Opinion
2018–10243 Index No.8377/15
03-04-2020
Anna BRENNAN, Respondent, v. Samuel GORMLEY, et al., Appellants.
Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Nathan Shapiro of counsel), for appellants. Schonberg Law Offices of the Hudson Valley, P.C., Central Valley, N.Y. (Susan R. Nudelman and Ryan Fagen of counsel), for respondent.
Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Nathan Shapiro of counsel), for appellants.
Schonberg Law Offices of the Hudson Valley, P.C., Central Valley, N.Y. (Susan R. Nudelman and Ryan Fagen of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she fell while descending the stairway in front of the defendants' home. The plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against the defendants, alleging that she fell because the bottom-most step of the stairway was obscured by leaves. Following the liability portion of a bifurcated trial, the jury found that the defendants were negligent, and that their negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident. On the issue of the plaintiff's comparative fault, the jury found that the plaintiff was negligent, but that her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident. Following the damages portion of the bifurcated trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $400,000 for past pain and suffering, and $200,000 for future pain and suffering over a period of 16 years.
The defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict on the issue of liability and for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict on the issue of liability as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial or, in the alternative, to set aside, as excessive, the verdict on the issue of damages. By order dated March 14, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion. A judgment was thereafter entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in the principal sum of $600,000. The defendants appeal.
For a court to conclude as a matter of law that a jury verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, "[i]t is necessary to first conclude that there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [persons] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial" ( Cohen v. Hallmark Cards , 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145 ). A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless it could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets , 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163 ).
Contrary to the defendants' contention, a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences support the jury's determination that the defendants were negligent, and that their negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident (see Cohen v. Hallmark Cards , 45 N.Y.2d at 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145 ). The plaintiff's testimony sufficiently identified the condition that caused her to fall (see Wallace v. City of New York , 108 A.D.3d 760, 761, 970 N.Y.S.2d 237 ). The evidence at trial failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the condition at issue was both open and obvious and not inherently dangerous (see Bissett v. 30 Merrick Plaza, LLC , 156 A.D.3d 751, 751–752, 67 N.Y.S.3d 268 ; Pellegrino v. Trapasso , 114 A.D.3d 917, 918, 980 N.Y.S.2d 813 ). Moreover, the jury's determination with respect to the defendants' liability was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets , 86 N.Y.2d at 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163 ).
Further, the jury's determination that the plaintiff was negligent, but that her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident, was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. "A jury's finding that a party was at fault but that such fault was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause" ( Garrett v. Manaser , 8 A.D.3d 616, 617, 779 N.Y.S.2d 565 ; see Moffett–Knox v. Anthony's Windows on the Lake, Inc. , 126 A.D.3d 768, 768–769, 5 N.Y.S.3d 486 ). Here, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the plaintiff was negligent in choosing to descend the stairway despite the presence of leaves, but that her negligence merely furnished the occasion for the accident (see Peters v. Wallis , 135 A.D.3d 922, 923, 24 N.Y.S.3d 178 ; PJI 2:70 ; cf. Karsdon v. Barringer , 20 A.D.3d 551, 553, 799 N.Y.S.2d 548 ). Accordingly, the jury's determination that the plaintiff's conduct was not a substantial factor in causing the accident was not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
"The amount of damages to be awarded to a plaintiff for personal injuries is a question for the jury, and its determination will not be disturbed unless the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" ( Graves v. New York City Tr. Auth. , 81 A.D.3d 589, 589, 916 N.Y.S.2d 793 ; see CPLR 5501[c] ). Here, considering the nature and the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, the jury's verdict on the issue of damages did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501[c] ; Victor v. New York City Tr. Auth. , 112 A.D.3d 523, 524, 976 N.Y.S.2d 663 ; Alfonso v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth. , 103 A.D.3d 563, 564, 962 N.Y.S.2d 69 ; Kouho v. Trump Vil. Section 4, Inc. , 93 A.D.3d 761, 762–763, 941 N.Y.S.2d 186 ; Karwacki v. Astoria Med. Anesthesia Assoc., P.C. , 23 A.D.3d 438, 439, 808 N.Y.S.2d 123 ; Perkins v. McAlonen , 289 A.D.2d 914, 914–915, 735 N.Y.S.2d 634 ; Kahl v. MHZ Operating Corp. , 270 A.D.2d 623, 623–624, 703 N.Y.S.2d 842 ; Dooknah v. Thompson , 249 A.D.2d 260, 261, 670 N.Y.S.2d 919 ).
Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination denying that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404(a).
BALKIN, J.P., HINDS–RADIX, CONNOLLY and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.