Opinion
No. ED108971
02-16-2021
DUSTIN M. BRAY, Appellant, v. TONY Y. LEE, JAMIE S. FUHRMAN, and CHRISTOPHER A. GOHLKE, Respondents.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis
1822-CC00911 Honorable Joan M. Moriarty Angela T. Quigless, P.J., Kurt S. Odenwald, J., and James M. Dowd, J.
Introduction
Appellant Dustin M. Bray appeals the trial court's summary judgment against him on the basis that he lacked standing to recover for the January 2018 property damage to the rented residence located at 6169 Westminster Place in the City of St. Louis allegedly committed by tenants Tony Y. Lee, Jamie S. Fuhrman, and Christopher A. Gohlke, who are the Respondents here. Respondents' motions for summary judgment asserted as a matter of undisputed fact that Bray was not the owner of, and had no legally protectable interest in, the Westminster property and therefore could not recover for damages because he lacked standing.
We affirm the trial court's conclusion with respect to Bray's lack of standing. However, we reverse the summary judgment and remand for the entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice due to Bray's lack of standing because the trial court lacked the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to enter a judgment on the merits.
Background
This case arises from damages that Bray claims occurred to the Westminster property when Respondents, who were college students at nearby Washington University, left the property to return home for Christmas break and lowered the thermostat which Bray claims allowed the water lines to freeze and burst in January 2018, causing extensive damage to the property. On May 4, 2018, Bray filed his petition for property damages in which he alleged he was the owner of the property and therefore had suffered the damages and could seek recovery.
On January 9, 2019, Respondents each filed an answer to Bray's petition in which they asserted that Bray was not the real party in interest and lacked standing to maintain and prosecute this action because he was not the record owner of the Westminster property. In addition to Bray's lack of standing, Respondents also asserted that Bray failed to join the actual owners who were necessary parties, and that Bray should be judicially estopped as he had taken the position in other litigation that others owned the subject property. Finding that Bray lacked the requisite standing to recover on his claims, the trial court granted the Respondents' motions for summary judgment on February 4, 2020, and dismissed the case with prejudice against Bray. This appeal follows.
Bray raises three points on appeal. First, he claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against him as it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter such a judgment in light of its finding that Bray had no standing. Second, Bray claims that the trial court erred in finding that he lacked a legally protectable interested in the property and therefore lacked standing to collect damages because he claims he established at least as a matter of disputed fact that he was the fifty-percent owner and property manager, that he serviced the property, and that he collected rents as the acting landlord. And finally, Bray claims that the trial court erred in not granting his request to amend his petition to join purported owners Kimberly Sexton and Equity Trust Company FBO #79987 as necessary parties.
Because our disposition of the first point regarding standing is dispositive, we need not address Bray's second and third points.
Standard of Review
1. Standing.
Standing is a question of law that we review de novo. St. Louis Ass'n of Realtors v. City of Ferguson, 354 S.W.3d 620, 622-23 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Ste. Genevieve Sch. Dist. R-II v. Bd. of Alderman of the City of Ste. Genevieve, 66 S.W.3d 6, 10 (Mo. banc 2002)). Standing is the antecedent to relief, and the party seeking relief bears the burden of establishing standing. Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Mo. banc 2011). To assert standing successfully, a plaintiff must have a legally protectable interest, even if that interest is attenuated, slight, or remote. St. Louis Ass'n of Realtors, 354 S.W.3d at 622 (citing Comm. for Educ. Equality v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Mo. banc 2009)).
2. Subject matter jurisdiction.
If a plaintiff lacks standing, then their petition is subject to dismissal because it failed to establish the requisite subject matter jurisdiction. Borges v. Missouri Public Entity Risk Management Fund, 358 S.W.3d 177, 183 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). As a result, a trial court lacking subject matter jurisdiction cannot enter a judgment on the merits. Id. Summary judgment is inherently a merits-based disposition of a case. Id. Therefore, a motion for summary judgment claiming that a party lacks standing has generally been treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 55.27(a)(1). Id. In cases where a trial court dismisses a claim for lacking of standing via entry of summary judgment, the appellate remedy is (1) to affirm the trial court's conclusions with respect to standing, and (2) to then resolve the issues presented as the trial court should have, dismissing the claims of the party with deficient standing without prejudice. Borges, 358 S.W.3d at 179, 183-84; see also Klenc v. John Beal, Inc., 484 S.W.3d 351 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015).
Discussion
Whether Bray has standing to prosecute these claims against Respondents depends on whether he can prove that he had an ownership interest, or some other legally protectable interest in the Westminster property either at the time the damages occurred or at the time he commenced this action. Therefore, to meet his burden of proof to show he had the requisite standing to prosecute his claims, Bray must show that he was the real owner of, or had some other legally protectable interest in, the Westminster property in January 2018, when the damages were allegedly sustained or, at the commencement of this litigation in May 2018. He has failed to do so.
A party seeking judicial relief with respect to property must have a valid interest in the property at issue. Continental Coal v. MO Land Reclamation, 150 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). In cases where the injury pertains to real property, the right of action, or standing, is in the present owner alone, and not in any subsequent purchaser or successor in title. Id.
The trial court reached the correct conclusion on this record that Bray lacked standing because he failed to produce any evidence that he had an ownership interest of any kind in this property. Bray certainly failed to establish that he possessed any written instrument conveying an interest in real estate and recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds in the jurisdiction where the real property at issue is located pursuant to § 442.380 . RSMo § 442.380; see also RSMo § 442.390, § 442.400.
All statutory references are to RSMo 2018 unless otherwise stated.
Instead, Bray presented to the trial court a potpourri of pleadings and litigations involving the Westminster property, none of which demonstrated that Bray was the owner. By way of example, one matter Bray relied on was a quiet title action filed six months after he filed this action in May 2018, and eleven months after the damage to the Westminster property allegedly occurred. See Continental Coal, 150 S.W.3d at 381 ("If a plaintiff at the time of commencing an action has no valid and subsisting title or right to the subject thereof, the plaintiff's subsequent acquisition, or perfection, of a right or title to the subject of the action during the pendency thereof will not remedy the defect so as to enable the plaintiff to maintain the action.") More importantly, this quiet title matter is still pending and therefore has not judicially established that Bray is, or at any time was, an owner of the Westminster property.
Accordingly, we find that Bray has no ownership or other legally protectable interest in the Westminster property and, as a result, has not met his burden of proof to establish standing. Point one is denied, and we need not address Bray's other two points on appeal.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that Bray lacked standing. However, we reverse the summary judgment that resulted in the dismissal of the petition with prejudice and remand for the entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice.
/s/_________
James M. Dowd, Judge Angela T. Quigless, P.J., and Kurt S. Odenwald, J., concur.