013-CA-000858-MR
04-18-2014
CLINTON BREWER-EL APPELLANT v. GARY BECKSTROM; SARA POTTER; AND JOHN DUNN APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Clinton Brewer-EL, Pro Se West Liberty, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Angela T. Dunham Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 13-CI-00083
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
BEFORE: JONES, MAZE, AND MOORE, JUDGES. JONES, JUDGE: The Appellant, Clinton Brewer-EL, appeals the Franklin Circuit Court's order dismissing his writ of mandamus. For the reasons more fully explained below, we vacate the dismissal order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Appellant is currently incarcerated at the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex (EKCC). In 2013, he filed various administrative grievances at EKCC under the name "Clinton Brewer-EL." EKCC prison officials rejected the grievances because Appellant appended the "EL" suffix to his last name. The rejections informed Appellant that the prison would not "accept or process a grievance with 'EL'" after an inmate's last name unless the inmate had a "court ordered name change" on file with the prison. Since Appellant had no such order on file, the EKCC officials instructed Appellant to resubmit his grievances without the "EL" suffix.
Instead of resubmitting the prior grievances without the suffix, Appellant filed a new grievance complaining that the prison's policy and rejection of his prior grievances violated his right to freely practice his religion under the First Amendment. The prison also rejected this grievance on the basis that Appellant appended the "EL" suffix to his last name.
According to Appellant, he is part of the Moorish Science Temple of America, which dictates the use of the suffixes "EL or Bey" and forbids members from going to court to change their names accordingly. Appellant submitted documentation to substantiate his allegations in this regard.
Appellant then filed a writ of mandamus with the Franklin Circuit Court. He argued that the prison's policy violated his right to freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment. On April 2, 2013, the Kentucky Department of Corrections ("KDOC") moved the circuit court to dismiss Appellant's action for failure to comply with KRS 454.415(2)-(3), which requires prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies and to provide proof of exhaustion prior to seeking redress from the courts. On April 10, 2013, before Appellant's response time elapsed, the circuit court entered an order summarily dismissing the case. The order states:
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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This matter is before the Court on motion of the Respondents to dismiss the Writ of Mandamus; and the Court having reviewed this matter, and being otherwise sufficiently advised; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED. This is a final and appealable order.
This appeal followed.
II.
The circuit court did not issue any written findings regarding the reason for its dismissal. The circuit court's failure to do so violates KRS 454.415(5), which states: "[a] Court which dismisses a civil action brought by an inmate for the reasons set out in this section [failure to exhaust administrative remedies] shall include as part of its order specific findings as to the reasons for the dismissal." (emphasis added).
It is abundantly clear to us from a review of the record that the circuit court dismissed the Appellant's claim for failure to demonstrate exhaustion of his administrative remedies. However, the order itself is not abundantly clear. It does not cite the statute or even contain the word "exhaustion" in its text.
In a case such as this, it is tempting to excuse the circuit court's failure to comply with the technical requirements of the statute. However, we must respect the General Assembly's entire statutory scheme. The General Assembly explicitly included the mandatory requirement that any court dismissing an action by an inmate for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies "shall include as part of its order specific findings as to the reasons for the dismissal." To affirm simply because the underlying record supports the circuit court's deficient order would be to create an exception by judicial fiat.
The General Assembly's statute is plain and unambiguous in its requirement of specific findings. No exceptions can be found or inferred from the statute. The circuit court did not include any such findings in its order. As such, we must remand this matter to the circuit court for entry of an order that complies with KRS 454.415(5). See Keifer v. Keifer, 354 S.W.3d 123, 124 (Ky. 2011). In compliance with this mandate, the circuit court need not reevaluate its ultimate conclusion. It merely needs to include a short and plain statement indicating that it reviewed the Appellant's claim and found that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial redress.
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the dismissal order and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MAZE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MOORE, JUDGE, DISSENTS. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Clinton Brewer-EL, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Angela T. Dunham
Frankfort, Kentucky