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granting motions made pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(f) explaining, "Within her factual averments, from paragraph twenty-four to paragraph one hundred five, Plaintiff explains, often through multiple paragraphs, the significance of more than forty dates in 2001. Such exactitude in pleading is unnecessary and unfairly cumbersome"
Summary of this case from Wallace v. Federal Employees of U.S. District CourtOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-4688
January 28, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, Barbara A. Brejcak, is the appointed Administratrix of the Estate of Virginia Margaret Brejcak. This is a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and arises out of a series of incidents in which the plaintiff's decedent was allegedly denied proper, appropriate, and necessary medical and psychiatric care by the defendants at the Bucks County Correctional Facility ("BCCF"), allegedly resulting in persistent and invasive infection, seizures, and her eventual death. Virginia Brejcak died on December 26, 2001.
Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on November 12, 2003. It alleges that the official policies, practices, and customs of the County of Bucks and Commissioners Michael Fitzpatrick, Charles Martin, and Sandra Miller were either non-existent on certain issues and/or defective for others. Additionally, the Amended Complaint alleges that all defendants failed to treat Virginia Brejcak properly in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; that a special relationship existed between Virginia Brejcak and the defendants by virtue of her incarceration at BCCF, and that defendants breached their affirmative duty to protect the health and safety of Virginia Brejcak given the special relationship then existing; that Virginia Brejcak's injuries, harm, and death were the result of a state-created danger; and that the defendants, individual defendants, and agents of the defendants were not properly and reasonably trained with respect to recognizing, reporting, and responding to inmates' complaints of medical problems and psychiatric needs. Lastly, the Amended Complaint alleges that certain defendants — Diamond Pharmacy Services, Diamond Drugs, Inc., Lewis J. Brandt, M.D., Dr. David Davis, and the County of Bucks — prescribed for and dispensed to Virginia Brejcak decongestant medication containing the ingredient Phenylpropanolamine ("PPA"), which was the subject of the United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") Public Health Advisory on November 6, 2000, one year prior to its prescription for and dispensation to Virginia Brejcak, due to significant concerns about the safety of PPA due to its high risk of hemorrhagic stroke in women.
Presently before the Court are two Motions to Strike the Amended Complaint under Rules 8 and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On December 1, 2003, defendants County of Bucks; Michael Fitzpatrick, Charles Martin, and Sandra Miller in their official capacities; Gordian Ehrlacher; Lewis Polk, M.D.; Joan Crowe, R.N.; Harris Gubernick; Willis Morton; and J. Alien Nesbitt filed a Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Docket No. 15). On January 15, 2004, defendants Diamond Drugs, Inc. and Diamond Pharmacy Services filed a Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(f) (Docket No. 29). For the reasons which follow, both Motions will be granted.
Peripheral to these two Motions to Strike the Amended Complaint are two Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint also currently pending. On November 26, 2003, defendants Michael Fitzpatrick, Charles Martin, and Sandra Miller filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Docket No. 14). On January 15, 2004, defendant Lewis J. Brandt filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Docket No. 28). For the reasons which follow, these Motions will be denied as moot.
I. Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Further, the Rules provide that "the court may order stricken from any pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). A plaintiff is limited to a "short and plain statement" in order to
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms amended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified "notice pleading" is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.Burks v. City of Philadelphia, 904 F. Supp. 421, 423-24 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). At issue in the instant case is whether this Court should strike Plaintiff's forty-five (45) page, two hundred and sixteen (216) paragraph Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(f).
II. Discussion
Plaintiff has submitted an Amended Complaint that details seven counts against combinations of the fourteen defendants against whom she brings suit, seven of whom Plaintiff sues individually and in their official capacities. As stated above, Plaintiff's tome spans two hundred and sixteen paragraphs over forty-five pages. While this Court understands that Plaintiff needs certain liberties in order to present a "short and plain statement" of her multiple claims against multiple defendants, this Court concludes that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint runs afoul of the letter and spirit of the Federal Rules.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is not as confused or ambiguous as those pleadings stricken in the cases cited by the defendants; nor is the Amended Complaint as straightforward as Plaintiff represents. In defense of Plaintiff's submission, it does not "improperly and amateurishly repeat, more than a dozen times, [its] bald allegation[s]." Burks, 904 F. Supp. at 424. Nor are its contents necessarily "scandalous" or "impertinent." Drysdale v. Woerth, No. 98-3090, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18589, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1998). Notwithstanding, review of the substance of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint reveals that Plaintiff meticulously, but with unnecessary detail, recounted the factual background that underpins her claims.
Plaintiff excessively recites apparently each and every encounter Virginia Brejcak had with the BCCF medical staff and personnel during her incarceration. Within her factual averments, from paragraph twenty-four to paragraph one hundred five, Plaintiff explains, often through multiple paragraphs, the significance of more than forty dates in 2001. Such exactitude in pleading is unnecessary and unfairly cumbersome. See, e.g., Drysdale, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18589, at *7 (dismissing a prolix complaint that "describe[d] in unnecessary and burdensome detail every instance of Defendants' alleged misconduct"); Burks, 904 F. Supp. at 424 (dismissing a fact-laden complaint that "describe[d] in unnecessary, burdensome, and often improper argumentative detail, every instance of alleged racial discrimination perpetrated by Defendants over the period of 1993 and 1994").
