Opinion
December 7, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff Roderick Breem, a 15-year-old infant, was injured when he entered an electric substation owned by the defendant Long Island Lighting Company (hereinafter LILCO). The infant plaintiff scaled the chain-link fence which surrounded the locked substation and climbed over barbed wire in order to gain entry. Once inside, he climbed upon a transformer platform and was thereafter injured when he came in contact with a 13, 000-volt power line.
The plaintiff's commenced the instant action against LILCO, alleging that it was negligent in failing to prevent admittance to the area by not affording adequate fences, lighting, and warning signs. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. We affirm.
A landowner owes a duty "to exercise reasonable care in maintaining his property in a safe condition under all of the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the potential injuries, the burden of avoiding the risk, and the foreseeability of a potential plaintiff's presence on the property" ( Kurshals v. Connetquot Cent. School Dist., 227 A.D.2d 593; see, Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241; Laluna v. DGM Partners, 234 A.D.2d 519, 520; Watson v. Hillside Hous. Corp., 232 A.D.2d 252, 253). Encompassed within this duty is the duty to warn of dangerous conditions existing on the property ( Ackermann v. Town of Fishkill, 201 A.D.2d 441, 443; Rowell v. Town of Hempstead, 186 A.D.2d 553, 554). Landowners are not, however, required to warn of those dangerous conditions that can be readily observed by the reasonable use of one's senses ( see, Rowell v. Town of Hempstead, supra, at 553; Cimino v. Town of Hempstead, 110 A.D.2d 805, 806, affd 66 N.Y.2d 709; Binensztok v. Marshall Stores, 228 A.D.2d 534, 535; Ackermann v. Town of Fishkill, supra).
Here, the danger existing in the substation was obvious to one through the reasonable use of his or her senses. There were fences, barbed wire, a lock, and warning signs which sufficed to give notice of the danger ( see, Laluna v. DGM Partners, supra). Moreover, the infant plaintiff was well acquainted with the area and knew that "there were electrical wires inside the substation ( see, Rowell v. Town of Hempstead, supra). Therefore, the defendant had no duty to warn, but, in any event, did so reasonably.
Furthermore, the "proximate cause of [the plaintiff's injury] was his own willful behavior in engaging in hazardous * * * conduct, and compensation should not be granted in such circumstances" ( Tillmon v. New York City Hous. Auth., 203 A.D.2d 19, 20; see, Rice v. New York City Hous. Auth., 239 A.D.2d 400). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Sullivan, J. P., Krausman, Goldstein and Luciano, JJ., concur.