Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-1106-HMH-JDA
04-19-2022
Michael T. Braxton, Plaintiff, v. Joette Scarborough, A. Boyd, C. York, Donnie Stonebreaker, Mrs./Ms. Freeman, Ms. Hendrix, Bryan P. Stirling, Mr. Michael Stobbe, Lettie Jacobs, Mrs./Ms. Baker/Price, Teresa S. Player, George M. Ducworth, Mr. Gerald Black, Don A. Thompson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Michael T. Braxton (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the above-named Defendants violated his constitutional rights. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Anderson County Detention Center pursuant to a petition filed under the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVP”) at case number 2020-cp-04-01330 in the Anderson County Court of Common Pleas. A jury trial is scheduled to begin in that case before the Honorable R. Keith Kelly on April 25, 2022.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the pending SVP action against Petitioner in the Anderson County Court of Common Pleas at case number 2020-cp-04-01330, see Anderson County Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Anderson/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number “2020cp0401330”) (last visited Apr. 7, 2022), as well as Petitioner's prior actions filed in this Court and other actions previously filed or currently pending in the state court. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
By way of background, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's prior actions filed in this Court and in the state court. In 2017, Petitioner filed an action in the South Carolina Administrative Law Court at case number 2017ALJ040154AP, appealing the decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) regarding Petitioner's sentence calculation. Petitioner filed an appeal from the Administrative Law Court's decision to affirm SCDC's calculation in the South Carolina Court of Appeals at case number 2017-001964. See Braxton v. SCDC, No. 2017-001964 (S.C. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2017), available at https://ctrack.sccourts.org/public/caseSearch.do;jsessionid=08E2AE44AEEB4E476 BC6A4F555717E6C (search by appellate case no. 2017-001964) (last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
Next, in April 2018, Plaintiff filed an action in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 making nearly identical allegations against six of the Defendants named in this action: Boyd, York, Stonebreaker, Scarborough, Freeman, and Hendrix. See Braxton v. Boyd, No. 8:18-cv-00959-HMH-JDA (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 2018) (“Braxton I”). That action was summarily dismissed on May 7, 2018. See Braxton I, Doc. 15 (adopting Report and Recommendation at Doc. 10).
Then, in September 2020, Plaintiff filed an action in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking habeas relief based on the same allegations made in the present action. See Braxton v. Warden of Kershaw Correctional Institution, No. 8:20-cv-03168-HMH-JDA (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (“Braxton II”). That action was dismissed on February 11, 2021, after the Court granted the Respondent's motion for summary judgment. Braxton II, Doc. 31 (adopting Report and Recommendation at Doc. 21).
Finally, Plaintiff filed an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in the Anderson County Court of Common Pleas on February 17, 2021, at case number 2021-cp-04-00320. See Braxton v. South Carolina, No. 2021-cp-04-00320, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Anderson/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number “2021cp0400320”) (last visited Apr. 7, 2022). In that action, Petitioner made allegations nearly identical to those made in the present action. Id. The PCR Court entered an order of dismissal in that case on November 23, 2021, and the South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal on February 3, 2022. Id.
In each of the cases noted above, Petitioner presented nearly identical allegations related to the calculation of his sentence imposed after he pled guilty in 1983 to criminal sexual conduct. The present action contains the same allegations and claims as in his prior cases. Much of the factual background relevant to this case was described by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Braxton v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, which this Court previously quoted in Braxton II:
On November 17, 1983, [Plaintiff] was sentenced to thirty years' incarceration after pleading guilty to first degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC). [Plaintiff] served ten years and four months of his sentence, and on March 31, 1994, he was conditionally released to the state of Tennessee on parole. On April 16, 1996, while on parole in Tennessee, [Plaintiff] was arrested for two counts of aggravated rape. On May 28, 1996, while he was in custody for those arrests, South Carolina
issued a parole violation warrant, and a parole violation hold was placed on [Plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] was held in pretrial detention until he was sentenced to twenty-three years' imprisonment in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC), and he was transferred to TDOC on June 1, 1998. On June 8, 1998, South Carolina issued a second parole violation warrant on [Plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] completed his sentence in Tennessee on November 2, 2015. Thus, from the time of his arrest in 1996 until he finished serving his sentence in 2015, [Plaintiff] served approximately nineteen years and five months in Tennessee. Following his release, beginning November 8, 2015, [Plaintiff] was incarcerated in Anderson County, South Carolina. Following an appearance before the Full Board of the South Carolina Board of Pardons and Parole on January 20, 2016, [Plaintiff] was transferred back into the custody of SCDC with a release date of June 22, 2022.
[Plaintiff] timely filed a Step 1 grievance with SCDC, claiming SCDC failed to give him credit towards his remaining CSC sentence for the time he spent on successful parole supervision and for the time he spent incarcerated in Tennessee. [Plaintiff's] Step 1 grievance was denied. [Plaintiff] then filed a Step 2 grievance with SCDC, restating the allegations set forth in his Step 1 grievance and also arguing he should be credited for time served “incarcerated in Tennessee . . . (which includes the time served during the extradition process).” His Step 2 grievance was subsequently denied.
[Plaintiff] then appealed SCDC's denial of his grievances to the [Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) ]. He argued SCDC erred in refusing to give him credit (1) for the time he spent on parole, (2) for the time he spent in pretrial detention and incarcerated for unrelated charges in Tennessee while there were parole violation warrants from South Carolina in place, and (3) for the time he served for the period he was held in Anderson County before returning to the custody of SCDC. By order dated August 24, 2017, the ALC affirmed SCDC's final decision regarding the calculation of [Plaintiff's] sentence.Braxton, 846 S.E.2d 383, 385 (S.C. Ct. App. 2020) (footnotes omitted). In Braxton II, the undersigned further explained as follows:
Addressing [Plaintiff's] claims, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that “the ALC erred in affirming SCDC's refusal to grant him credit for time served while he was successfully on parole prior to his Tennessee arrest” and therefore remanded that “issue to the ALC to recalculate [Plaintiff's] sentences such that he receives credit for the time he served while on parole.” Id. at 386. Regarding [Plaintiff's] arguments that the ALC erred in refusing to give him credit for time served before and after he was sentenced on charges in Tennessee and in refusing to give him credit for the time he was held in Anderson County, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 387-88.
On remand, Administrative Law Judge H. W. Funderburk, Jr. determined that the time [Plaintiff] was on parole prior to his Tennessee arrest was two years and 16 days and therefore ordered that [Plaintiff] be credited with that amount toward his sentence. [Doc. 15-2 at 10-11.] In response to that order, SCDC wrote a letter to Judge Funderburk dated September 1, 2020, notifying him that [Plaintiff] “ha[d] already been given credit for the time he successfully served on parole prior to his Tennessee arrest, ” although SCDC acknowledged that its prior court filings had “caused confusion” regarding this issue. [Doc. 18-2 at 1.] In the letter, SCDC explained in detail how [Plaintiff's] release date had been calculated and informed Judge Funderburk that “once [he had] had an opportunity to review th[e] letter, SCDC w[ould] adjust [Plaintiff's] credits according to any further instruction.” [Id. at 1-2.]
Judge Funderburk responded to the letter in his own letter dated September 9, 2020. [Id. at 3.] In it, he noted that he understood from the letter and attached printouts that SCDC “had this information before the case came to [the ALC] or to the Court of Appeals.” [Id. at 3.] He s[t]ated that he could “only follow the directions given [to him] by the Court of Appeals, ” and thus, he suggested that SCDC “forward [its] explanation to the Court of Appeals and ask for its guidance.” [Id.] SCDC subsequently sent [Plaintiff] a letter dated September 28, 2020, stating its position that “SCDC [wa]s in compliance with” Judge Funderburk's order on remand because [Plaintiff's] March 25, 2021, release date already gave [Plaintiff] credit for the two years and 16 days in question, as well as additional days. [Doc. 15-2 at 1.] On that basis, SCDC noted that it “consider[ed] the matter closed, ” that “no further action will be taken, ” and that [Plaintiff] had “already been
given more parole time than” Judge Funderburk had ordered in his decision on remand. [Id.]Braxton II, 2021 WL 260482, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Jan. 4, 2021) (some alterations in original) (footnote omitted), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 252582 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-6264, 2021 WL 4902109 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 2021).
In the Complaint filed in this case, Plaintiff presents allegations similar to those summarized above. For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he has suffered emotional distress, mental anguish, depression, and anxiety. [Doc. 1 at 23.] He contends he has sought mental health counseling and was prescribed medication for his mental health issues. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks $10 million in actual, punitive, and compensatory damages. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff appears to be a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
This action is subject to dismissal because the parties, the claims, and the operative facts in this action are all duplicative of prior actions filed by Plaintiff in the State court and in this Court. Crowe v. Leeke, 550 F.2d 184, 186 (4th Cir. 1977) (“The principle of res judicata . . . is fully applicable in prisoners' civil rights suits brought under [§] 1983.”). “Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, provides that once a court of competent jurisdiction actually and necessarily determines an issue, that determination remains conclusive in subsequent suits, based on a different cause of action but involving the same parties, or privies, to the previous litigation.” Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486, 491 (4th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff previously litigated his claims in the state court and in this Court. See Braxton, 846 S.E.2d 383; Braxton II, 2021 WL 252582. Those cases were decided on the merits, and Plaintiff lost. Thus, Plaintiff's claims in this action for damages under § 1983 are barred under res judicata. See Boston v. Stobbe, 586 F.Supp.2d 574, 580 (D.S.C. 2008) (explaining res judicata precluded an inmate's § 1983 action based on the court's determination of the same issues in a prior habeas action). Accordingly, having previously lost in his cases filed in both the state court and in this Court, Plaintiff is precluded from taking another bite at the apple in this Court. See Wells v. Powers, No. 2:16-cv-1060-TMC-MGB, 2016 WL 6070088, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 6039163 (D.S.C. Oct. 14, 2016).
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).