Plaintiff relies heavily on Martin v. Warrington, No. 01-1178, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3502 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2002), to support her contention that her Amended Complaint is unambiguous enough to defeat the defendants' Motions. Martin is facially helpful to Plaintiff's efforts, especially with its advice that "the exercise of this [Rule 12(f)] power should be reserved for a pleading which is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised." 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3502, at *8: see also Miller v. Group Voyagers. Inc., 912 F. Supp. 164, 168 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("While courts possess considerable discretion in weighing Rule 12(f) motions, such motions are not favored and will generally be denied unless the material bears no possible relation to the matter at issue and may result in prejudice to the moving party.") Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is not objectionable because of any disguised substance; rather, its deficiency is its guileless recitation of all potentially relevant facts. Martin notes that "[w]here pleadings are laden with unnecessary factual narrative, courts have stricken them." 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3502, at *9. Lastly, the Court is not convinced that Martin is factually analogous because, while the opinion is not entirely clear regarding the length of the complaint, it seems that the complaint in Martin was merely thirteen pages and might not have exceeded thirty-one paragraphs. Id. at *8. While there is no precise algorithm that answers at what length a complaint becomes objectionable, it is reasonable to conclude that 216 separate paragraphs are excessive under notice pleading, which the Federal Rules require.
Some, if not most, of Plaintiffs factual averments constitute evidence, the pleading of which the Federal Rules discourage. Drvsdale, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18589, at *8. Plaintiff argues that most of her averments come directly, if not verbatim, from the medical records and inmate request forms produced and maintained by the defendants during Virginia Brejcak's incarceration. (Pl's Reply Br. at 3.) Plaintiff also argues that she provided opposing counsel with copies of those relevant documents. (Id.) There is undoubtedly some litigation strategy at play in the early stages of this case. Plaintiff probably wants the defendants to admit the contents of medical records, etc., and the defendants are reluctant to do so lest such admissions be read to the jury at trial. This Court will not accelerate the function of discovery to the pleading stages, and require the defendants to respond to the umpteen factual averments contained within the Amended Complaint. The Federal Rules, such as Requests for Admission, allow litigants to buttress their notice pleading claims and defenses through the liberal discovery process.
A "short and plain statement" of Plaintiffs' claims is all that is both expected and required as the case moves into the discovery stage because the rules allow the parties, through the discovery process, to obtain the necessary details to support their claim or defense, whether that is in the form of oral depositions under Rules 30 and 31, written discovery under Rules 33 and 36, or document discovery under Rule 34. The limits of these rights are governed by Rule 26. To shift the factual emphasis from this discovery stage back to the pleading stage distorts both the purpose and the function of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the administration of this civil case. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[These rules] shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.").Burks, 904 F. Supp. at 424 (emphasis added).
III. Other Pending Motions to Dismiss
Defendants Fitzpatrick, Martin, and Miller have also moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Plaintiffs personal capacity/individual liability claims are insufficient as a matter of law. The Court has reviewed the Memoranda filed on this issue, but does not specifically rule on the issue at this time. Assuming that Plaintiff will file a second amended complaint, as required in response to the other pending motions, the Court believes that the Plaintiff should plead with particularity any allegations against these individual defendants, and incorporate within the pleadings any specific allegation as to whether the individual defendants knew, or why the individual defendants should have known, of certain acts or omissions which form the basis of Plaintiff's theory of liability. Thus, as to this aspect of the case, the Court believes that specific allegations, rather than notice pleading, are desirable. Plaintiff should also make the allegations specific as to why these defendants would have individual liability over and above the liability of Bucks County itself.
As to the Motion of Defendant Lewis Brandt to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, that Motion will also be denied as moot in view of the Court anticipating a second amended complaint. Assuming Plaintiff will file a second amended complaint, the Court requests Plaintiff to consider including allegations that Defendant Brandt asserts are insufficiently plead at the present time. However, the Court will not rule on the merits of defendant Brandt's Motion.
IV. Conclusion
The Court believes that Plaintiff acting on the above discussion should propel this case out of the pleading stage and into discovery. The Court believes that Plaintiff is entitled to pursue discovery on her theories of liability. All parties will be able to file dispositive motions once discovery is complete. For the reasons set forth above, the defendants' Motions to Strike the Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be granted. In light of this Memorandum, the Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint will be denied as moot.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of January, 2004, upon consideration of the Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by defendants County of Bucks; Michael Fitzpatrick, Charles Martin, and Sandra Miller in their official capacities; Gordian Ehrlacher; Lewis Polk, M.D.; Joan Crowe, R.N.; Harris Gubernick; Willis Morton; and J. Alien Nesbitt (Docket No. 15), it is hereby ORDERED that said motion is GRANTED. Furthermore, upon consideration of the Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(f) filed by defendants Diamond Drugs, Inc. and Diamond Pharmacy Services (Docket No. 29), it is hereby ORDERED that said motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is STRICKEN, and she may file a second amended complaint that conforms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, and upon failure to so plead, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed.
In light of this Order, the Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Defendants Fitzpatrick, Martin, and Miller, Docket No. 14; Defendant Brandt, Docket No. 28) are DENIED AS MOOT.