Opinion
1:15-CV-0005 (DNH/TWD)
04-17-2015
RODNEY E. BRANTON, Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA COUNTY, NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: RODNEY E. BRANTON, 14-A-4032 Plaintiff pro se Coxsackie Correctional Facility Box 999 Coxsackie, NY 12051
APPEARANCES: RODNEY E. BRANTON, 14-A-4032
Plaintiff pro se
Coxsackie Correctional Facility
Box 999
Coxsackie, NY 12051
OF COUNSEL: THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
The Clerk has sent this pro se complaint together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion to set aside judgment to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 4, and 10.) For the reasons discussed below, I grant Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 4), recommend that the action be dismissed without leave to amend, and recommend that the motion to set aside the judgment (Dkt. No. 10) be denied as moot.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Jonathan D. Nichols, a judge of the Columbia County Court, presided over a felony indictment charging Plaintiff Rodney E. Branton with two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Nichols v. Branton, 995 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). In open court, Plaintiff told Defendant, "Your Honor, just to let you know, I will be liening, putting a lien on it" and later reiterated that he had a "lien against" Defendant. Id.
This Defendant is listed in the caption as Jonathan D. Nicholas.
Plaintiff then filed a UCC Financing Statement identifying himself as a secured party and Defendant Nichols as a debtor. Nichols, 995 N.Y.S.2d at 452. In the Financing Statement, Plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to all of Defendant Nichols' property "claimed at a sum certain of 28 million U.S. dollars." Id.
Defendant Nichols commenced a special proceeding to expunge the financing statement. Nichols, 995 N.Y.S.2d at 452. He was represented by Defendant James B. McGowan of the Attorney General's office. Id. On September 24, 2014, Defendant Richard M. Platkin, a judge of the Columbia County Supreme Court, granted Defendant Nichols' petition and imposed sanctions on Plaintiff. Id. at 452, 456.
Plaintiff was convicted of the felony charges against him and received into the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") on September 16, 2014. Inmate Information, N.Y. DEP'T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/GCA00P00/WIQ1/WINQ000 (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
On January 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed this federal action. (Dkt. No. 1.) The named Defendants-in addition to Defendants Nichols, McGowan, and Platkin-are Columbia County, Assistant D.A. James A. Carlucci, Court Assistant Susan Kusminsky, Acting Judge Richard A. McNally, Jr., Police Officer Jason C. Finn, the New York State Police, Investigator Abdul Weed, Trooper Shannon J. Sullivan, DOCCS, Acting DOCCS Commissioner Anthony J. Annucci, and the New York Attorney General. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.)
The gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint is that he holds a secured interest in Defendants' property. Specifically, Plaintiff states that he:
has perfected a security interest in all of the Debtors Property. Plaintiff has a security interest in the indictment/SC #13-059 and all bonds created from the indictment/SCI 13-057. Once the Plaintiff accepted the Debtor property he became exempt from arrest and the acceptance of the indictment moved the controversy from the court.(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6.)
Plaintiff also explains that:
The Vessel in Commerce known as RODNEY EMANUEL BRANTON© is a trust created by the Government for the sole benefit of the Secured Party; Rodney Emanuel Branton® is a beneficiary directed trust, for which Rodney Emanuel Branton® is the sole beneficiary. RODNEY EMANUEL BRANTON© [w]as created using the same letters as are used to spell the name of the Secured Part i.e., Rodney Emanuel Branton®, the only difference between the spelling of the two being that the name of the Vessel in Commerce is written in all capital letters and the name of the Secured Party is [w]ritten in upper and lower case letters.(Dkt. No. 1-2 at 6, emphases in original.)
Plaintiff's complaint, motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and motion to set aside the judgment of Columbia County Judge McNally are now pending before the Court. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 4, and 10.) II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Plaintiff has applied to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 4.) A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2006). After reviewing Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 4), I find that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Plaintiff should note that although the application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, Plaintiff will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2006) directs that when a person proceeds in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff "show" that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged--but it has not shown--that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
"In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Courts are "obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally." Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When screening a complaint, the court has the duty to show liberality towards pro se litigants. Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam). "[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond." Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff's complaint is a classic example of "redemptionist" or "sovereign citizen" theory. As the Third Circuit has described it, this theory espouses:
that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the "strawman." The "strawman" purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard . . . and, instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman's name or, in the case of prisoners, to keep him in custody.Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008). Redemptionists claim that when "[a] person's name is spelled . . . with initial capital letters and small letters, [it] represents the real person . . . . Whenever a person's name is written in total capitals, however, . . . only the strawman is referenced, and the flesh and blood person is not involved." McLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 201, 210 (D. Conn. 2010) (citations and punctuation omitted). "Theories presented by redemptionist and sovereign citizen adherents have not only been rejected by the courts, but also recognized as frivolous and a waste of court resources." Muhammad v. Smith, No. 3:13-CV-760 (MAD/DEP), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99990, at *6, 2014 WL 3670609, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (collecting cases). Therefore, I recommend that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.
The Court will provide Plaintiff with a copy of this unpublished decision in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Where a pro se complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court generally "should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Id. Here, the problems with Plaintiff's complaint are substantive and better pleading will not cure them. In addition to the claims being patently frivolous, many of the named Defendants are immune from suit. Therefore, I recommend that the Court dismiss the complaint without leave to amend. Because I recommend dismissal without leave to amend, I further recommend that the Court deny the motion to set aside the judgment (Dkt. No. 10) as moot.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that the application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 4) is GRANTED; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that the complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed without leave to amend; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that the motion to set aside judgment (Dkt. No. 10) be DENIED AS MOOT; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of Muhammad v. Smith, No. 3:13-CV-760 (MAD/DEP), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99990, 2014 WL 3670609 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a). Dated: April 17, 2015
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge