As this Court has previously instructed, parties "may not use an appeal of a temporary injunction ruling to get an advance ruling on the merits" and the appeal of a temporary injunction "should not be cause for trial delay." Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); Hiss v. Great N. Amer. Cos., 871 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ). We explained that, often, "the fastest way to cure the hardship of an unfavorable preliminary order is to try the case on the merits."

Additionally, temporary injunction appeals should not be cause for trial delay, and often, “the fastest way to cure the hardship of an unfavorable preliminary order is to try the case on the merits.” Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex.App.Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing Hiss, 871 S.W.2d at 219). Unlike most other permissible interlocutory appeals, an appeal from a temporary injunction does not stay the proceedings in the trial court.

Art Inst. of Chi. v. Integral Hedging, L.P., 129 S.W.3d 564, 570 n.8 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (citing Smith v. Davis, 999 S.W.2d 409, 417 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.)). "An appeal from an interlocutory order granting or refusing a temporary injunction may not be used as a vehicle for carrying other non-appealable interlocutory orders and judgments to the appellate court." Bobbitt v. Cantu, 992 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (quoting City of Arlington v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 540 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); see City of Wilmer v. Northwind Props., Ltd., No. 05-10-00309-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8279, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that "parties 'may not use an appeal of a temporary injunction ruling to get an advance ruling on the merits'" (quoting Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.))). Thus, even if the trial court's summary judgment order "effectively" overruled the Association's motion for temporary injunction, we do not have jurisdiction over the issues that the Association has raised.

We have considered and disapproved of this tactic many times in the past. See e.g. id.; Reeder v. Intercontinental Plastics Mfg. Co. Inc., 581 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1979, no writ); Hiss v. Great N. Am. Cos., Inc. 871 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ); Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Senter Invs., L.L.C. v. Veerjee, 358 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). Such a practice delays the ultimate resolution of the merits of the parties' dispute and wastes judicial resources.

The appeal of a temporary injunction should not be cause for delay. SeeTex.R. Civ. P. 683. In fact, temporary injunctions are expressly excluded from the automatic stay provisions of section 51.014 of the civil practice and remedies code. SeeTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(b) (West Supp.2012); Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). This Court has consistently noted the “fastest way to cure the hardship of an unfavorable preliminary order is to try the case on the merits.”

We also addressed this issue in Hiss, 871 S.W.2d at 219-20, in which one party requested a continuance to allow this Court to render a decision on issues involving the merits of the underlying case and the other party neither agreed nor disagreed with the relief requested. And in another case earlier this year, Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.), we discussed Hiss at length and once again explained our position concerning such tactics. None of the parties' briefs reference Brar, Hiss, or Reeder, or otherwise explain why we should condone the actions of the parties in delaying the trial of the underlying case in an effort to obtain an opinion from this Court in this interlocutory appeal.

(mem. op.); Senter Invs., L.L.C. v. Veerjee, 358 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.); Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); Hiss v. Great N. Am. Cos., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); Reeder v. Intercontinental Plastics Mfg. Co., Inc., 581 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ). This practice not only delays the ultimate resolution of the merits of the parties' dispute but wastes judicial resources.

P. 683. Appeals from temporary injunction proceedings are expressly excluded from the automatic stay provisions of Section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(b) (West Supp. 2018); Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). At the outset of this appeal, we requested that the parties advise us of the trial court's setting of the trial on the merits in this case.

This Court has considered and disapproved of this tactic many times. See DK8, LLC, 2016 WL 6094308, at *2 (citing Reeder v. Intercontinental Plastics Mfg. Co., Inc., 581 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1979, no writ); Hiss v. Great N. Am. Cos., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ); Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Senter Invs., L.L.C. v. Veerjee, 358 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.)). This practice not only delays the ultimate resolution of the merits of the parties' dispute, but wastes judicial resources.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2); Fox v. Maguire, 224 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied); see also Brar v. Sedey, 307 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Furthermore, the trial court's August 7, 2013 "order to withdraw funds" is not an order, much less an appealable order; it is a notice to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice under Government Code section 501.014(e).